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INTRODUCTION 
In the present study, the writer attempts to do three 
things First, he tries to know the peculiar restrictions, if any, 
upon Japan’s freedom of action in the Chma Problem, so as to 
engrave Japan's act10n-radius as against her international social 
environment. Secondly, the present author endeavours to 
discover some consensus about the Chma problem as among 
Japanese people by and large, and consensus withm and among 
the responsible influential groups (relevant social strata〕， in
order to understand the anatomical aspect of Japan’s comp Ii
cated feelmgs toward the China problem. Thirdly, through ana-
lysing the views of the Japanese Government, he will observe 
the basic attitude it assumed toward the China problem m the 
Ikeda Administration, and change of/in such attitude, even in 
nuance, as a result of unexpected situational alterat10n con-
cerning the China problem. The last will be done in the con-
text of Japan’s action radius (Margmal Position〕andconsensus. 
which, respectively, restricts Japan's policy-making, and 
determmes the success or failure of Japan's China Policy. This 
writer does not intend to prove anything; he only wishes te> 
find out something existing and gives them explanations. 
What occupies the cardinal position therefore is not a value 
judgment of whether certain act10n of Japan was or was not 
mternationally legal, but is a description of how the Japanese 
Government strived, as every government would do under 
similar circumstances if other things being equal, to increase 
freedom of act10n of its State, or to minimise the risks invited by 
its action/inaction matters concerning pohtical wisdom in terms 
of Japan's Marginal Posit10n (action-radius) as a result of the 
juridical restrictions peculiar to Japan, when she was confronted 
by a situation or change thereof, in or concerning China. 
499 
Consequently, to get nd of pen!, this writer will make no 
predictions in this study. Nor will he make criticism, seeing 
that it is always easy for persons not responsible to a state 
or a people, to criticise an officially established policy line, but 
that it is too hard for a government to make a policy immune 
from arbitrary criticisms. 
By saymg the above, however, the present writer may 
111 no wise be presumed as havmg by implication or otherwise 
endorsed Japan’s policy lme or the consensus that may be drawn 
from estabhshed facts. Nor, moreover, is he trying to justify 
the attitudes assumed by the Japanese Government through 
which to apologize to the consensus so found out, when a govern, 
ment attitude appears to be not m conformity with such con-
sensus He will state only what m his Judgment are reliable 
facts Only by so domg, it is submitted, can a certain degree 
of objectivity be mamtained. National bias is the most danger-
ous thing in study of a problem of this sort; and it happens 
that the present writer is a Chinese by birth. The ideological 
nature of the China problem is too strong a temptation for him 
to resist, and 、>1henhe evaluates Japan's policy lme in this 
regard he is not so confident that he can remain faithful to 
his stand as a scholar. 
Analogically, in the present study, the use of some terms 
sigmfymg the two existing Chinese political entities without 
making ethical distinction, is to be understood as purely 
matter of convenience and bears no pohtical or moral approval/ 
disapproval. To use the terms“China”and "Taiwan" would be 
siding with the Mainland Regime, and to use“Communist 
China" and “Nationalist China" would hmt for a two-China; 
both impress one as if the China Situation has been settled 
through fait accompli. Logically, the term“China”signifies 
the State of China as a whole. 
The starting pomt of the present thesis is that the China 
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problem 1s for Japan more juridical than it is political. In other 
words, before it 1s a poht1cal question the China problem is for 
Japan a problem of international law. This may empirically be 
just出edby the existence of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945〕
which was an international iurid1cal situation; and by the conse-
quences of the existence of a peace treaty (basis for re-estab 
lishment of peaceful relations destroyed by a war, between the 
states once at war) between Japan and one of the two Chinese 
ent1t1es, and the consequences of the non-existence of one 
between Japan and the other entities in China (and this to 
Japan JS legally not representing “China”〕， bothof which are 
iurid1cal facts in positive and negative senses. 
It stands to reason that Japan’s such relations with the State 
of China are unique, and that hence Japan, once a defeated m the 
war with China, is under some pecuhar restrict10ns before 
the China problem. Although political 1mphcat10ns can not be 
ignored here, 1t remams true that at the pre-dec1s10nal stage 
the Japanese policy-makers no doubt take note of this fact and 
its consequences in the juridical context. 
But here it is equally clear that al troubles come from the 
reality that there exists in China a plural-government pheno-
menon. And this is the source of the China problem in its 
present form. 
From the above it follows that we have different senses。f
the term 
present study, and have the meanmg of the term “Marginal 
Position”. All these are to guide any study of Japan’s con-
sensus, opimons, and government views on the China problem. 
It seems superfluous to inquire mto the ‘senses’of the ‘China 
problem'. As a rule the meaning of the Chma problem 1s 
presupposed as self-evident. But this perchance is the root of 
many pseudo scientific studies on this problem: their conclu-
sions have been pre-determined, through intentionally keeping the 
501 
meamng of the term“Chma problem" ambiguous so as to make it 
ideologically omnipotent. This again 1s an empirical fact We 
prefer to clarify the meamng of the subject-term “China prob-
lem”at the outset, for this is necessary to keep the facts pure 
The China problem is ideologically magical and pohtically 
dynamic. It comes from the “China Situation”パ e, from the dual-
government phenomenon in China (C凶naproblem in a narrow 
sense〕 Itis an embracing concept, i.e., a form representing the 
totality of the concrete issues (contents given birth by a situa-
tion and its changes in and concermng China). It necessitates 
foreign states to take note of, or to consider, with or without 
reactions, or even to contemplate a solution. In other words, 
it is the object, while its content the subject matter, of the 
China policies of all states and of policies of the two existin~ 
Chinese political entities inter se. 
As is true of all problems m world affairs, so is 1t true also 
of the China problem that, when dealing with Chma, states 
differ m stand and attitude, hence in degree of urgency/need 
to handle the China problem This 1s difference in “position”． 
Such differenoe may come from an ad hac result of the power-
position of Ch:na as the pol!cy-target state vis-ii-vis that of a 
pol!cy-making state or, what amつuntsto the same thing, from 
the power-relations between them at a given time in a certam 
concrete situat10n in and concerning China. Accordingly, for 
such pohcy-makmg state the China problem may exist only 
temporarily and may be conditional m nature. This state of 
affairs may be concei ・ej as the 'relative category’ The Chma 
problem here 1s perhaps more properly termed 'a China prob-
lem' 1f the definite sLftH q仰 becut off from the historical 
contmua t10n 
But such difference may instead come, m addit10n to or m-
dependent of the power-relation, from tradit10n and/or pre-
determined conditions of states confronted by China, in terms 
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。fgeo-political, cultural, ethnic, ideological and commercial 
factors and of feelings of these states and their peoples toward 
China (political in the broad sense) Thus the China problem 
at once becomes an unending cham of issues and takes the form 
of many“a Chma problem" in the historical context. This 
conditionロiayproperly be conceived as the ‘absolute categoryヘ
The China problem here cannot be cut into pieces (many “a Chma 
problem”）， nor can 1t be solved in disregard of the pre 
determined conditions of a specific state. This is a matter of 
fate and not question of chance. Posit10n of a state m this 
category evidently differs m quality from positions of other 
states 
Naturally, w1thm both categories, among states there may 
exist quantitative differences, that 1s, differences m degree of 
urgency/need to deal with the China problem Between the 
two categories, furthermore, there are states standmg in the 
middle. They are mall cases the Great Powers on the world 
political stage at a certam historical pomt of time. Bemg Great 
Powers they may belong to each of the two categories, or to both 
simultaneously, accordmg as their positions may appear to 
be. 
For policy-makers of some states belonging to the relative 
category, the Chma problem may be considered m the present 
tense only. Although it is always more desirable for such 
policy-makers to have a vision (vista〕inmaking their foreign 
policies, such vision, indeed, is not absolutely reqmred of them in 
their China policies. 
For policy-makers of states belongmg to the absolute cate-
gory, on the other hand, in order to avoid engaging their states 
with serious risks, they must consider the China problem as 
an historical whole, and deal with it as such m the historical 
current, by referring, of course, to past experiences, to predict-
able changes of the China status伊w,to world environment, 
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and to other factors which by destiny their states should not 
ignore, and especially to their nat10nal consensus or prevailing 
opinions on the China problem and their national feelings 
toward China, w1th changes thereof, if any (in fact, they have 
to discover all such changes and to adapt their pohcy lines to 
same accordingly). This amounts to saying that in this case 
weight 1s put rather on the future. This needs vis10n. Such 
states therefore are in a somewhat passive and, indeed, a far 
more difficult, position. Like the Great Powers of the time, 
even 1£ they are no Great Powers these states are nevertheless 
reqmred high prudence, for the sake of their respective national 
mterests which may unexpectedly be at stake, and in the cause 
of peace in the Far East and of world peace in the last analysis 
(and this is more so 1f such states happen to be Great Powers 
of the time〕， throughmamtaming the international political 
balance 〔pohcybalance during a given penod) at thIS corner of 
the earth In this sense, states belonging to the absolute 
category bear more responsibility; their voices will be more 
determinative than that of other states with equal rank m 
world affairs but belonging to the relative category pure and 
simple. Their changes of policies toward Chma, that is, changes 
of attitude and decisional evaluation about the Chma problem, are 
therefore gradual, sometimes inv1s1ble It goes without saymg 
that comparison of policies of different states on the China 
problem should be made with great care. Analogy is in most 
cases not only useless but dangerous 
Consequently, a China problem, or the present China problem, 
being subject matter of pohcy, takes at least two different 
shapes before vanous groups of foreign states. The first may 
be termed “the status quo”（or the “power-relation'”〕 concept
of the China problem , the second, the “historical”（or the 
“predestined position”） concept of the Chma problem. 
The status quo concept always and mvariably refers to some 
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concrete situat10n: it is bound to have certam fixed content. 
The historical concept rather appears more to connect the 
present with the remote future. But for the present, a problem 
of the future bas no defmite content, it is sub1ect to prediction 
by po!Icy-makers in the abstract with image. This in other 
words tests their political wisdom. In terms of foreign pollcy, 
the historical concept mvolves “vista”， and that is, vis10n 
Two pomts are immediately clear. 
In the first place, since in diplomatic history for many reasons 
time may be considered the best means to solve a difficult 
international problem, the fact that po!Icy-makers of certain 
states, when they conceive the Chma problem in the context of 
historical current, prefer to, and in fact are apt to, have their 
final decisions to take drastic actions conditioned by a vital change, 
may not always be disapproved without strong reasons and 
deep insight. For, such inaction is in fact one form of act10n; 
and the decision -makers may be iustified, and sometimes even 
be considered wise, if after calculation positive action in a 
drastic way appears to be a source of unbearable risks at the 
expense of their primary national interest and/or of world 
peace at large, or if there is actually no solution for the time 
bemg to the satisfaction of majority of states concerned. 
In the second place, ipso facto the solvmg of a status quo 
Chma problem does not in any sense sigmfy that the b1stoncal 
Chma problem is also resol. ed accordmgly; in fact, it only 
declares the birth of another status quo China problem. 
Smce a status quo China problem bas, and should always 
have, some concrete content, change of the status 伊 oof 
necessity produces change m the content of the China problem 
But any status quo, and change thereof, should have some 
cause Such cause may not be smgular m number, nor may 
the number of issues composing the Chma problem. In reality, 
multiple cause and plural-issue rather seem to be the rule. 
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And if the causes and/or the issues are multiple, in most in 
stances they can not be separated. Both the causes and the 
issues here are the organic parts of the whole problem. A 
fortiori, this is true of the historical concept of the China 
problem. In such a case 1t 1s more desirable, and safer, that 
the China problem be solved as an mseparable whole, if it be 
susceptible of bemg solved at al. 
But in some exceptional cases for some reasons a few states, 
which are subiectively not necessitated to deal with the Chma 
problem as matter of urgency (hence in their foreign policies 
the Chma problem may not occupy an important rank), or 
which are objectively not Great Powers nor states with great 
weight (hence they bear no correspondmg responsibility to the 
world), may with no consequential risks confuse one smgle 
issue of the Chma problem with that problem itself, and solve, 
or try to solve, the China problem accordmgly, without 
paying heed to the causes and/or other related issues at al. 
Such states are given more margin for choice, and that is, 
they are given broader margm in their freedom of action For, 
m this case there would be no qualitative alteration in the 
world political balance (China-policy balance /status quo among 
states) as a result of their drastic actions. 
This is not al If the meaning of the term“China problem" 
vanes from state to state, it follows that the content of the 
problem cannot be the same for different states. And this is so 
not only quantitatively but also qualitatively To some states, for 
instance, some of the issues of the China problem may be st> 
important that compromise is beyond question, as it may en-
danger their national survival ; whereas to other states, action 
or inaction as a form of disposal of the same issue or issues 
may not be of relevance to their China policies, and other 
issues may not exist as issues at all. This picture is 
substantially decisive for measuring the desirability and 
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wisdom of a state's policy on the Chma problem. 
In this sense, strictly theoretically speaking there 1s no“China 
problem" in general. Here lie special difficulties for study of 
the China problem as an international quest10n. 
Much more is it a difficult thing to study “Japan’s”Chma 
problem. This is so because: first, facmg the China problem, 
Japan 1s a state belongmg to the absolute category by fate; 
secondly, 1t is a state belonging to the relative category by 
chance due to its power・relation with the State of China m 
the Far East, and thirdly, 1t happens to be a Great Power on 
the current world political stage, hence JS responsible for the 
collapse of the present world balance of policies on the China 
problem as a result of its drastic action. 
The above peculiarities are sufficient to remind Japan of her 
being restricted m freedom of action when confronted by 
the China problem What makes Japan’s position unique, and 
its freedom of action minimized, 1s the historical fact that 
Japan was once a defeated in a war while the State of Chma a 
victor in the same war This calls forth the Juridical question 
of existence/non・ex1stence of a peace treaty between Japan 
and each of the two entities in China. This question takes pre-
cedence over other political considerations, and keeps Japan’s 
reservoir of freedom of action always at the minimum point. 
In other words, Japan meets restrictions everywhere with 
mimmum breadth for choice of alternatives. In this sense, 
Japan’s unique position is named the“marginal position”. This 
necessarily determines a formal attittude/v1ew of the State 
of Japan, and evaluation of Japan’s China policy should take 
this as the compass if one is not to do injustice to the policy-
makers 
Be th盟国 itmay, for the purpose of research, presummg 
that other things being equal, as far as the China problem is 
concerned we can see that there are some juridical restrict10ns 
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common to all states, and that 1s, general restrictions upon 
their freedom of action. To know the particular restnct10ns 
upon Japan, which put Japan in the marginal pos1t1on, one must 
know these general restnct10ns ; and this can be done only 
through analysis of each of the rnsues of the Chma problem m 
their juridical aspect But since these issues, bemg iund1cal in 
nature and the component questions of the same problem, are 
interrelated, the logical order of the content of the China 
problem becomes the pre-requisite here 
The juridical situa t10n in and concerning Chma 1s that there 
exist in a single state two rival governments engaging in con-
tinuous host1hties，、ll'hatever scale they be. This state of 
affairs is the aftermath, 1f not the continuat10n, of the Chinese 
Civil War of the 1940’s (the Cause-Issue); whereas the continu“ 
ing existence of the traditional government, which makes 
possible the plural -government phenomenon, depends on the 
legal status of Taiwan as terntory (another Cause-Issue, in 
fact the nucleus of the China Situation (Problem）〕. In logic, 
the present condition of hostilities m the Taiwan Straits, which 
h出every genesis of the China problem, takes pr田edence
over other issues 
By dint of the two cause issues, there comes the quest10n 
“One China or Two Chinas?" (the Object-Issue). And for the 
solution of this object句issue,there are two ways (means) in 
law: recognition by majority of states through accidental con-
cert of their individual acts, or recognition by these states in 
an international organisation (UN). This brings forth the 
questions of Recognit10n and the UN Chmese Representation 
(the two Means-Issues〕. The logical order for approach in a 
discussion of the China problem is thus clear. 
Parts One and Two (Chapters 1 to 4) will deal with the issues 
of the China problem m the above logical order They are aimed 
at knowing the general juridical restrictions upon freedom 
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of action of states in the China Situation. 
Part Three (Chapter 5) will give a picture of Japan’s mar-
ginal position (particular freedom of action〕throughanalysis 
of the restrictions peculiar to Japan in the Chma Situation 
(the Restrictive-Issues of Peace Treaty and War-Indemnity〕，
and through comparison with states’freedom of action in 
general in the same situation as demonstrated m Parts One 
and Two 
Parts Four and Five will center on Japan’s“attitude”during 
the Ikeda Administration ( 1960-1964〕. But while Part Four 
(Chapters 6 and 7) is about Japan’s national consensus (public 
opinion, etc.〕orbasic !me, Part Five (Chapters 8 and 9), about 
consensus (attitude/opinion) of the responsible groups, i.e., of the 
political parties amt of the most vital pressure groups behind 
government attitude or policy-making, and about government 
views/attitudes for comparison with these consensus and with 
national consensus. All these will be done in the co明textof Japan’s 
marginal position as demonstγ・ated in Part Thγee (Chapter 5); 
so as to understand h。、vbefore the China Situation the Japan-
ese Government, like other governments as a rule will do when 
confronted by serious international problems, strived between 
the exercise of maximum freedom of action, on the one hand, 
and pressures from certain group opinions and criticisms claimed 
to have represented national consensus/public opinion, on the 
other hand. 
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PART ONE 
THE CHINA PROBLEM-LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS 
OF THE SITUATION 
This Part is aimed at knowing the freedom of action of states 
confronted with the China Situation, through juristic reasoning, 
so as to mark Japan's marginal position in the Chma problem 
(m the broad sense, meaning the problem including al vital 
legal issues〕ーThespeciality of the China situation, therefore, is 
the point of departure. 
The Chma situation, and that 1s the“Chma problem" in the 
proper (narrow) sense of the term, consists of two closely 
related issues. The one is the nature of the dual-governmenf 
status quo in the Taiwan Straits (and this, needless to say, has 
much to do with the legal status of the two Chinese parties 
engaged in this s1tuat10n); the other is the legal status of 
Taiwan as territory, which makes possible the dual'governinent 
phenomenon. The former is the “Situat10n”itself, the latter, the 
necessary condition for continuation of lhis situat10n They are・ 
the cause-issues of the・ Chma problem (in the broad sense). 
CHAPTER 1 STATUS QUO IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS 
Lying between mainland and the island of Taiwan, the Taiwan 
Straits has long been considered one of the most・ dangerons 
explosive magnetic field m the Far East, and even a source of 
another world war What is significant m this status quo which 
has been maintained for 17 years without remarkable alterat10n, 
is the fact that there exist two, instead of one, Chinese political 
entities, both usmg force to express their exclusive ・claims tO" 
legitimacy. What, however, is not clear, is the nature of this 
state of affairs-if it is not a peaceful situation (and in al 
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respects it is not), may it be considered a state of civil strife＇》
iuridically relevant 〔hencehavmg important bearmg on the status 
of the two parties〕？
It is widely believed that the Chinese Civil Strife of the 1940's 
was ended. But the two parties maintain that as between them・ 
selves up to・ the present there has been an armed struggle for 
final victory, that is, for extinction of the rival. There is uo 
doubt that the present situation in the Taiwan Straits has deep 
root in the Chinese Civil Strife of the 1940’s, nor is there 
denial that the former bears much similarity to the latter. 
However, the fact remains true that we have an endless dispute 
of whether the civil strife which was started sometime m 1946 
has come to a立 endobjectively. And this is the prerequisite for 
interpretmg the present situat10n in the Taiwan Straits 
Here we have to inquire into the commencement, the continu・ 
at10n (existence〕andthe termination of a civil strife (or civil 
war〕.In addition, we have also the question of ani刑usbellige・
問ndi(the intention to be in a state of war〕ofthe parties. 
Discussion of these necessitates some knowledge of the history 
of the past(?) civil strife and its relat10n with the present 
status quo, on theoretical plane it requires a clarification of 
the concept of war. 
I. Brief History of the Domestic Armed Struggle in China 
From as early as the 1930’s, there have been many armed con・ 
fhcts, local in nature, between the Nationalist Government and 
the Chinese Communists. During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-
1945〕， althoughpolitically (and to some extent militarily〕the
latter submitted themselves to the formal command of the Na-
tionalist Government, armed conflicts were nonetheless frequent, 
in spite of the immediate menace from their common 田町iy-
Japan 
Immediately after World War I, from October 10, 1945 on・ 
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wards, through efforts of USA there were held a series of peace 
conferences between the two parties, and some armistice agree-
ments were made one after another. From July 12, 1946, 
however, full-scale armed contest broke out and a natrnn-wide 
civil strife began. It had never been formally recognised by 
foreign states as a war de ;u陀（perhaps chiefly due to the 
fact that there had been no naval warfare nor e旺ectiveblock-
ade), though armed forces cast mto this strife were three 
million men on the part of the Nationalist Government, and one 
million on the part of the Chinese Communists 
After three decisive battles fought between main forces of 
the parties, the Government Side suffered a total defeat. On 
April 23, 1949, the Communist Side occupied Nanking, the gov-
ernment capital; and the government retreated thenceforth, from 
Shanghai to Hangchow, next to Canton, next a’gam Chungking 
and then to Cherトtu,with its enemy army runnmg after it. At 
last, the Government Side evacuated the mainland and moved 
to Taiwan. It declared Taipei the temporary capital of the 
Republic of China (ROC〕onDecember 7, 1949, and re-established 
itself in that island both politically and militarily. On the 
other hand, the Communist Side established the People’s Repub-
lic of China 〔PRC〕onmainland on September 21, 1949 (for-
mally proclaimed on October 1 the same year〕
From that time the two parties east and west of the Taiwan 
Straits, each recongised by a group of foreign states as 
the legitimate government of the Chmese State, have mam-
tained this situatrnn with armed struggle. Long period of time 
passed by. Due to the sporadical nature of armed engagements, 
this status quo of armed confrontation between the Island 〔Tai-
wan〕andthe Mainland (Communist regime〕seemsto have con -
cretized itself day after day, up to the point of losmg the hostile 
appearance and, in the eyes of ordinary observers, it looks like 
a state of peaceful co-existence and hence, curiously enongh, 
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armed engagements are alleged to be something abnormal, that 
is, except10nal. 
Armed forces used m actual struggle are about 1日 thousand
men on the part of the Island and 300 thousand, of the Mamland, 
with strengths of about half a million men and 2 million men 
respectively at the back. There were in this period several 
considerably furious battles at sea and m the air, with at least 
once or twice (September 1954 and after〕ofland warfare of 
considerable scale when the Mainland attempted to land an army 
on the Kinmen Island but failed. Armed engagements of smaller 
scale continued up to 1955. Sometime in the latter part of 
August 1958, there came a showdown between the two sides, 
and it led many to predict another world war, because the 
parties are in close alliance with USA and with USSR Since 
then they have adopted quasi－、.var-timesystem within their 
respective controllmg areas. For a period after August 23, 
1958, furthermore, the Mamland shelled the Isle of Kmmen 
on an unprecedented scale The Island shelled in return. However, 
from September 5 of the same year, they stopped the cannon 
fight. 
~On Octoder 23, 1958, in the Chiang-Dulles (ROC-USA) Joint 
Communiqu邑，ROCexpressed its intention to counter-attack mam-
land chiefly by political means, in contradistinct10n to counter-
attack by military means adopted theretofore (with the reser-
vation of an except10n, often overlooked, of a“Hungarian type of 
rebellious situation”）， m exchange for US re-assurance of support 
to legitimacy 〔“authenticspokesman" for the Chinese people, 
in the wording of the Joint Communiquめ. Shortly after this 
event, the Mainland started a strange“even-day shelling" agamst 
Kinmen, avowedly leaving the odd days for the Island to supply 
the Kinmen and Matsu which are bases for counter-attack 
against mainland. Such situation, as a condition of domestic' 
hostilities, is without precedent in history; but it has continued 
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to exist up to the present day, with sporadic armed contacts 
remmdmg one of its existence 
II. Structure of War. 
The situat10n is really not easy to understand. The point at 
issue is: Whether a state of hostilities with only seemingly 
accidental occurrences of armed conflict is or is not juridically 
relevant目 Thisis matter of structure of the phenomenon “war". 
As early as the ancient Roman period, Cicero conceived war 
as“a contest by force (certatioρer vim)". Gentili developed 
this concept10n, by defining war as“a just and public contest 
-0f arms”， and stressed that“war lS nothing if not a‘contest’”－ 
War was here an objective phenomenon of actual fighting bet-
ween two parties, and ‘paper war', that is, a war declared but 
followed by no actual armed contest, was excluded from the 
eoncept “war”. " 
At a later period, to meet with the curious reality of the 
fight-and-rest Thirty-Year War, Grotius interpreted Cicero’s 
conception of war m the light of custom and practice of states 
of his time, departed from Gentili's“contest theory" and found司
・ed the state-of-war theory (or status theory of war) War 
to Grotius "is a (juridical）‘status’of contesting by force" 
(Bellum sit status Per vi問団rtantium〕. It was conceived more 
as state of affairs than as action 〔contest).It was a juridical 
fact, an abstract10n of continuous umt of time, wherein peoples 
earried on a series of contest by force "A‘paper war' declared 
by a single state was made possible and Jundically relevant. 
The structural difference between these two theories of war 
-0ngmally lay only m the pomt of emphasis. the contest theory, 
puttmg stress on observable bilateral acts, did not at al exclude 
the subjective unilateral intent10n （回附叫:tsbelligerendz) which 
would make a state of war independent of actual armed contest, 
whereas the status theory, though it put the focus on the 
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animus belligerendi the declaring of which would be universally 
vahd and would leave no room for choice by third states as to 
the existence or non-existence of a state of war (hence auto-
ma tic operation of laws of war and neutrality〕， alsotook armed 
contest for granted. Thus both theories considered as elements 
the wills of the parties to war and the acts of war. In later 
periods, however, through iuristic mterpretat10ns the two theo-
ries were made as if they had been antithetic; and from the 
begmmng of this century, when paper war became frequent, 
once more juristic interpretations functioned, and this time with 
the result that the two theories were mixed into one, with 
equal weights being put on both elements. This theoretical 
condition has remained the same up to the present day. 
War is therefore a status (state of aff回目〕； itis also a contest 
(act of armed struggle). There is a war, when there is certain 
scale of armed contest, or when armed contests continue for so 
long a time that they become a single conceptual unit-a state 
of affairs (fight and rest〕．
Furthermore, a war (internat10nal), as a rule, begms when 
one of the parties so declares, and exists universally as a spe-
cific juridical state of affairs disregarding whether third states 
so recognize. Moreover, in our time when debellatio, genocide, 
and slavery have been prohibited by law, war, if one be waged, 
has an aim more or less hmited: this aim is to impose, not 
boundlessly, the will of the victor on the defeated for the purpose 
of making peace. This means that the defeated is to be 
spared; and m fact its survival is necessary, because realization 
of the war-aim needs the defeated to come to terms with 
the victor about the conditions for recovery of peaceり Coexistence
is always presupposed here. And, agam, war, m principle, 
is ended by a formal treaty of peace. 
This is the case of a war in general (an mternat10nal war〕.It 
applies to the case of armed struggle within a state (m ordi-
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nary language, a civil war），日 thoughwith some mod1flcat10ns. 
But what is a civil war? 
ill. Characteristics of a Civil War 
A civil war〔strife).is always undeclared, and is begun by 
armed contest. It does not exist as a war de jure unless rec-
ogmzed as such by foreign states. Moreover, it is a struggle 
for the all-or-nothing aim of exclusive legitimacy, or of estab-
lishment of a new state, for the "legitimate government at least, 
therefore, coexistence in future 1s beyond question, and uncondi-
tional surrend~r the rule. And, unlike an internat10nal war; 
it may be ended by factual. terminat10n of hostilities, by the 
appearance of a unified government, or, m some cases, by・ a 
treaty granting independence." 
〔1) Beginning of a civil war A civil war is always fought 
between the sovereign and the rebels. In classic terms, it is ・a 
private war, and legitimacy 1s the most vital point The rebels, 
not bemg a sovereign entity, have no nght to declare a war; 
for the sovereign〔legitimategovernment〕， onthe other hand, 
1t is impractical, if not absurd, to declare one at the begin' 
ningηIn the last analysis, a declaration of war is valid (for 
givmg nse to a state of war, hence to obligat10ns of neutrality 
of third states independently of recognition by third states) 
only as between sovereigns. Tbus the situat10n of ‘paper civil 
war' or‘nommal (civil〕war(Scheinkrieg〕’ abtηitio is never 
possible. The subiective animus belligerendi loses its . omni-
potence here, hence a civil war is always, and without except10n, 
begun by armed contest. The contest theory applies. A civil 
war, in other words, starts with observable phenomenon of armed 
contention (war de facto). To become a war de ju四， thatis, a 
quasi-internat10nal war, 1t needs recogmtionfrom foreign states. 
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(2) Existence of a civil war Thus, 1t is a foreign state, and 
not the home state or its legitimate government, that declares 
the existence of a c1v1! war de 1ure, m which case the status 
theory applies. But, whether recogmzed or not, a civil strife 
(armed contest〕remamsa civil war de facto. Recognition of 
belligerency (express or tacit〕isas yet matter of policy (expedi-
ency〕， andis valid only for the parties at war and the foreign 
state grantmg recognit10n. Such recognition, in other words, 
has no universal validity. A contrario (and, as a matter of 
fact, accordingly〕， demal of the existence of a civil war 
by foreign states has nothing to do with the de facto existence 
of the civil strife for the parties.'' In this sense the animus 
bel/igerendi is effective negatively. 
(3) The aim of a civil war For one party at least, a civil 
war is one for complete conquest, and that is, for the extinc-
tion of the enemy government (or group〕m the form of un -
conditional surrender.'' But a civil war may be one aimed at 
snatchmg the powers of the established government, or at 
separating from, hence independent of, the state represented 
by the legitimate government. The former may be termed 
revolut10n; the latter, rebellion (war of secession or of mdepend-
ence〕
In case of rebellion, extmct10n of the legitiロiategovernロient
is not necessary for the realization of the war-aim of the 
rebels. But since civil wars are not, and never can be, prohi-
bited by any law, aims m civil wars may be changed by the 
parties at will-from revolution to rebellion, or vice versa. Here 
comes the kernel of the qu田 tion. 
It may not be uncommon that a situation appears to be such, 
that extinction of the nval party ma war of revolution happens 
to be difficult, if not impossible, due to exhaustion, or to inter-
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vention by foreign powers in concert or otherwise. Here change 
of war-aim becomes possible or expedient, and even necessary 
in some cases. It is not likely in our time that a rebelhon, due 
to change of war-aim on the part of the rebels, takes the form 
of revolution, even if their victory be so swiftly won that final 
success is predictable But it is reasonable that the contrary 
case is more likely to occur. 
However, insofar as the parties msist on their original aim to 
revolt 〔orto put. down the revolut10n〕orthe aim to rebel 
(or to suppress the rebellion〕， withcertain scale of armed con-
test stil going on, there would be no ground for third parties 
to say with effect that the civil war has come to an end This 
is so, especially when the conditions laid down by internat10nal 
law are fulfilled: (a) the insurgent entity is in effective control 
of an important part of nat10nal territory, (b〕theinsurgents 
are able to conduct the war according to rules of warfare, and 
(c) they are organized under a responsible authority."' Such 
conditions apply a fortiori to the case where the established 
government bears the external appearance of“rebelsヘforwhich 
no proper term may be used; for, the general rule is that 
presumption of legitimacy m a civil war is in favour of the 
estabhshed governロ1ent.
(4〕 Theend of a civil war The common factor for the endmgs 
of civil wars is extinct10n of one of the parties at war (loss of 
part of sovereignty over the newly independent state is con-
sidered one form of extinction〕.Survival of one, and only one, 
party is the conditio st加 quanon for realization of the aim of 
a revolution and, in prmciple, for recognition of new govern-
ment in particular. That is to say, provided that the parties 
do not change their war aims, and so long as armed contention 
goes on and fulfills the conditions laid down by international 
law, foreign states are of right not to recognize the termina-
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tlon of the civil war or a final victory."' In a c1v1l war, factual 
cessation of armed struggle is conclusive evidence for its termi-
nation 
In a revolution, therefore, 1f there is no compro田1sebetween 
the parties nor change of war-aim thereof, especially if both 
parties are recogmzed by two groups of states as de jure 
governments, the situation is umque, and is perhaps what 
Hershey once named “potential belligerency" "' In this event, 
it would be free for foreign states to determme for them-
selves, m the context of their recognition policy, as to whether 
or not the civil war has come to an end. Of course, it must 
be remmded that such determination is coupled by risks. 
It 1s therefore safe, and reasonable, to assu在iethat, smce a 
civil war exists with armed contentions which are observable 
facts, its end would also be proved by the disappearance of 
armed contentions. A contrario, continuation of armed contests 
in a civil strife, iPso facto, shows that a civil war has not come 
to an end. And what may be considered conclusive is the case 
where a state of hostilities continues for considerably long 
period. Chance of victory for either party at war is not count・ 
ed, and in fact this can not be presumed or guessed. For, 
this is exactly the point to be determined by arms.同
What then amounts to an“armed contest (contention〕” the
accumulation of which may be considered a state of hostilities 
which, in turn, may prove the existence of a civil war? This 
1s the decisive point. It, m terms of recognition of new govern・ 
ment or new state, would impute international responsibilities 
of. premature recogmtion to foreign states 
But question such as this involves extent and scale, and dura・ 
tion, of armed struggle, and can be answered only on a case・ 
by-case basis."' It is a matter of fact, the e四 luatrnnof which 
should take into consideration many factors, such as impact of 
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the armed struggle on world situation at large and on neigh-
bouring states iri particular, probability of development of the 
situation (but, to repeat, not probability of victory of one 
of the parties at war〕， andhistorical background of the strug 
gle, etc The state that admits (recognizes) or refuses to 
admit the existence of such a fact bears risks for its own 
judgement In any case, one point is clear: recogmtion of the 
rebels or revolutionists as government de jure, accompanied by 
withdrawal of recognition of the established government, does 
not end the civil war so long as armed contest continues, and 
that is, so long as the established government continues to exist. 
IV. The Chinese Ci吋IStrife 
The above statement shed light upon an understandmg of 
the nature of the status quo m the Taiwan Straits. 
It is of course not impossible to share with the common sense 
opinion that the Chinese Civil War of the 1940's came to an end 
when the Mainland Regime proclaimed itself the Central Gov-
ernment of the PRC. But with this the status quo between the 
two sides cannot be explained, except when it is considered a 
new civil strife, which would make the situation more comph-
cated, and is not m lme with historical facts of the Chinese 
Civil War originated in the 1930’s the present armed struggle in 
the Taiwan Straits is bemg fought between the same parties of 
the allegedly ended civil war of the 1940’s, with the war-aim 
exactly the same as that of the armed struggle in that period. 
As a matter of fact, the relation between the ROC and the 
Mainland Regime is not one of peace. This makes it difficult for 
one to maintam that the State of Chma as a whole is m a 
condition of order and tranqmhty, whether Taiwan be consider-
ed Chinese or non-Chinese territory and even the ROC be 
deemed a State-in-exile. This is more so, if one takes mto 
account the fact that as between the two rival parties there 
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are nothmg less than uncompromismg antagomst attitudes 
which, m foreseeable future, will never disappear, and that 
there have been repeated, if mterm1ttent, armed contests con・ 
s1derably large m scale expressive of such antagonist attitudes. 
Thus, on the principle that any explanation of a social phe・ 
nomenon is required to make that phenomenon better under・ 
stood, and not to make it more confused, one may have no other 
chmce if the status q即 inthe Taiwan Straits can be better 
explained by something in lme with legal norms 
(A〕 Therewill be no doubt that there was in China once 
a civil war de facto if not de jure in the latter part of the 
1940’s. Many a states recognized the Mainland Regime after the 
establishment of the PRC, and 
c1v1l peut iusti五erla . reconnaissance”. "' And, once there is a 
civil war, there must be an end to 1t. When a state of things 
appears, and continues for a quite long period of time, whether 
one likes it or not the presu立1pt10nis in favour of its contm・ 
uation and not of its discontinuance. Facts m the Taiwan 
Straits do not supply us with valid proofs that there is no 
more civil stnfe there is no factual cessation of armed con・ 
test, not to say formal cessation. On the contrary, the state of 
hostilities has contmued for many years and is likely to exist 
for another many ・years. Even if this・ is less than a civil war, 
it is of course something more than a gunfight between two 
bandit groups in Chma. Whether a state of war 1s or is not 
recogmzed by foreign states has no bearings 、＂hatsoever on 
the existence of that civil strife. 
(B) Armed forces回 stm the struggle is million in number. 
Although contests appear to be smaller m scale than those 
occurred m the 1940’s, their impact on world situation is so 
seriously pcrilous, that there is constant probability of its bemg 
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developed into a major war, if not a world war, engaging many 
Great Powers. It is perhaps helpful to emphasize here, that 
probability of armed contest m a state of hostilities alone, is 
sufficient to prove the continuat10n of a civil strife And the 
s1tuat10n in the Taiwan Straits is more than probability: armed 
contests have been, and will be, actual. 
The only reasonable doubt on the nature of this situation as 
a civil strife is perhaps this: at present, the form and scale of 
actual armed struggle are strange, because there is no land 
warfare. But land warfare is not at al a condition for the 
existence of a war, less is it one for a civil stnfe.'" Accord-
ingly, it is more realistic to conceive that the Chinese Civil 
Strife, havmg continued for so many years, is now at its penod 
of stalemale, behind which preparat10ns, at least potential dan-
ger of same, of full-scale attack, for better or worse and by 
either or both parties, are under way;"' and that for many・ 
years al states concerned have been doing their best to prevent 
such full-scale armed contest. 
(C) From viewpoint of war aim, a similar line comes into view. 
For the Nationalist Government, maintenance of legitimacy, as. 
a subjective aim,-has never undergone change. As between suc-
cess or failure of its counter-attack and its very existence 
there is in fact no equat10n for assumptii>n It is recognized. 
by many states as the legitimate government of the ・State of 
China, and its existence is the deadly weakness of the ・Mamlan証
Regime問. But the fact that it has so far not been able to ptit 
down the revolution is nonetheless true. 
On the part of the Mainland Regime, on the other hand, it 
・has not changed its aim of snatching the sovereignty of whole・ 
China. However strong it be, the very existence of the Nation-
ahst Government with nearly half a million men armed, 
proves that it too has not realized its aim. 
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In this way, subjectively, in terms of the 回幼叫日 belligeγ・endi
(note that both parties are recognized by many states, hence 
are both competent to exercise the jus beli〕， like1t or not the 
present situation seems to be a continuance of the civil war of 
the 194日、.If 1t is not a civil war de jure, it 1s of course no 
less than one de facto. It is therefore impossible for one to 
name it a“paper civil war.” 
Needless to say, if both parties, or either of them, give up 
their original aim for legitimacy, and change it into one for 
separation, and if both sides be recognized as independent 
states, then we have a typical picture of two Chinas. But 
this within foreseeable future is likely to remain in the realm 
of hope and theory. There is no other way to follow in legal 
interpretation of this statusψa, nor 1s there other m四回 to 
mitigate, if not to prevent, cruelty of the will-be large-scale 
armed con丑ict,except the one analogical to Grotius' state-of-
war theory, until the day comes when the end of this civil 
strife becomes real.叫 Onemay not strain logic and assert the 
absurd or the unknown agamst objective reality, for the sake 
of ideology and/or preference. 
The assertion that the Chinese Civil War came to an end in 
1949 is understandable. This comes from either of the following 
reasons. 
First is the confusion of formal establishment of the Main-
land Regime with factual cessation of armed cont母t,due to 
ideological sympathy toward revolution or to misunderstanding 
of facts. The second is the prediction that the Nationalist 
Government, being defeated on mainland and retreated to 
Taiwan, could not have been maintamed for long, and such 
prediction was hased on an erroneous view ahout Chinese history, 
or on mrnjudgment coming from short-sightedness '"' Underly-
ing both is the common feature that Taiwan 1S not, or at least 
not yet, Chmese territory and that, consequently, the Nation-
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a!ist Government, being a government-in-exile 〔perhapsfor 
them the term state-m-exile will be more appropriate〕， could
no more五ghtdown, not even fight with, its nval on the main-
land The latter part of the statement is a predict10n which, 
though it may be good subject for arguments, has nothing to do 
with the existence or non-existence of the civil war de facto. 
The former part is a substantial judgement which raises many 
questions, theoretical as well as practical ones. This will be 
discussed m the next Chapter. 
The above is a legal interpretation of the Situat10n. ・There is 
in the Taiwan Straits a civil war. In law, accordingly, freedom 
of act10n of foreign states in this situation is qmte clear. 
Though as objective fact there is in existence of a state of civil 
strife in the Taiwan Straits, foreign states are free to or not 
to admit, or recognize, the factual existence of such a civil 
stnfe so as to make it relevant or irrelevant to international 
law. Their freedom of action is perhaps maximal here"' Such 
recogmt10n is matter more of policy than of law. Their judg-
ments, naturally, are made at their own risks But whether or 
not recognized as a war, the state of civil strife in the Taiwan 
Straits remains as it is. The Spanish Civil War, the Chmese 
Civil War, and many others, though they are far more furious 
than many mternational wars, were not, or have not been, 
recognised as civil wars de jure. However, they do not for 
this reason alone lose their nature of civil wars. And, being a 
civil war, the status quo in the Taiwan Straits, as al authorities 
have agreed, is not subiect to prohibition by mternational 
Jaw. Thus the signi五canceof legal interpretation of the Situation 
lies not m the freedom of action of states, but rather in the 
independent and actual existence of the state of civil strife in 
the Taiwan Straits. 
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CHAPTER 2 TERRITORIAL STATUS OF TAIWAN 
The present issue must be kept distmct from the question of 
status of the two rival parties m Chma, on the one hand, and 
from the state of civil strife m the Taiwan Straits, on the 
other What concerns us here IS the question‘of title to, and 
sovereignty over, a territory, which is matter of mternatwnal 
law proper."' 
I. Backgroi店id
Since 1683, Taiwan had been territory of the Chinese Empire. 
By Article 2 of the Shiinonoseki Peace Treaty of 1895, it was 
ceded to Japan. During World War I, on December 1, 19必，
the Cairo Declaratwn was made among the Principal Allies, in 
which Taiwan, referred to as Chinese territory stolen by Japan, 
was declared the territory which “shall be restored to the 
Republic of China”. The Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945 
con丑rmedthis pomt. On September 2, 1945, Japan signed the 
Instrument of Surrender, through which Japan “accepts the 
conditions put forth by the Allied Powers as co・victors" {Ar-
ticle 1〕， and“〔shall)carry out世田 proV1s10nsof the Potsdam 
Proclamatwn”（Article 6) In this way Japan, m e宜ect,prom・ 
ised to carry out the provisions of the Cairo Declarat10n On 
the same day, General MacArthur, actmg as the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers m the Far East, issued the Direc・ 
tive No. 1, requiring, among other things, that Japanese armed 
forces on Taiwan surrendered to the Republic of Chma. The 
Japanese Government transformed this mto its General Order 
No. 1 on the same day, ordering its armed forces ori Taiwan 
to do accordingly. 
On September 20 of the same year, the Government of the Repub-
lic of China rnsued a law proclaimmg Taiwan a Chmese province. 
On October 25, 1t received surrender of Japanese armed forces 
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on Taiwan, thus physically took over this island. On June 22, 
1946, the Chinese Government promulgated a law, making the 
inhabitants on this island Chinese nationals. No objection was 
raised from any of the co-victors. 
On December 4, 1949, the Nationalist Government evacuated 
the mainland and re-established itself on this island, and smce 
then it has been rulmg stably. 
On January 5, 1950, USA confirmed that Taiwan had been 
returned to China, without awaiting a formal cession"' This 
recon自rmed止heview theretofore held by USA. About 6 months 
later, however, due to the breakmg out of the Korean War, 
USA changed its attitude. Simultaneous with neutralizat10n of 
the Taiwan Straits, President Truman declared that Taiwan’s 
future status would have to wait for recovery of security m 
the Pacific area, to be settled by a p田 cetr田 tywith Japan 
〔formalcession), or to be determmed by the United Nations."' 
The San Francisca Peace Treaty with Japan (1951〕， however,
did not settle this question; nor did the Peace Treaty (1952) 
between the Republic of China and Japan. Their stipulations 
go no further than Japan’s renunciation of sovereignty over 
Taiwan, and no complete formal cess10n was made from Japan 
to any single state. On January 10, 1952, on the San Francisc。
Peace Treaty, J. F Dulles, then advisor to US Secretary of 
State, made an official statement for records of the Senate, t<> 
the effect, inter alt a, that Taiwan’s status was yet undetermin-
ed, pending international determination m future."' Since then, 
US has maintained this negative view. 
In the case of the United Kingdom (UK〕thecondition is 
similar. Before 1950 when it recognized the Mainland Regime, 
UK had not objected to the claim that Taiwan had become 
Chinese territory. Thus it seemed to have adopted a positio立
of acquiescence. As a matter of fact，“in September 1949, the 
British Government had made it clear that 'it believed that 
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stra teg1c island of Formosa should remam Chinese even if the 
Commu凶sttook over the control there’J’zのInthe Korean War, 
UK, like USA, changed her view from the a伍rmati ve to the 
negative as agamst Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan"' And 
this negative view has been maintained up to the present 
Agamst this view, quite naturally both Chinese entities have 
been consistently asserting China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. 
Their reasonings are not identical, and there is no agreement on 
the quest10n as to when this island was restored to China. 
USSR and India endorse this affirmative view m favour of the 
Mainland Regime.問
I. The Antagonistic Interpretations 
The crux of the issue, as seen from arguments given by both 
views, is whether a complete formal cess10n of Taiwan by 
Japan to China is necessary. Thrn is determined in the first 
instance by the legal nature of the wartime arrangements, i e., 
the Cairo Declaration, etc. USA and UK assert such necessity, 
with the reason that the wartime arrangements are not legally 
bmding treaties.問 TheChinese entities, on the contrary, claim 
that no formal cession is required, because, among other 
things, the wartime arrangements have de五nitelegal effect of 
transferrmg to Chma the sovereignty over Taiwan.叫
On theoretical plane, specialists split among themselves into 
two main groups, each developing new concepts and mterpreta-
tions for this apparently tradit10nal but novel issue to Justify 
the antagorustic views held by two groups of states and by the 
Chmese entities referred to m the above. 
(1〕 TheNegative View 
Representing those who support the Anglo-American thesis is 
Schwarzenberger, who suggested the theory of 'condominium’． 
Schwarzenberger's theory may be summed up as follows: (a) 
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On October 15 (sic, October 25？〕 1945,in compliance with an 
<>rder ISsued on the basis of consultat10n and agreement between 
Alhed Powers concerned, Japanese forces in Taiwan surrendered 
to Chma; (b〕withthe consent of the Supreme Commander m 
the Far East, China undertook the administration of Taiwan; 
〔c〕henceChina exercises only delegated authority m Taiwan, 
on behalf of those parties to the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
who recognise the Nationalist Government, (d) since there had 
been no formal cess10n of Taiwan from Japan to China, and 
smce m the San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan renounced her 
title to Taiwan, this territory ceased to be Japanese, and the 
-0ther parties to this treaty became co-sovereigns of Taiwan-
condomznzun. "' 
On the wartime arrangements, Schwarzenberger puts forth 
1ns arguments in the same Letter (a〕TheCairo Declarat10n 
was a jomt communiqu邑orstatement, and its contents, some 
understandings, were“at the most-legal commitments . regard-
ing their mtention to restore…Formosa to China”， and such 
intention was confirmed in the Potsdam Declaration; (b) so far 
as Japan was concerned, these understandings became legally 
bmding, due to her acceptance of the Potsdam Declarat10n, and 
(c) whether these legal commitments were to・ be honoured, and 
which China was to have relation, were separate issues. 
This mterpretat10n is in lme with the UK official view. But 
it 1s arbitrary as well as illogical. Among other things 
Schwarzenberger presumed the necessity of a formal cession, 
while formal cess10n, accordmg to internat10nal law, though an 
a伍rmatively su伍cientcondition, 1s not a negatively necessary 
<:ondition, for transfer of title to territory.'" Moreover, 
he confused surrender of the Japanese forces m Taiwan with 
other possible legal sources of China's nghts to this territory.＂》
Agam, when he said that the wartime arrangements were 
no sources of rights (not bindmg among the Allied Powers 
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making them) but were nevertheless sources of obligationgo 
〔sofar concernmg Japan), he was self-contradictory even if his. 
“legal commitments”be understood as Pacta de contrahendo.叫
This 1s not alL Schwarzenberger was silent about the reason 
why the wartime arrangements were not legally binding, and 
this is the very basis of his suggestion of“condomimum”. He・ 
only so presumed More fundamentally, his confusion of a 
state with its government"' deprives his theory of condo問in-
ium of al validity In short, Schwarzenberger’s suggest10n 
of“rule by delegat10n”is a fiction, and not wise fiction町
Be that as 1t may, similar line of mterpretation, with various 
reasonings, was made also in the USA. Representing this group 
are Qumcy Wright from viewpoint of international law and 
Walter Lippmann from that of mternational politics. 
Wright’s interpretation was based on the maxim lex Paste向or
deγogat Priori. The result is that “the obligations undertaken 
by Great Britain and the USA in the Cairo Declaration of 1943” 
would have to give way to the UN Charter＇ηunder w h1ch the 
principle of self-determination of peoples apphes, and that 
therefore Taiwan 1s under condominium. On the other hand,. 
Lippmann suggested the idea of“custody川町.They both started' 
from the two-China proposition'" and, !Ike Schwarzenberger,. 
presumed necessity of a complete formal cess10n and political/ 
policy nature of the wartime arrangements 
(2) The Affirmative View 
This is the majority optmon. However, the reasonings are 
diversi五ed.
Wang Si-kie, famous jurist and once Foreign Minister of the・ 
ROC, wrote early m 1947 on this issue. 日sline is in the・ 
mam followed by the Chinese official view in later periods. 
His r回 soning is as follows: (a) Taiwan 1s an historical' 
territory of China, and the inhabitants are Chinese; (b) Japan’s 
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・domina t10n had never been recognised, hence fOr China in 1945 
there was no question of annexation or acquisition of new ter-
ntory, but was only one of re-mtegration or restitution of a 
territory illegally robbed：，〔c〕inthe Instrument of Surrender 
there was no proviso that a formal cession would be necessary, 
and Japan’s surrender on September 2, 1945 meant that it 
renounced her sovereignty over Taiwan in favour of China. In 
support of this thesis, Wang cited the case of Alsace and 
Lorraine as a precedent, which territories were returned to 
France through an armistice signed on November 1, 1918, and 
not through the Versailles Peace Treaty of June 28, 1919. Fur-
thermore, he also raised the rule of estoppel ag剖nstother 
Allied Powers."' 
Whereas the negative view must presume the requirement of 
'a complete formal cession, hence logically deny the legally 
bmding force of the wartime arrangements; the a団rmative
view cannot but deny any requirement of a formal cession, 
with the logical result that it must instead supply other source 
for Chinese sovereign nghts to Taiwan m 1945, and that is, 
that it must prove the bmding force of the wartime arrange-
ments. But Wang seemed to have pushed from another angle. 
By so doing, however, he deprived his argument of all juridical 
force-he based his claim chiefly on moral grounds. Smce his 
reasoning is read only fragmentarily, beyond this our criticism 
・can not go lest we might do him inJustice. 
If Wang be considered representative of the position of the 
Government of Republic of China, Mei Ru-au, formerly judge 
of the (Tokyo〕MilitaryTribunal for the Far East, may be 
considered tbat of the Mainland Regime. 
Mei's thesis may be outlined thus ，〔a)Before the war between 
China’s Ch'ing Dynasty and Japan (1894.〕， Taiwanhad continu-
ously been Chinese territory; (b) China was pressed to make 
the Shimonoseki Treaty as a result of that aggressive war, 
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and since that time Taiwan had been occupied by Japanese 
aggressor；〔c〕onOecember 8, 1941, at the time when Chrna 
formal!y declared war on Japan, she solemnly declared al trea -
ties (including the Shimonoseki Treaty) made between China 
and Japan null and void, (d〕inconsequence, from that day 
Japan’s domination over Taiwan lost its basis, and durmg the 
years of the Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan was under Japanese 
occupation ；〔e〕fromlegal standpoint, China had the right to 
consider that her sovereignty over Taiwan had been recovered 
as of December 8, 1941, and (f) victory m the war against 
Japan guaranteed to Chrna that (the e旺ectsof〕herdeclara -
tion (of nullificat10n of the Shimonoseki Treaty, etc.〕bereaト
ized, and on October 25, 1945 when the Chinese Government 
accepted Japan’s surrender on Taiwan, China declared that 'from 
now on Taiwan and Penghu formally become Chinese territories 
anew', which was only the practical action 匂kenby China to・ 
carry out her own declaration and, as a matter of fact, Taiwan 
¥vas returned to Chrna on October 25, 1945 "' 
This thesis, indeed, is only a restatement of the view given 
by the Mainland Regime formal!y It is also similar to Wang’S 
view on some vital points, especially when Mei made moral 
appeal regardmg Japan's war against Chma in 1894. Instead of 
basing Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan on the legally binding 
force of the wartime arrangements alone, l¥foi founded sucll 
sovereignty on the effect of Chma’s declarat10n of war against 
Japan in 1941."' But since the convmcmg power of legal reason・ 
ing is not necessarily matter of quantity, when his assertion of 
the “effect”of a declarat10n of war is discovered to be mistaken 
m law, the thesis loses its juridical basis and breaks down as. 
a wllole. 
More concretely, to say that the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty 
was made under pressure (duress) as a result of the war of 
1894, hence that, despite the fact that cess10n of Taiwan had 
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been made, this island remams Chinese historical territory, 
will meet with approval from no internat10nal lawyer.'" The 
cess10n of Taiwan from Chma to Japan in 1895 was legal, 
because at that time war was extra-juridical, and conquest 
legal means of obtammg title to territory. 
In addition, the view that a declarat10n of war could annul 
al kmds of treaty and obligations denvmg therefrom, is not at 
al correct statement of law. This is especially so, when a 
peace treaty is mvolved, and obligat10ns (m our case, cession 
of Taiwan from Chma to Japan m 1895) under it had been 
executed, hence transfer of title to territory completed A 
unilateral declaration of war (and even a war〕， thoughit, 
once made, will leave no room for choice on the part of the 
state which has been declared war, may not have the legal 
effect of altering the status quo established by a former peace 
treaty. This is why the status of Manchuria differs from that of 
Taiwan after World War IL＇心
Thus, due to many reasons there appears no well-grounded 
agreement on the exact date for China’s recovery of sovereignty 
over Taiwan・ it may be 1895, or 1941, or 1945, or 1952, or even 
1943 when the Cairo Declaration was made. This, to repeat, 
is the most vital pomt, seemg that it dommates the answer 
to the quest10n as to whether or not the Mamland Regime 
has any claim to Taiwan at al If at the very date of recov-
ery of sovereignty by Chma over Taiwan the Mainland Regime 
had not come into existence, then the answer to this question 
must be in the negative. Actually, th沼田 perhapsthe root of 
disputes about the present issue.“】
There are many specialists in the field of mternational law 
who hold the affirmative view, but we can only raise those 
whose demonstrations are more convincing, and mention them 
m passmg. 
Thus, we have O’Connell〔acquisitionby occupation), Phillips 
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(subiugat10n〕， andZemanek (original acquisition〕.＂＇ Their con-
current point is that this issue, though a juridical one, could 
not be cut o旺 fromthe recognition policy (toward Chma) of 
foreign states.叫 Inthis way, their theories, though plausible, 
become impracticable and misleadmg at the last moment-they 
tend to五ndtheir shelter in the“two -Chma”theory, going the 
same way with the negative view by confusing the state with 
its government. 
III Another Possible Interpretation 
It must be confessed that all the theories exammed m the 
above are seriously defective, hence that m objective law none 
of them is satisfactory. 
To begin with, the deadly w阻 knesscommon to al these 
interpretat10ns is that some really fundamental points are miss-
ed. For mstance, perhaps the answer might be more agreeable, 
if an interpretation be the logical conclus10n of a more profound 
study of the legal nature of the “Alliance”in World War I. In 
other words, if this alliance was legally based (e. g., by tacit 
agreement〔treaty)of alliance〕， theremight exist a common 
will, organic in nature, which decision (the Cairo Declaration, 
for example) would be legally obligatory and bmding upon al 
the parties to the alliance; but if there was no such agreement, 
not even one presumed, then what was reached at Cairo would 
be nothing more than “expression of intentionヘas Churchill 
and Eden called it. 
But in this hypothetical case, it is pregnant to see that Chma’s 
claim would seem to be m the right: if there was a legally 
based alliance, etc., the Cairo Declarat10n, whatever its form, 
would be legally binding, hence the parties (USA, UK〕couldnot 
negate Chmese sovereignty over Taiwan if they would not at 
the same time violate their legal obligat10ns；叫 and if there 
、/'lasno such legally based alliance, then as the victor over 
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Japan (in this case the term‘co-victors’or co・ belligerents would 
lose legal relevance〕Chinawould be legal to take over Taiwan 
by dint of her own belligerent right (jus belli〕 andindepend-
ently of the Cairo Declaration. And since m such a case no 
other state might have any source of right concernmg Taiwan, 
Japan’s renunciat10n of nghts, titles, etc. to Taiwan in the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951〔andiu the Sino Japanese Peace 
Treaty of 1952〕wouldclearly imply also nominating China as 
the ceded state, and thus the cession, even if it be necessary 
for transfer of sovereignty, would become complete. In either 
case, the law sides with the a伍rmatJveview m favour of Chi-
nese sovereignty over Taiwan. 
There are therefore some other possible interpretations. But 
we do not have space to give details. With the material at 
hand, obiectively 1t 1s rather hard to see why the affirmative 
view is not ・better grounded m law. 
In the宣rstplace, a formal cession, as havmg been mentioned, 
is not an absolute cond1t10n for valid transfer of title to ter-
ntory. It is only m case of doubt that formal cess10n 1s required; 
and indeed the concept of formal cession-renunciation of title 
and nomination of the new sovereign to the territory intended 
to be ceded was made to function in ambiguous cases, and 
not otherwise. To insist that a formal cession is yet not com・ 
plete (and m our case, this would mean that the latter half of 
a formal cession〔nominatmgthe new sovereign) has not been 
done), and that hence there is no cess10n, even if the ceded 
state is clear and even the territory has in fact been transfer・ 
red, is to strain a legal norm for political purposes and to 
complicate the situation. 
Secondly, internat10nal law does not require that an accord, 
be it named a treaty, an agreement, an arrangement or even a 
declaration, to be legally bindmg, must take a specific form.叫
This is again a general principle to which no international 
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lawyer will raise obiection. 
The above two pomts are the components of the watershed 
between the two antagonistic groups about Taiwan's territorial 
status. After al, 1t 1s unbelievable that the heads of state at 
Cairo and at Potsdam intended that the declarations they would 
make would not be legally bmdmg among themselves at all, 
although, it must be admitted that at the time of their bemg 
made these documents were of no legal concern of Japan Pacta 
tertiis栂cnocent御 cProsunt. 
So conceived, the issue may be mterpreted in a different way. 
Let us expound in the sequence. 
〔A) The Potsdam Proclamation (with the Cairo Declaration 
as its part〕， beingan ultimatum toward Japan, derived its legal 
validity from Japan’s acceptance of it. That 1s to say, at least 
as among the Allied Powers who had made these documents 
the legally binding force of the Potsdam Proclamation was con-
dttional. This was so, because before the Imperial Rescript of 
August 15, 1945 was made to the Japanese public by the 
Japanese Government with which Japan accepted the provisions of 
the “Joint Declaration" (that 1s, the Potsdam Proclamatrnn〕， the
content of this Proclamation had remained amendable by a later 
common-will (if there was one〕ofthe Alhed Powers that had 
made the document, and its e古ectremamed indefinite accord-
ingly (and it 1s even improper here to talk about legal effect). In 
this sense, the Proclamat10n〔andthe Cairo Declaration, too〕，
though it was an offer, may be considered matter of political 
intent10ns (pohcy). 
CB〕Butas soon as Japan accepted the Potsdam Proclamation 
on August 15, 1945, which acceptance would later be confirmed 
in a more formal way through the Instrument of Surrender of 
September 2, 1945, the Potsdam Proclamatrnn, which incorpo-
rated the content of the Cairo Declaration, became an interna-
tional accord legally bmding upon Japan, and upon the Alhed 
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Powers too, whether we treat it as a bilateral accord 
between the Allied Powers as one party and Japan as the other 
party, or consider it as a multilateral accord among all the 
states directly concerned. Before the signing of the Instrument 
of Surrender on September 2, 1945, Japan had been fully free 
to do as a sovereign state on equal footing with the Allied 
Powers, and so far as accords were reached, even with the 
victors, in law she ought to be treated as an equal, and the 
obligations given rise by those accords were strictly legal, that 
no party could without consent from other parties change the 
contents of such accords, less could they give such contents 
other (e. g., political) nature. 
c〕 Inthis way, the content of the Cairo Declaration became 
obligatory for Japan as for the Allied Powers "' Chma’s ac 
ceptance of surrender of Japanese armed forces on Taiwan was, 
accordingly, execution of part of the content of the Cairo Dec-
laration, even if China had not or could not have in law taken 
over the island on the basis of her own jus belz. And it must 
be emphasized that what has been legally executed cannot be 
sub1ect to doubts raised at a later date for political reasons. 
The thesis that China was delegated by the Allied Powers to・ 
rule Taiwan is therefore no less mlStaken than the assert10n 
that Japan had been in illegal occupat10n of Taiwan since 1895. 
CD) Even if it be considered possible tbat the Allied 
Powers other than China, based by the legal “alliance" 
against Japan, had some rights to Taiwan, they gave such 
rights up in 1943 and in 1945 when they made the two wartime 
documents they could have made Taiwan an ob1ect of, say, 
condominium, but they did not do so. Thus, the Instrument of 
Surrender of September 2, 1945 and Chinese physical control 
over Taiwan since October 25, 1945, coupled by acquiescence on 
the part of other Allied Powers, become strongest proofs of 
evident transfer of title to, and sovereignty over, the island of 
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Taiwan from Japan to China."' There was therefore no need 
of a complete formal cession; and the msert10n of Japan’s re・ 
nunciation-clause into the San Francisco Peace Treaty was clear-
ly done on behalf of China, because it would be ridiculous to 
conceive otherwise, due to the fact that no other state may be 
possible new sovereign to Taiwan m future without Chma’s 
consent"', if for no other reasons This may be used as a pro-
China argument for argument’S sake on the omission in the 
peace treaties to nommate China as the ceded state In fact, such 
omission was a result of political expediency; and political 
reasons can never take precedence over the law unless that 
law has been changed previously 
(E〕 Herewe come to the most vital point From the above 
demonstration, the result would be that, Taiwan had become 
Chinese territory, befo開 thecoming問tobeing of the PRC, 
hence at least for those states that recogmze the ROC (and 
for states that recognize neither of the two Chinese parties 
too), Taiwan is Chinese territory ruled by the Nat10na!ist 
Government as the legitimate government of the State of China. 
But for states which recogmze PRC, there is some difficulty to 
say the same thing. For, the Mainland Regime has never been 
able to hold physical control over Taiwan.叫 It1s m this sense 
that we may agree with Philhp and Zemanek, that the Taiwan 
issue is determmed by recognit10n. 
In any case, it seems not superfluous to repeat here that it 
is the state, not its government, that is subject of international 
law ( that is, subject of rights and obligations), and that the 
government, m all events, only exercises rights belonging to the 
state No challenges may be iust泊ed m law against Chmese 
sovereignty over, and title to, Taiwan. Freedom of action of 
states in general on this issue is therefore mimmal. States 
might assert the contrary, but they do so at their own risks; 
the legal picture is not the least influenced thereby. The negative 
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view, objectively speaking, 1s a result of purposive mixture of 
the legal status of Taiwan as territory, and the status quo in the 
Taiwan Straits which concerns the nature of the armed struggle 
between the two Chmese parties This is mexcusable, but 1t is 
deeply rooted, having close relation with the two-China theory 
suggested by many as a means of resolving the dilemma “one 
China, or two Chmas 戸
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Note• 
ユ〕 Theterm “civil stnfe”has in many an occasions been used to 
describe a state of hostilities within a state not recognized as a war 
de jure (belligerency), hence not ipso facto relevant to international 
law (of neutrality, of r田 ognition,etc.) See Padelford, International 
Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife (1939〕， Preface,vii. 
Cf The Havana Convention on Rights and Duties of Third States 
m Case of Civil Stnfe (1900〕； ThePan-American Convention on 
Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife (1928) 
This term is adopted here for the purpose of avoiding prejudice to 
a田口nor to negate the existence of a civil "war＇’which is a jurid1 
cal fact. 
'2) Gentili, De Jure Belli L1bri Tres, English translation, in Clas-
sics of International Law, lib I, cap. 2, on p 12, and Phillipson’S 
Introduction thereto. 
3) Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. I, cap. 1. i and note 1; hb. 
II, cap, XX!, 1. 
4) Brierly, Outlook for International Law (1944〕pp49-50; Oppenheim-
Lauterpacht, International Law, vol I, 7th ed. (1952) p, 202 (also 
vol I, 2nd ed. (1912) p. 60〕．
5〕Oppenheim-Lauterpacht,vol. I, 7th ed., op. cit, p, 209 
日） Unconditional surrender in the Second World War was not‘四一
conditional’at all This is so, because survival of the defeated was 
presumed See, Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender (1961), Preface 
and p. 13 ff; Chase in Political Science Quarterly (1955) p. 263. 
Strupp-Schlochauer, Worterbuch des VOlkerrecht, Erst. Band (19印〕
S. 261, Edwards in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vols. ][[-N, 
12th printing (1957〕，（II)p. 523 f. Wehberg in Recueil des Cours, 
Academie de Droit International de la Haye (Hague Recueil) (1938) 
(I〕p.39; Garner in American Journal of International Law (AJ〕
(1937) Ed. Comment, p. 66 and note 2 idem ; Briggs, The Law of 
Nations, Cases, etc. (1938〕p,729 f.; Verdross, Volkerrecht (1950), 
Spanish tr. (1955) paginas 374 y 409. 
7〕ThePrize Case (1862〕， inChen, The International Law of Rec-
ognit10n (1951) p. 343 
S〕Rourke,in AJ (1937) pp. 400 and 406; Hershey, Essentials of Inter-
national Public Law and Orgamzation, revised edillon (1930〕pp
201 202 and note 16 on p. 204, McNair, International Law Opinion, 
vol. I (1956〕p.371; Oppenhe1m-Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp 209-210 
and note 1 on p, 210; McNair’s Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 
I, 4th ed., (1926〕p,124; Padelford, op cit, viii, and in AJ (1937) 
note 25 on p. 230 and p 237, Hall, International Law, 8 th ed (1924) 
J). 36. 
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Lorimer, The Institute of Law of Nations (1883) p 143, Lauter-
pacht, Recognition in lnternat1onal Law (1948) § 58; Wehberg, op. cit., 
pp 37, 85, 95. 98; Brierly, Law of Nations. 6th ed. (19fi3, Waldock’s 
Ed.) p 142; Dana’s Wheaton, p 374; Hall, op, cit円 pp.39 40; Moore, 
Digest, I, p. 165, Y. de Yanguas Messia, Behgerancia No Interven-
cion Y Reconocimiento (1938) pag. 21. 
9) Edwards, op. cit., p 524; Chen, op. cit., p. 307; Rougier, Les Guer-
res Civiles et le Droit des Gens (1903) p. 387, Oppenhe1m-Lauterpacht 
vol I. op cit , p 209 
10〕 Article8. Resolution of the !nstitut de Dro1t International (1900〕；
Vattel, Droit des Gens. English tr. p. 427; Quad口， Dinttolnternaz 
Pubbl. 3αediz (1960〕pag.403 4; Lawrence, Principles of Interna-
tional Law. 7th ed. (1923) p 331, Lauterpacht, Recognition. op. cit., 
§ 58, 60. 
11) Padelford, Civil Strife, op cit., note 2 on p. 2, p. 17, and p. 21, 
Chen, op. cit , p.307; Arang10-Ruiz, "La Quest1one Cmeseぺinvol. 
1°, Scritti di Diritto Int. In Honore di T. Perassi, p. 68. 
12) Essentials, op. cit., p. 203. 
13) Brierly, Law of Nations，。p.cit., p 141; Wehberg, op. c比＇ p, 88 
Cf. Fauchille, Traite de Droit Int Pub. (Bonhls ed ), Tom I (1925) 
pt. I. p. 309, Hall, quoted in Chen, op. cit., pp. 365-66 
14〕 Monaco,Manuale di Diritto Int Pubbl.〔1960〕pag434. 
15) Wehberg, op d 田＇ p. 86 
16〕 Cf.Rourke, op cit., p. 407; Hershey, op. cit , note 21 on p. 206. 
17) The fact that both parties claim legitimacy, presupposes possibility 
of such full-scale attack. The situation will, and must, come to a 
per10d of closure by war if peaceful means be impctent. 
In fact, m our history there has been no war fought without 
intervals. Actually, m our situation we cannot perceive a complete 
and permanent standstill, if we are not to fall mto self-deception. 
There have been shellings between both sides; there are fights in 
the sky and at sea Such a situation is nothmg less than a civil 
war de facto. V The Pnze Case (1862). loc. cit. 
18〕 Itmay be seid on the contrary that the existence of the Nation-
ahst Government profits the Mainland Regime in regard to its claim 
of sovereignty over Taiwan, m the sense that the civil strife is 
mamtamed m form if not m substance. 
19) The Spanish Civil War provides us with a good precedent, see. 
Thomas, The Sp叩 1shCIV!l War 〔1961)pp. 569 f., 579 ff' 606; 
Padelford, Civil Strife, op. cit., Ch VII. 
20) Lauterpacht is a good example, see his“Recognition of Government" 
in The London Times (January 6, 1950〕； forcriticism. see Arangio・
Ruiz, op. cit, pp. 69 and 76. Cf. Q. Wright in AJ (1955〕p 323. 
21〕 See among huge number of author出esagreeing on this point, 
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Hackworth, Digest, vol. 1 (1940〕p.391. Lex desideratum, for 'human-
itarian reasons, international law should have a rule governmg 
such peculiar civil war, so as to make applicable part of laws of 
war. 
22) Confusion of the three questions is not rarity, and it has been 
proved that this is destined to lead to mistaken conclusions See, 
Dean in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 
(1955〕p.105; Frankenstein m Revue Pol et Par!., Tom. 206 (1952〕
p. 59 
The term“Taiwan" as it is used here includes Penghu (The 
Pescadores) but田 eludesthe offshore isles of Kmmen and Matsu 
23〕Cf.E Maurer in US Dept. of State Bull. vol. 39 (1958) No. 1017, 
December, p. 1006 f. 
24〕 Truman’sspeech on June 25, 1950 Cf Statement by UK Foreign 
O伍ceto the Supreme Court of Hongkong regardmg the case of Civil 
Air Transport Inc v. Chennault and Others, see Green m Interna苧
tional Law Quarterly (1950) pp. 418-422. For detaiis on motives 
behind this change, see Colliard in Annuaire Fran~ais de Dr. Int 
(1955) p. 73 et seq For content of o間cialstatements, etc. m this 
regard, see Phillips Jr , in Western Pol. Quarterly, vol. 10 (1957) No 
2, June, p. 280 and note 29 idem; Dean in Foreign Affairs (19日－55)
p. 372. 
25) W. Lippmann’s article in the NY Herald Tribune, reproduced in 
the Japan Times (Feb 4, 1955〕.The same view was repeated by Dull白
himself after he had become Secretary of State And, in connection 
with this, at the time of ratifying the Treaty of Mutt四1Defence 
with the Republic of China, the US Senate on December 2, 1954 
made known itsιunderstariding’that "nothing in the present treaty 
shall be construed as affecting or modifying the legal status or the 
sovereignty of the territories referred to in Article VI＇’（Article 
VI reads: へtheterms .. 'territories’shall mean m resp巴ctof 
the Republic of China, Taiwan, etc.") See Phillips, op cit, pp. 
277-9, 281 282; Brohi m Hague Recueil (1961〕（I)p 210 
26〕 Greenm Yearbook of World A百airs(1952) p 20 
27〕 V Foreign Minister Younger’s written answer to the House of 
Commons, Par!. Deb, vol. 478 (1950), Col. 60; Reading’s answer at 
the House of Lords, Dec. 20, 1954, Par I.Papers, 5 S. H. L., vol. 190, 
Cols. 510-513. Cf O’Connell in AJ (1956〕p409, E. Lauterpacht, 
in the Int. and Comparative Law Quarterly (1956) pp. 143-4. See 
further, Foreign Mmister Eden’s written answer to the House of 
Commons, Parl. Deb. (Hansard), H of C Off. Rep., vol 536 (Feb. 4, 
1955) Col 159, m which Churchill’s line was followed, to the e旺ect
that Taiwan’s legal status was •uncertain or undetermined'. It is 
interestmg to see that Attlee (and Bevin before), who had taken the 
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negative view, this time challenged Eden’s by asserting sovereignty 
for the Mainland Regime, see O’Connell, op. cit , p 406, and Par!. 
Papers, op. cit., vol. 531, Col 1532 
It must also be mentioned here that Canada and Australia follow 
UK’s negative view, see O’Connell, op. cit., p. 410. 
28) The Sekai (Japanese language 〔J〕〕（Apr 1955〕p91 f. For USSR 
view, see M1ezdanarodnoe Pravo (International Law) (Moscow 1957) 
Japanese tr. by Yasui et altra, vol. J, p. 211, USSR Memorandum t<> 
USA regardmg Taiwan’s status, on May 7 and June 10, 1951; the 
Molotov Speech at the Supreme Soviet Committee, Feb. 8, 1955. For 
Indian view and o缶crnlstatements.see Green m Yearbook of World 
Affairs, op cit , p.26 and Jain in AJ (1963) p. 39 f. 
29〕 Seeon the former pomt, statement by Turton, UK Joint Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign A宜airs,made on May 4, 1955 (Par!. 
Deb. vol. 540, Cols 1870ー 71).On the latter point, Churchill’s o宜I・
cial view was that“the Cairo Declaration of 1943 contained merely 
a statement of common purposeヘhenceaccording to him it was 
not binding upon the parties to it; see Par! Deb. (Hansard) op 
cit., vol 548 (1955). 
30) Chiang Kai・shek’s address (Feb. 8, 1955), presumably m response 
to Churchiil’s and Eden’s negative view, formal statement on the 
legal status of Taiwan by the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of 
China on Oct 16, 1959, as a reaction agamst a iudgment of the US 
Federal Court which denied to China her sovereignty ov町 Taiwan.
In this formal statement, it is noteworthy that China’s declaration 
of war on Japan on Dec 9, 1941 was put forth as legal basis for 
Chmese sovereignty over Taiwan. The reasoning is this: the decla-
ration of war categorically annulled all treaties and agreements 
made between China and Japan, hence the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty 
(in the statement, the word ‘Peace’was dropped, perhaps intentional・ 
ly) also became null and void. and this・ was later con耐medby 
Article 4 of the Peace Treaty of 1952 between the Republic of Chma 
and Japan. The date for China’s recovery of sovereignty over Tai-
wan was declared m that statement to be Oct 25, 1945 
The Mainland Regime shares the same view, but instead stresses 
that Taiwan is historically a part of China, adding that since 1945 
no state had ever questioned this legal fact (that China regained 
sovereignty over that island〕，thusthe question of estoppel .was raised. 
See Chou En-lai’s statement (June 28, 1950〕， inImportant Docu-
ments concernmg the Question of Taiwan (1955〕14and 22; Wu Hsiu-
chuan’s speech at the UN Security Council (Nov. 28, 1950), UNSC 
Off. Recs. (1950) p. 6, and Important Documents, op. cit., 41-42; 
The Ren Min Ri Bao (People’s Daily), Dec 5, 1954 (Editorial); Chou 
En-lai’s interview with an English correspondent on Sept 5, 1960. 
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Cf Frankenstein, op. cit, pp. 51-52. It must be reminded here, that 
since the Mainland Regime has declared null and void all interna-
tional arrangements made by the Nationalist Government, in logic 
1t may not assert the effects of the 'legal fact’occurred in 1945 as a 
result of a provision of an international arrangement declared null 
and void by itself. See 159 London Economist 203 (1950), quoted m 
Jain, op. cit., note 30 on p 33. 
As a matter of fact, the two Chinese entities do not consider the 
cession made under the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty valid at all To 
them such cession was, to borrow Fitzgerald’s words，“a concession 
to force, without validity”（Revolution m China〔1952〕p202〕ーThis
is understandable, because the Chinese are apt to consider juridical 
question in terms of morality (ibid pp. 9, 28) 
Pending the question of whether the Chinese claim is sustainable 
in law, attention must be drawn to one vital point: Is the exact 
date for "restoration”of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan October 
25, 1945 when the Nationalist Government took over physical control 
of that island, or August 5, 1952 when the peace treaty between 
the Republic of China and Japan came into forceフIfthe latter date 
be correct, then in law before that day the Nationalist Government 
had exercised only de facto authorities as a victorious belligerent 
occupant This raises a serious question, m view of the fact that 
before this date (Aug. 5, 1952) there had already existed the dual-
government phenomenon m China, which is the true source of dis-
pute, 
31) Letter to the editor of The Times, The London Times, Feb 2, 
1955. Concur except point (4), Green m op. cit, p. 5, contra, 
o’Connell, op. cit , p 411 f. It must be pomted out that neither 
is there in the San Francisco Peace Treaty a single word leading 
to such cond閥的iium.Thus, it is perhaps arguable that to assert an 
implied condominium in this issue is less convmcing than to assert 
implied transfer of sovereignty from Japan to China, which would 
be more realistic. Cf. Strupp-Schlochauer, Worterbuch, cited in 
supra note 6, S. S. 293, 2貯； Oppenheim-Lauterpacht,Int. Law, vol 
!, 8th ed. (1961) p, 453 et seq Cf. also Oppenheim・Lauterpacht,
vol. I. op. cit., p. 239. 
32) This is generally agreed among international lawye'8 See Ph1ll1ps, 
op crt , p. 288 and note 53, I. c , Dean, op crt .p. 96; Myers, in AJ 
(1旬7〕p.599 and note 124, I. c ; Potter in Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 319-20. 
33) General Directive No 1 of the Supreme Commander was addressed 
to the Japanese Government, never to China as a co-victor, and 
surrender by Japanese forces m Taiwan was execution of the Gen-
eral Order No 1 of the Japanese Government which transformed the 
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content of the General Directive No. 1. See Yokota, Occupation of 
Japan by the United Nations (J) (1947〕pp.71, 73, 74; Ueda in the 
Asian Affairs (J〕（1955)vol. 3, No. 6, p 39. 
34) In the last analysis, al treaty obligations are nothing but “under-
standings" as to what legal norms shall apply to a certain case, see 
Brierly, Law of Nations, op. cit, p. 58 
35) It is the state, and not its government, that may be entitled to 
sovereignty over territory It IS perhaps not Impossible to conceive 
a theory of “suspended sovereignty”here, m the sense that cession 
of Taiwan to China has been done. albeit done mcompletely as a 
.,matter of formality (renunciation of old sovereignty without nam-
ing the new sovereign), that hence this island can not be transfer-
red to any other state without consent from China, and that in 
conclusion Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan is only suspended Cf. 
o’Connell, op. Cit , p 411 
36〕 Inthis sense, see Jam, op. Cit , p.29, Cited Jessup’s criticism of 
this theory. See further criticism not purely juridical, Younger’s 
and Paget’s Letters to the editor of The Times, The London Times, 
op. cit. Feb. 4 and Feb. 7, 1955 respectively. 
37) Referred to in Jain, op. cit., pp. 29-30. At an early date, Wright 
had maintamed similar position, though somewhat ambiguously and 
mconsistent as to the real nature of the Cairo Declaration, etc , 
see Wright in AJ (1955) p. 322, p目 333.Cf. US reply to USSR (Dec. 
27, 1950) 24 Dept of State Bull., pp 65-66〔1950)
38〕 Lippmannin op. cit. and in the Japan Times, Feb 7, 1955. For 
criticism, see Phillips, op cit , p.276 Lippmann, however, changed 
his view later, see Sued, Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of Int 
Politics (1963) p. 149 f. 
39〕 Thiscan also be seen from Schwarzenberger’s concl udmg part of 
his Letter to the Times, cited above For criticism of this sugges-
tion of UN sovereignty, see O’Connell, op. cit , p.408; Zemanek in 
Archiv des Volkerrechts, Bd. 5 (1955) S. 316. 
40〕 Articlein Central Daily News (Nanking), April 14, 1947. The 
full Chinese original t位 tis not obtainable, and the content of the 
reasoning here is taken from Frankenstein (op. Cit .• pp. 57-58〕and
Tabata’s article (in昂oritsu]iho vol 28, No. 10, 1956, pp. 1156-57) 
For criticism of Wang's view, see Zemanek, op cit , S目 s.311 f 
41) Mei in The Modern Time (Chinese (C)), June 1955. published on 
mainland Note that here, ton, the word‘peace’was deleted from 
the term “Shimonoseki Peace Treaty", as 1f such deletion might 
have anythmg to do with the nature of that peace treaty as a 
'peace’treaty. 
42〕 Foran oPinion, equally of the PRC, assimilating the status of 
Taiwan with that of Manchuria, see Chan Ti-chiang in The New 
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China Monthly (C), March 1955. 
43) Coactus volut, sed tamen voluit See Fauchille, op. cit., pp 298-99; 
Cavaglieri in Riv1sta .d1 Dir. Int (RD!), anno. 27 (1935〕pp9-10, 
V1sscher, Theories et Realites en Dr. Int Pub, Engl. tr. by Corbett 
(1957) pp. 246-47. On historical territory, see the case of Legal 
Status of Eastern Greenland (PCIJ, 1933, Ser. A/B No. 53〕， but
there was no question of discontinuity in I暗 altitle (the time ele・ 
ment〕asin the case of Taiwan. Cf Von der Heydte in AJ (1935} 
p 426 f., esp. pp 465 67; Graham in ibid (1944) Ed Comm’t 
44) See a discussion of Manchuria’s territorial status, Belo宜， Foreig~
Policy and the Democratic Process (1955) pp 44 f. 
45) On stress of importance of this‘date’for other reasons, see 
o’Connell, op. cit 
46) 0’Connell, op cit, pp. 406-414; Phillips, op cit., p. 281 f.; Zem-
anek, op. cit , S.S 315-319〔concur,Tabata, op cit, p 1161; but 
cf K Irie in the Sekai CJ), Apr. 1955, p. 94) For a strong and 
convincing view that on the present issue the law is against a. 
two-China theory, see Starace m RD! (1959) p 83 f. 
47〕Phillipseven went so far as to say that吋helegal status of For-
mosa.. no longer rests on the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations or 
even upon the Japanese peace treaty, but rather upon the recogni-
tion policies of various governments m the world＇’（op cit , p.288〕，
On the other hand, Zema.nek confirmed China’s sovereignty over 
Taiwan with his theory of terra derelicta but reserved the last 
word for recognition policies of foreign states toward China (op. 
cit., S. S. 316 f. and S. 319). 
48) Cf. Heilborn, Grundbegri百edes Vol ks., 1912, S. 32 f Both Churchill 
and Eden seemed to have resorted to the clausula rebus sic stantibus 
(vital change of circumstaoces) at the last moment, in order to-
negate Chinese title to Taiwan without bearing the risk of such 
negation’s bemg denounced a violation of treaty, see Sekai Shuhe> 
(J) Feb 21, 1955, p .58. But it is very difficult to suggest a conclu-
sive answer m such a case, hence the result is most likely to be 
a situation of cnmmations and recriminations On such difficulty, 
see Parry, The Sources and Evidences of International Law, (1965) 
p. 62 
49) Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, 4th ed (1961) p. 332 f., 
quotes Oppenheim with approval; Monaco in Hague Recueil (1949) 
(II), pp. 294-5, 300, 306; Myers m AJ (1957〕note66 on p. 587; 
McNair in the British Yearbook of International Law 〔BY)(1952) 
226 and The Law of Treaties (1961) pp. 6, 10, 12 with cases cited 
in Note 3, p 23 1 c.See further, Nicolson, Diplomacy, 3rd ed. (1962) 
p. 195, p 228 and p. 243; Kaplan & Katzenbach, The Political Foun-
dations of International Law (1961〕pp.237-38. Opp田 he1mev四
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asserts that a umlateral declaration may create legal rights/obi抵抗ions,
see Satow, ibid., p. 333 It is desirable to make distinction between 
declarat即時 Jointlymade by many states for the common aim and 
with common content, and declarations separately made by states 
with contents accidentally similar. Cf. Myers, loc cit., pp, 588, 599, 
and 605. 
'50〕 Monacom Hague Recueil, op cit., pp, 284, 328-9, 358. 
石1) The formal validity of such transfer dates back to August 15, 
1945, when the Cairo Declaration obtained its legally obligatory 
nature through the accepted Potsdam Proclamat10n , cf. Starace in 
RD!, op. cit., pp. 76, 79 and nota on p 80. 
宮2) Because of the rule of estoppel, the theory of ℃o-sovereignty’ 
cannot stand m any sense. Cf. Colliard, op. cit , p.70, and Starace, 
ibid., p, 72 
!53) Cf. Kunz in Al (1950〕Ed Comm’t p, 719. Of course, the Mam-
land Regime may, if it wishes, claim •constructive’ control over 
Taiwan as a result of its legitimacy recogmsed by a group of 
states But the Nationalist Government surely may, with stronger 
reasons (due to the rule that presumption of legitimacy is m favour 
of the田tablished,traditional, government), also claim constructive 
control over Chma mamland. And this is the ultimate weakness of 
the Mamland Regime. On this pomt, see Chapter 3 below on the 
implication of the rule of effective control. 
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PART TWO 
THE CHINA PROBLEM 
BASIC JURIDICAL POINTS OF THE MEANS-ISSUES 
The centre of the China Problem is the question “one China, 
or two Chinas ？” This may be named the object-issue This 
issue is not a juridical one, there is therefore no need to dis-
cuss 1t here" However, to solve this issue, hence also the 
cause-issues already discussed in Part One, there are two de-
vices both of which are juridical in nature Recogmt10n and 
determinat10n of the UN on the Chmese Representation Question. 
The subiect matters of these devices may be termed the means-
issues, and are to be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
Publications on these issues are volummous, and, indeed 
nearly all relevant disputes have been discussed In this Part, 
therefore, we will examine only the most basic pomts. 
It must be warned at the outset that, as content of the China 
problem in the broad sense, these two issues have been con-
sidered, through emphases by specialists, as more important 
than the Chma problem in the proper .Cnarrow〕senseCi. e., the 
two cause-issues discussed m Part One〕.This is a dangerous 
mistake. It leads to a tendency of confusing the means with 
the end: it impresses one with the idea as if a solution of 
the China problem 〔inthe proper sense〕throughrecognition 
and/or through determination of UN on the Chinese represen-
tation quest10n, with whatever results, were the end, thus giving 
birth to reckless, sometimes absurd, suggestions without con-
sidering the reality of the Chma Situation. Unreasonable solu-
tions, even 1£ they be realised, do not solve the China problem 
at all; they only change its shape and give it a new content, 
hence make the problem more complicated. 
Consequently, it must be borne in mind that the two issues 
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of recognition and UN representation are always the “means”， 
never the ends, of studymg the China problem: they are the 
means to solve the question “One China, or two Chmas ？”． 
CHAPTER 3 THE RECOGNITION ISSUE 
Recognition, understood m our problem here, is an overt act 
expressive :of the will of a foreign state to maintain or to alter 
its attitude toward the China Situation (China problem in the 
proper sense) in connect10n with the status of the two rival 
“-governments”in Chma." Such act, through operation of law, 
gives the government which is recognised as legitimate, the 
quahfication to represent its state to the exclusion of its nvaJ; 
including a claim to exercise the rights belonging to the state, 
includmg, that is, the so-called right to representation in the 
UN, as ag，αh時tα時 Joγeig沼 statesoγecognises it.め
I. Effective Control (The Principle of Effoctivity〕－ARe-inter-
pretation 
The should-be focus, not always being so treated, around 
which al discussions are to be undertaken, is “effective control" 
which is the objective, and is said to be the only objective, 
criterion for recogmt10n This has nearly without exception 
been presupposed as something easily understood by al. And 
all unfortunate disagreements and shortcomings have their 
common origin in mterpretat10ns of this principle (or rule). 
It is generally admitted that, hke all other topics which are 
in the process of normative crystalhsation, question of recognト
t10n too takes as the centre the applicability of a rule asserted 
to be jt日 vig.四ite,that is, al disputes have their source in the 
existence or non existence, and the content, of a legal norm. 
This is the problem of the law ‘is’and the law‘should-be'." 
In addition, even when the content be agreed upon, there re-
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mams the question of interpretation. In this regard, the principle 
of e世ectiv1ty(effective control〕asa condition to recognition of 
government comes to the foremost m the Chma problem But 
it is of course not everything; it is only one of the dec1s1ve 
points. For, recogmt10n, to repeat, is merely one of the me沼田－
issues of the problem here Hence, not at al is this principle 
me渇ntthat other conditions or pomts are immaterial" 
“Effective control" is an observable fact. It is a species of 
the genus“e旺ectivity”， andis generally treated as the principle 
for legal admissibility of an act of recognition of government 
mstituted by force, etc.'' 
However, this is not entirely free from doubts. Many author-
ities, especially those of Latin origin, even question the more 
fundamental point or仕ieprecondition, as to whether “effec-
tivity”（hence ‘effective control’〕 isa legal prmciple at al, as 
understood by most of their Anglo-American colleagues.η 
Even if it be conceded that “effective control" is a legal prin-
ciple, its basis and. nature of function are not self-evident.め
And, following this there is yet another question of substance : 
what lS the content of this principle, and where are the cntena 
for mterpreting this normative content, at least so far as recog-
nition of government is concerned "' All these are not to beg 
questions, nor to五ndfault with any particular mterpretation. 
Actually, these are, one way or the other, sources of disputes 
dearly given in pubhcations. 
In consequence, paradoxically, if e百ectivecontrol is a stand-
ard, it needs a standard for itself. Such ‘standard of standard' 
can be found, maybe, only after re-interpretation, through 
anatomy, of the notion “e旺ectivecontrol'’ 
The concept‘e旺ectivecontrol' has two essences・theobjective 
essence of observable fact (physical control), and the subiective 
essence of evaluat10n (judgement on“effective”or“me旺ect1ve”
。fsuch control). To push one step forward, the essence of 
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‘control’further consists of two elements, both quantitative . 
(factual) control of territory and (psychological) control over 
people (obedience). The essence of ‘e旺ect1ve',on the other hand, 
1s determined by the 百me’element(permanency〕whichis in 
turn conditioned by the 'quahty' element (absence of senous 
threat to stability) Thus the concept‘e百ectivecontrol' has 
two aspects, one a筒rmative,the other negative and, in case of 
doubt, the presumption, according to mternat10nal law, is m 
favour of the estabhshed (traditional) government 
In thrn way，“e百ectivecontrol" becomes observable not m the 
a伍rmativeaspect (as understood by commonsense〕， butm the 
negative aspect To say the extreme, both control of tern-
tory and control over people are symbolic, hence both are not 
exactly “observable”facts in all cases. And, in connection with 
the quest10n of“effective”or“meffective”，the really objectively 
observable phenomenon is the negative aspect only: control 
of territory to the exclusion of the rival force, and control 
over people without large-scale resistance (hence absence of a 
rival force representing (symbolic〕thepeople or part thereof〕．
By so analyzed and reformed, the not10n “effective control" is 
linked with the symbolic ‘consent’of the governed'"'. and 1s 
made clear and more dependable as criterion for judgment by 
policy-makers of states in considering the legal admissibility of 
their acts of recognition of new government mstituted/ organ-
ised by anti-constitutional means. In this picture, it must be 
emphasised, the negative aspect of the“e旺ective”essenceoc-
cupies a paramount position : itbecomes the determinant of the 
notion of “effective control" as a whole. This, expressed in 
another manner, will be this, that, when one is m quest of the 
point as to whether or not a certam‘control’店、百ective'm a 
given case of newly instituted revolutionary entity, the Prima 
facie test, and indeed conclusive evidence, would be whether 
the estabhshed government is still in existence and carries on 
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its armed contention against the seemingly successful revolu-
tionary entity.川 Thismay be given the m皿e“thenegative 
test of effectrvity”； 1t blocks the“effective”nature of the fact 
of physical control. In concrete terms, it determines the pros-
pect of permanency (stab11ilty) of a new government whether 
there exists serious menace-probability of its being over-
thrown or of its decreasmg in power within reasonable period."' 
Thus, not incidentally, the quest10n of change of war-aim of 
the parties to a civil strife comes mto our view-m the context 
of the distinct10n between ‘revolution’and ‘rebellion', such 
change of aim would materially decide the point of effectivity. "' 
Furthermore, the question as to whether the established govern-
ment, which is stJ!I trymg to put down the revolution or to 
suppress the rebelhon, undertakes this on foreign soil or on the 
nat10nal territory, would also become vital iめ This1s exactly 
the situation in China. 
日. Effective Control and the China Problem 
But the theoretical world of internat10nal law seems to be m 
an obscure condit10n on the pomt of apphcab1lity, hence of mter-
pretat1on, of this rule. One example only will su伍cefor show-
ing this backwardness, and also for making ourselves avoid 
the extremes asserted by writers to the point of dogmatism 
1f not of absurdity. 
The most mstructive example is perhaps Lauterpacht's opin-
ion. Immediately after UK recogmt1on of the Mamland Regime 
(January 6, 1950〕， Lauterpachtjustified this act with the reason, 
inter alza, that“to maintain that the lawful government hold-
ing out m one rnolated fortress is entitled to continued recog-
nition de jure is to strain to breaking point an otherwise 
ummpeachable rule ”“It is a question of fact，＇’he added，“to be 
ascertamed m good faith, whether the authority of the lawful_ 
government has become purely nominal.山＇ This directly con-
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cerns the rule of effective control and the China problem (recog” 
nition). But this would be m conflict with his own assert10n 
of the rule of presumpt10n (of legitimacy〕infavour of the 
estabhshed governロ1ent“solong as the revolution has not been 
fully successful, and so long as the lawful government remains 
within the national territory and asserts its authority.則的 Such
conflict can be evaded, and Lauterpacht can be consistent, only 
when and if the Chinese Civil Strife of the 1940’s be considered 
"to have come to an end (hence the situat10n of armed hostilities 
be totally ignored), and when Taiwan be presupposed as non-
Chinese territory But both have been demonstrated to be 
misleadmg. "' 
As a matter of fact, there are many good lawyers against 
Lauterpacht’s above view. Chen is at least as correct as Lauter-
pacht, when he says：“As Jong as the war lasts the government 
which has hitherto been governing contmues to be regarded 
internationally as the de juγe government of the state, to what-
ever extent it may have lost actual controlへ1ηFurthermore,Ruiz 
is a little careful, and with vision, in reminding Lauterpacht 
that, inteγalia，“Formosa is not a fortress”. '" 
As a matter of theory, Lauterpacht’s view would lead to a 
situation of state-in-exile, of which one can五ndno precedent 
m history and about which, no explanation m international law.同
And, indeed, his view, if sustamed, would be a two-China the-
ory which reahsation is, to repeat, highly improbable. The 
Nat10na!ist Government is not a nominal government like the 
Tinoco Regime of a small country like Costa Rica at its last 
stage; its existence, after its evacuatmg the mainland, has con-
tmued for nearly 20 years (note that the Tinoco Government 
existed only for a little more than two years〕. And, like it or 
not, it is recognised as the legitimate government of the State 
of China〔TheRepublic of China), hence it is not“isolated” 
either. 
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The rule of effective control, to be an 'ummpeachable’rule, 
should, therefore, include as its part, or should refer to, the 
length of time of existence of the established E。vern立1ent”ousted"
the size of territory/people it controls, number of states recognising 
it, and its traditional mternational position. These are fair 
・considerations. They pmnt to the signi五canceof the negative 
aspect of effective control or, what amounts to the same thing, 
importance of the survival of the established government. 
How are we then to observe the app!icat10n of the rule of 
e町ectivecontrol to the Chma Situation, without committing the 
mistake of going with the extremes? 
According to what have been illustrated in the above Chapters, 
we have a clear picture of the China Situation (1〕thereis a 
state of hostilities between the established government and the 
allegedly successful revolutionary regime, each controlling part 
<Jf the national territory, (2) this state of a旺airshas continued 
for more than 15 years, and there is probability that a full-
,;cale war may be necessary for the五nalvictory , ( 3〕inthis 
,;ense, though differed m degree, each of the parties is a menace 
to the other, and this state of a旺airsis to continue for a quite 
long period to come , ( 4〕thee宜ectivecontrol of one of the 
parties me泡.nsthe ine旺ectivec.ontrol of the other, and from 
<JbJective facts it is no easy thmg for one to say with certainty 
<Jn the matter of extinction or survival of either of them, so long 
as the parties do not change their corresponding war-aims.'" 
This situation is very peculiar. 
Faced by this novel situat10n, we have a borderline case. But 
1f the China Situat10n is pecuhar and novel, it立mstbe dealt 
with as such In iuristic logic, viewing the Chma Situation as 
it is, and that is disregarding the non-legal considerations, by 
asserting that the Mainland Regime represents the Chmese 
State as a whole one does not in reality solve the China problem, 
but only suggests a new Chma problem. One may not confuse 
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and equate the position of the seemmgly successful revolut10n-
ary regime with the established government, m the matter of 
sigm五canceof the fact of continumg resistance the Jaw 1s with 
the established government, not with the revolutionary regime_ 
Pragmatism holds no rank in the realm of Jaw. 
In this way, the rule of e旺ectivecontrol, as a criterion for 
recognition of government instituted by force, also applles to the 
China Situation in its novel shapeー thepredommance of the nega-
tive aspect of the concept'". It, agam, lmks recognition to the 
status quo m the Taiwan Straits (civil war de facto). Recogni-
tion of the Mainland Regime by a foreign state is a denial of 
the existence of the civil war m Ch ma; for, admission of such 
existence would make recognition premature, hence illegal. 
But why is 1t that a group of foreign states acted otherwise 
and recognized the Mainland Regime without considering the 
negative aspect of the rule of effective control' Is 1t not proper, 
then, to say that recogmtion IS matter of politics and not of 
law? 
Although it can not be denied that recognition has its politicar 
aspect (rather, political colour), the fact remains true that the 
act of recognition is subject to legal control. And the answer to・ 
the above questions can be found m a fact, not at all profound 
but easily overlooked, that there js a dilemma m the matter of 
premature recogmtion and its legal sanctions. 
There 1s under traditional mternational law a quest10n, not 
yet resolved, as to whether there exists an obligation for exist-
mg states to recognize a new government in e旺ectivecontrol of 
the national territory or part thereof (this in theory at least 
involves responsibllity of the what may be called “blockade・ 
m recognition”）. This question bemg put aside, the object for 
sanctions in international law of recognition is “premature作
recogmtion only. But there is an intrinsic contradiction m the 
conception of responsibility for premature recognition of govern-
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ment The conception 1s of meaning only m case of recogmtwn 
of new state (respons1b11Ity toward the mother state). In case 
of recognitwn of a new government (and with it withdrawal of 
recogmtion of the estabhshed government＂＇〕， evenif that new 
government has not fulfilled the necessary conditions (granted 
that no serious challenges exist about such conditions) required 
by internatwnal law, and that 1s, even if we have a typical case 
of premature recognition, 1t is legally not possible to have the 
responsibi!Ity admitted, nor to have sanctions reahzed"' For, 
m this case, the estabhshed government, having been withdrawn 
its recognition by a foreign state, becomes legally non-existent 
for that very foreign state, hence it can find no legal remedy 
so far as that very foreign state is concerned. This is the real 
reason why the negative aspect (effect) of the rule of e百ective
control must be stressed. 
In concreto, in the case of recogmtion of new state, since total 
withdrawal of recogmtion of the mother state as an international 
person 1s not mvolved, liabilities for premature recognition are 
answerable by the recognizing state toward the mother state; 
whereas m case of recognition of new government, the formerly 
legitimate government, though it remains legitimate government 
for other states (hence remains qualified to act in behalf of the 
state when its rights are violated by, e.g., premature recogni-
ti on〕， cannot have a legal voice agamst the foreign states pre-
maturely grantmg recognition to its domestic rival. 
Whether in a specific case an act of recogmtion is or is not 
premature, there is no better proof than the one given ex Post 
facto; accordingly, 1t is thinkable that answer to hab1hty, hence 
undertaking of sanct10n, is conditional in this matter, i.e., that 
the legal wrong be made good at a later date when the estab-
Iished government succeeds in putting down the revolution under-
taken by the new government recognized by that foreign state. 
Though such a condition makes the respons1bihty and sanction 
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to the point not far from something in the air, on legal plane 
responsibility and any claim against premature recognit10n remain 
a clear reality. The whole matter ought to be determined 
by the objective criteria, among other things, of effective con-
tro!. And this 1s why the existence of the estabhshed govern・ 
ment may not be ignored in law as in fact. 
One of the explanations to this troublesome question seems to 
lie in the maximum freedom of action, accompanied by risks, 
of foreign states in the matter of admitting the existence of the 
state of hostihties in China, and following 1t would be the logic・ 
al necessity of acquiescence of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. 
But there seems a way out of this to・ just why is it that there 
can be only one government in one state > This brings forth the 
vital pomt of claim to exclusive (monopolistic) right to repre・ 
sent the state in general mternat10nal legal order."' 
III. Representation of a State in General International 
S田iety-The‘One S旭te, One Government’Principle 
and the China Problem 
According to what has been said, so far as e町ectivecontrol IS 
concerned 1t seems hard to say that either of the existmg par・ 
ties engaged in the Taiwan Straits status quo may claim uni・ 
versally exclusive right to represent the Chinese State, though 
the Nat10nalist Government, as the trad1t1onal government, m 
legal logic holds a stronger position. The change of the capital 
from mainland to Taiwan does not involve change in the repre・ 
sentation of the Chinese State."' 
The principle ‘one State, one Government' means：〔1〕thatdom・ 
estically there can be one, and only one, group of elite, calling 
itself 'government', to exercise power over a territory and to 
enjoy obedience to its sway by the bulk of the populat10n on 
that territory; and (2〕thatmternationally, there can be only 
one de ;ure government to represent the state m its relations 
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with other states (and with an mternational organization)."' 
But while point 〔l)is always true, to point (2) there are not 
without exceptions Recognition of bel!Igerency 1s one of the 
most conspicuous examples. Such recogmtion legally bestows a 
limited and provisional mternat10nal personality (m case. of 
rebel hon〕andquasi-governmental quah日cation(m case of revo-
lut10n〕onthe rival regime vis-a-vis the legitimate govern田ent.
Recognit10n of this kmd, includmg recogmt10n of insurgency, as 
such, 1s not necessarily a prelude to recognition of state or of 
government It is granted mainly for humamtarian reasons (to 
make applicable the jus in bello (laws of war) to the state of 
belligerency〕orfor factual needs (e. g., trade at sea, protection 
of nationals, etc.). In a word, the justification for recognition 
of this kind is expediency. But 1t is significant that underlying 
the system is the purpose to realise contact between the recog-
nizmg and the recogmzed, which contact otherwise would be pro-
hibited by law. To this extent, there is no great di旺erence
between the function of recogmtion of belhgerency and that of 
recogmtion of governロ1ent.Even the insurgents, if so recogmsed, 
will be in a position to represent the state，士houghtheir acts 
are territorially condit10ned and only with de facto effects. 
Thus, conSidered on a temporary basis the prmc1ple‘one State, 
one Government' 1s not at al absolute. 
It may, however, be challenged that recogmtion of belligerency 
or that of insurgency is nonetheless except10nal. But, in the 
case of existence of a state of hostilities for a considerable 
penod of time, such recognit10n is rather the rule a trans1-
tional measure which foreign states would be 。bligedto adopt 
for specific purposes 
Consequently, recognit10n of two political entities m a state 
is admitted in internat10nal law. It follows that there would 
be no need, nor strong legal reason, nor political justi五cation,
for a two-China theory the unnatural realizat10n of which 
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would, at present, make an mternational war inevitable. On the 
other hand, this also means that foreign recognition (or implied 
admission) of certain status of the two Chinese parties in the 
Taiwan Straits吋atusquo, is legally not difficult. And th由民!ls
that there is no way out of the troublesome picture raised at 
the end of the previous Sect10n All exceptions to the prmcip!e 
‘one State, one Government' refer to a civil war de facto or de 
1ure. 
There is in China a situation that needs a special way of set・ 
t!ement. Pending a畳間Iresult, hence a determination of the 
status of the rival parties m the civil war de facto, there ap・ 
pears to be no nce・ and・ for-all settlement Lex fe陀 nda,mterna・ 
tional law should have a norm to meet the plural・ government 
phenomenon which will not be infrequent in future. By ca!lmg 
the China Si tua ti on an“arti宣crnl”civilwar,"' one can not deny 
that situation the nature of a civil war. By recognizmg the 
Mainland Regime, hence withdrawmg recognition of the 
Nat10na!ist Government, a .state does not help solving the 
China problem. Recognition, like the issue of UN Chinese 
representation, is the means, never the destmation, of a“solution” 
to the China problem. 
Freedom of act10n of states on the means・ issue of recognit10n 
may therefore be described thus: Legally speaking, states are 
restricted by law to iudge the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of 
the conditions on the part of the Mamland Regime if they are 
to recognize it, and special weight must be put on the negative 
aspect (effect) of the rule of effective control, and that is, the 
existence of the established government and the existence of a 
civil war de facto can never be demed arbitrarily. States are 
of course free not to recogmze PRC so long as the Nat10nalist 
Government exists, because they are under no obligation to do 
so. In other words, for action on this JSsue foreign states hold 
restricted freedom; for maction, their freedom is maximal. 
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And since legal resp叩 sibi!Ityof premature recogmtion, at least 
in junst1c logic, though cond1tiona!, does exist, 1t remains true 
that states taking action on this issue, i e., recognizin宮 the
Mainland Regime, bear their own risks. 
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.CHAPTER 4 UN REPRESENTATION ISSUE 
As m the case of the recognit10n issue where recogmtion of 
the new government and withdrawal of recogmtion of the estab-
lished government are involved, m the present issue the United 
Nations General Assembly (hence the member states) is con-
fronted by the quest10n of whether to approve the delegation 
appomted by the Mainland Regime as quali宣edto speak for 
China in the U問ledNations and if so : (1) according to what 
・criteria may such approval be made? and 〔2)whether this del-
.egat10n, when approved its qualification, excludes, and takes the 
posit10n of, its counterpart from the Nat10nalist Government. 
I. Short History of the Issue in the United Nations and V国b唱
Results up to the 20th (1965) Session of the General Assembly 
Since 1950, states (chiefly India and USSR〕protagonistfor 
.approval of the quali宣cat10nof the Mamland Regime to represent 
‘The Republic of China' in the UN have in substance consis-
tently given the issue the form of ousting the delegation of the 
Nationalist Government (opposing the quallficat1on of this govern-
ment to represent Chma), and of seating the Mamland Regime in 
its stead. The opposition states (chie丑yUSA, Latin American 
countries, and later, Japan too), on the other hand, have given 
many forms to their 'legal resrntance’with success by proposing 
suspension to discuss the issue (Moratorium〕from1951 to 1960, 
and from 1961 to 1965, by an 'important question' proposal 
(hence necessitating a vote of two-thirds maiority of Members 
present and v。ting in the General Assembly to approve the 
change of the entity to represent China〕.＇ηThevoting result 
of the 20th (1965〕Session of the Gerieral Assembly shows 
that the 'important question' form seems to have come to its 
margin (47 for, 47 against, the 'important question' proposal, with 
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20 abstentions and 3 states absent〕， henceit becomes doubtful 
whether this form will work in 1963 as a legal means to refuse any 
attempt to oust the Nationalist Government as representing 
‘The Republic of China'. At this moment it is not yet clear what 
new form, if any, might be suggested by USA, etc., but it seems 
safe to say that some sort of two-China solution is under contem ・ 
p!ation as the alternative to the吐mportantquest10n’proposal 
if the latter may appear to be adverse to the position of the 
Nationalist Government.'" 
I. The Basic Points 
Quest10ns about this ISsue are too many. One of the most 
fundamental points is, no doubt, the nature of ‘representation' 
and appl!cab1lity of existing norms of the UN Charter to 'repre・ 
sentation' proper This may be pushed from two directions, 
one of adjective law, the other, of material law.問
As question of adjective law, the nature of ‘representation’ 
determmes whether the Chinese UN representation ISsue is an 
important question for the General Assembly under Article 18 of 
the Charter. As que,tion of material law, it decides whether 
t1>e conditions provided in Article 4〔1)of the Charter on ad・ 
miss10.n of new members are apphcable to the case of change of 
govermnent entitled to represent 1ts state. The former may 
cast light on criteria for exercising veto (and double veto too) 
at t1>e Secunty Council ('procedural matters: and ‘other mat・ 
ters’under Article 27 (2) and (3）〕；30》 thelatter, like the case of 
recogmtion issue, mvolves the principle of effective control"' 
and the Aggressor' Resolut10n of the General Assembly of 1951. 
Representation in an international orgamzation (e. g., in the 
United Nations), and that is, in a particular international legar 
order, is a concept sui generts. It bas no counterpart in private・ 
law, neither m the agent-principal relation nor in the repre 
senting・ represented relation. It, again, di百ersfrom the represent・ 
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ing-represented relation between a protecting and a protected 
states under international law, though the terms used are iden-
tical."' This 1s also true in the case of the recognition issue-
recognit10n of representat10n m the general mternational legal 
order. 
One of the most conspicuous di百erencesbetween 'representa-
tion' now in question, on the one hand, and ‘representation' or 
‘agent’in private law, on the other, hes m this, that, while in 
the latter cases, both the representing and the represented (and 
the agent and the principal〕aresubiects of law 〔bethey iuris-
tic persons or natural persons), in the former case, it is the 
represented only (the state〕andwithout exception, that is 
subject of international legal order, and the representing is only 
one of the essences (and that is, the government, and, actually, 
persons delegated w1th powers to represent〕ofthe state subiect 
・Of mternational law.‘Representat10Ii' is therefore always double 
and mdirect in nature. It 1s based on Iiat10nal law (constitut10n 
・or the laws of lower ranks), not in the form or nature of a 
・contract, but rather as a relation of ptiblic law. And the con・ 
stitution (or the laws of lower ranks〕1spart of the national 
legal order which, m terms of legal theory, is the state itself.'" 
Consequently, private law finds no full analogical application 
here What is ev1dent, however, 1s the fact that when question 
<if“representation”arises in an international organization (in 
the United Nations for instance), it is not the delegation (nor 
the indiv1dual delegates or representatives) that is directly in' 
volved, but rather the government that is the issue. The point 
is, clearly, not whether a certain delegation 1s quali五edto repre・ 
sent the state (regtilarity/valldity of credentials, in the practke 
of the UN, to be d1sposed of by the Secretary・ General of the 
UN), but rather whether the government which appoints this 
<lelegat10n is quali自edto represent the state.'" 
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III. The RePr.esentation Issue as Question of Adjective Law and 
that of Material Law 
Thus there are serious quest10ns lurking behind the statement 
that“Credentials may accredit to powers conferred by a govern-
ment on its representatives. Representation 1s the right of a 
government to act on behalf of the state.叫め This paragraph is 
quoted not because It IS authoritative, but because it ・shows 
the common error in treating of the present issue 
. In the outset, It must be pomted out that no state may have 
a right to representation unless It has been recogmsed (in case 
of general internat10nal society〕oradmitted〔m case of particu -
Jar mternat10nal society constituted by a particular international 
legal order〕.A government, be it a universali)' and tradit10nally 
legitimate one, not bemg subject of law, may not have any right 
in the proper sense of the term It only exercises the right, if. 
any, of its state and in the name of that state. A government, 
that Is, may not as a matter. of course claim a seat in an inter-
national organisation, e g., in the United Nat10ns. This. is more 
so, when that government IS one mstituted by force and when 
the established government survives. 
Whereas m private law there is no difficulty m determmmg a 
natural person or a juristic person m case of change of factual 
or legal situation, in international law, by dmt of the peculiar 
nature of 'representation’， in case of change of government by 
force (a break in constitut10nal order of the state), the con-
nexion between the new government and the state that new gov-
ernment claims to represent, must be certified according to the 
law of that international organisation (in our present issue, the 
Charter of the UN). And if there be no expressed provisions in 
that particular legal order, analogy becomes compulsory. 
Here, It should be reminded, the 'change’of government, 
hence its quahfication/status to exercise the rights of the state, 
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1s m question. In the end this JS highly consequential on the 
rights and obligations of the state itself, and not rights/obhga-
tions of the government(s〕. It stands to reason that, being 
matter of succession of government, representation, in adjective 
law, is never an 'un -important’or 'less important' quest10n (in 
the wording of Article 18 of the Charter，‘other' questions〕．町
Correlatedly, representat10n, as question of material・ law, be-
comes much clearer in meaning. IPso facto, the existence of the 
established government, in our case here, that is the ・survival of 
the Nationahst Government which has heretofore been e・xercis-
mg the rights of the State of Chma since the coming into being 
of the UN, 1s a bar to approval by UN of quail自cat10riof the 
Mainland Regime to represent the State of・ China・ by other間同問
than that叩hichthe Charteγpγ・ovides. 
There IS not a single word in the Charter on‘change’of repre' 
sentation Neither 1s there anything about the follciwmg question・ 
Is a change of qualification for representation from one government 
to another of the same ・state member, in material law, subject 
to special conditions, and 1f so, what are these conditions＇町
Thus we have a very embarrassing s1tuat10n 
But the situation is not at all hopeless. There have been many 
lacunae in international law. They have -al been五lied’oneway 
o.r the other, and analogy is one of the most effective tech-
mques 
In theory, it would be convenient to consider that ‘・representa-
ti on’as quest10n of adjective law 〔whetherit is an 'important＇.’ 
quest10n under Article 18 (2〕isone thing, while 'representat10n' 
as quest10n of material law (that is, according to what legal 
cntena is change of qualification for representation approvable〕
1s another. Of course, the two can not be cut distinctly; they 
are two aspects of the same issue, hence are destmed to be 
mutually related 
To begm with, If, as havmg been. demonstrated; the Chinese 
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representation issue m adjective law be one of the ‘important 
questions' under Article 18 (2〕， sincein the same paragraph 
“the admission of new members to the UN”1s illustrated as 
another ‘important' quest10n, there is strong reason for one to say 
that with this as connecting agent Article 4 (1〕onadmission of 
new members would apply to similar・important’questionof 
Chinese representat10n issue.町 Furthermore,owing to the fact 
that individual recognition is admission of a government to 
represent its state in the general mternational society, there 
would be stronger reason for one to say that change in Chinese 
representation m UN can not be. discarded from conditions 
stipulated in Article 4 (1) of the Charter, which are similar to 
criteria for individual recognition. 
IV. UN Representation and Rec略nitio:n.-Appli田 .bilityof the 
Conditions for Admission of New Members 
It is maintained by many that representation m an interna-
tional organization has nothing to do with recognit10n by indi-
v1dual states. From this proposition there co立1esthe view tha t 
question 。frepresentation is matter。fcredentials'" ( unimpor-
tant in adiective law), and matter of e町ectivecontrol"' (m mate-
rial law〕connectedby the condition, provided in Article 4 (1〕
of the Charter, of “able to carry out”obligations contained in 
the Charter (and other international obligations, too〕．
No doubt, we may go too far 1f we endorse Ruiz’s extreme 
opininon, to the e百ectthat there exists no question of “Chinese 
UN representat10n”；＂＇ but it is equally hard to follow the view 
of the late Secretary-General Trygve Lie, as stated in his Memo-
randum, that the Chinese representation issue in UN is matter 
of effective control only.＇的
As a matter of fact, while recognition of new government by 
an individual state is matter of representat10n of the recognised 
government in the general international society (tradit10nal diplo-
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macy), judgment of an international orgamsatwn on change of 
qualification for representatwn is matter of recogmtion of that 
qualification of the new government by the international organー
isatwn And, smce nearly al states are Members of the UN, 
and are legally competent to cast a vote in the General Assem-
bly, it seems extraordinarily hard to say that the Chinese repre-
sentation issue in the UN differs in essence from recogmtion. 
The identity between criteria for individual recogoition and 
the conditions laid down m Article 4 (1) for admission of new 
members is no accident 
So considered, recogmtion and representatwn have somethmg 
essential in common (especially in the China problem, changes 
in both issues are made necessary by alleged change of 
government ms1de China〕. It follows that in this issue UN 
approval of change of quahfication for representation is matter of 
recognition by the UN. This 1s similar in the case of mdividual 
recogoition of new government, and mdeed nearly al writers 
who take the position of supportmg the Mainland Regime to sit 
in the UN agree on this pomt."' 
Approval by UN on the Chinese representation issue m favour 
of the Mainland Regime is, in this sense, a disguise of UN re-
cognition of that regime. It touches the legal status of the Na-
tionahst Government. This statement will be more convincing, if 
one takes into account the fact that the Nationalist Government 
has been representing China since the birth of the UN. In con-
sequence, denial by the UN to the Nationalist Government its 
contmued quahficatwn to represent the State of China amounts 
to withdrawal of recogmtion of that government by the UN."' 
This being so, it stands to strong reason that individual re-
cognition supphes cntena for recogoition by the UN (of change of 
quail自cationfor representation, that is, change of government). 
The criterion basic for al is, hke in the case of mdividual re-
cogmtion, the principle of e百ectivecontrol. And, as having been 
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pointed out, this, among other thmgs, becomes the contact agent 
between our present issue and the conditions for admiss10n(ability 
to carry out internat10na! obligations, etc ）ー Cond1t10nsfor 
recognition cannot be cut from dispute over UN representat10n; 
neither can cond1t10ns for adm回目onof new members. 
But e百ect1vecontrol, though 1t 1s the most important criterion 
for settlement of our present issue, is of course not the suffi ・ 
cient condition"' Subiect to what has been said on negative effects 
(aspect) of the principle of e百ectivecontrol叫， there are stil 
other necessary conditions, e g., peace・ lovmg the maintenance of 
which condit10n is the raison d’， tre of the UN itself 
In this regard, the Aggressor Resolut10n of the General As-
semb!y of 1951 becomes highly significant. Doubts have been cast 
on whether this ・Resolution 1s stil valid as of today. But such 
a Resolution, important as well as unprecedented, once made, 
will remam valid for the General Assembly in law no less 
than in politics〔prestigeof the UN). To allege that it has lost 
its validity, strong proofs must be submitted, at least to the 
effect that the condemned entity has shown some change in at-
titude to the satisfaction of the UN or of two-thirds of its member 
states And from recent facts it can hardly be said that the 
Mainland Regime has become a little more peace-loving than it 
was before. 
But there are many who challenge the apphcation of this con・ 
d1tion (of peace:]oving) to the Chinese representat10n ISsue. The 
common measure is that it 1s the state, not its government, 
that is the member of the UN, and that conditions for adm1s-
sion apply to state newly applying for membership, and not to 
a claim by a government whose state is already a member of 
the UN.叫
Such attack, though strong at first sight, is impotent in fact. 
as in theory We have given su伍c1entreasons m refusmg the 
latter pomt, and there remains the first p01nt to be answered. 
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If 1t be correct and realistic to say that 1t is the state, and 
not its government, that is the member of the UN, and that it 
is the government which 1s m effective control of the national 
terntory and over the people (pending the bar of negative effect 
of the principle of e百ectivecontrol), that 1s able to carry out 
international obligations of the state; 1t would be equally correct 
and realistic to say that exactly due to these, the attitude 
of the government determines the attitudes (e. g, peace・ loving 
or aggressive, or otherwise〕ofthe state and of the people. 
Putting aside for the moment the philosophic argument, that 
it 1s perhaps truer to say that the people, and not the state, 
1s the real sub1ect of the UN, 1t is here necessary to stress 
that a government can not claim effective control without also 
making a陀即oiof its attitude to the state 1t represents or claims 
to represent. In fact, there 1s no people or state that 1s m nature 
aggressive or peace-loving; what could be aggressive or peace-
loving is the government, the elite group, which leads the 
people, or which forces the people to・ follow. It is a government 
that is the obiect for the UN to consider, even in case of 
membership; and the vice versa 1s of course hardly a falsity. 
There are therefore many legal reasons against UN approval of 
qualification of the Mainland Regime to represent the Republic 
of Chma m the UN Organisat10n. 
V. Speciality of the UN Chinese Representation Issue-The Two-
China Theory and the Principle‘One State, One Membership’ 
in the UN 
Though the 1undlcal picture may be drawn as the above, m 
reality there seem to be many other feasibilities. These came 
from the unique characteristics of the issue ：〔1〕pre-juridical 
nature, and (2〕ambiguouscriteria. 
In the Charter, determmat10ns of major problems are 
undertaken in accordance with prescribed procedure (adiective 
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law), and specific criteria (material law〕forjudgment m 
voting attitude are presumably clearly given. However, despite 
the fact that disputes in most cases arise from interpretations 
of express stipulations, determinations (decisions〕are funda-
mentally political or, more properly, leg1slat1ve, and that is, 
pre-juridical. Being pre-juridical, voting attitudes, the casting 
-0f the votes, and the dec1s10ns themselves, are irrelevant from 
legal point of view. They involve no question of legahty or 
validity as a matter of law; they are the givens, and shall be 
.accepted as such 
Thus, before such omnipotence of a vote of the General As-
sembly'", the criteria (legal conditions) become impotent. Many 
possible ways are open for states in the legislative world, and 
in our issue the two China theory has been suggested by many 
.as one of such possible ways. 
As factual conditions and m a broad sense, there are many 
Chmas m the world: Outer Mongolia is a 'disputed’Chma, and 
Hongkong is no less than a de facto Chmese state. 
A form of solut10n, any two・ Chma theory is aimed at the 
crystallizat10n, or transformat10n, of the de facto situation into 
a de ;u開 one; and this is tantamount to altermg the status quo 
iu substance. No doubt, at least at present such a solution is 
dangerous as well as iufeasible. However, m theroy it may not 
be superfluous for us to take a look at the picture. 
There lS no agreed content on the form of crystalhzat10n/ 
transformation (by agreement between the parties to the civil 
strife in the Taiwan Straits as a result of changing their war-
.aims, or through some kind of fait accomPli (status quo main-
tammg), or to impose one through recognition or a vote in the 
UN, by cutting the hnkage of the Offshore Islands with Taiwan, 
etc.〕Originatedsometime before 1950 (UK），＇ηthis theory in 
fact bears so many various forms: a split-China (two Chmas 
fa the proper sense), one China-one-Taiwan (Formosa as a new 
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state), one China on Taiwan and one new China on mainland, 
two new Chinas (successor states), and independence of Taiwan 
by plebiscite, and so forth. There are, furthermore, suggestions 
of UN trusteeship, etc, which may not be named two-China. In 
any case, a two China situation through recogmtion and a two・ 
China situat10n as a result of the UN Chinese representation issue 
must be kept distmct. They are not the same thing not the 
same m ends and effects. While realizat10n of a two・ China 
through recognition needs consent from the rival parties and 
has direct bearings on the Taiwan Straits issue, a two Chma 
through decision in the UN is legally left to freedom of the 
members at their own risks but is without consent from the two・ 
Chinese political entities On the other hand, while the e旺ectm 
the case of recognition is umversal and vahd in the interna ・ 
tional society as a whole, in the case of a UN vote, a two・ China 
situation (if one be so made) would be valid only in the UN as 
particular international community and for the representation 
issue only In order to be universally valid, recogmtion is the 
only means '" 
Suggestions of a twか Chinareached its climax in 1958 and in. 
1960. After 1960, due to strong opposit10ns from both Chinese 
entities, and to mternational environment, this theory slipped 
underground. In early 1966, however, with a view to breaking 
through the Chinese representation issue, suggestions of this the・ 
ory made their re-appearance everywhere and, m March 1966, 
it became a pubhcly discussed solution of the Chma problem m 
the Unites States and in UN. 
Obiectlvely speaking, rea!isat10n of a two-China theory, what・ 
ever its form, is so di侃cultthat the theory itself would become 
impracticable For one thing, without consents from the Chinese 
entities, it is highly doubtful just how useful this theory may 
be 1t gives birth more to danger than to secunty Solution of 
the UN Chinese representation issue, after al, is not an end m 
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itself; it is only one of the means subiect to higher ends. To 
solve the UN representation issue improperly would, in any 
circumstance, give another UN representation issue In this 
event, the issue is not‘solved’， but is made less susceptible of 
bemg solved. 
This is not all Solution of this issue through a two-Chrna 
device is destined to fail. Though there is no certainty in saying 
that the Mainland Regime has not really intended to take over 
the seat rn UN, it is sure that for many years, especially in 
1958 and 1960, it took serious steps outside the UN which in our 
eyes are no more nor less than flank defenses for the Nat10nal-
1st Government in the UN as against the common enemy-against 
any attempt to make a two-Chma situation in the UN. And 
there is good logic that the Mainland Regime, if its intention is 
to choose the timmg best fitting itself to be seated m the UN, 
should defend the Nationalist Government for the sake of con-
tinuity, and perhaps of punty and mtegnty, of the Chinese State 
m the UN."' 'Solution’of the issue, and even one for the purpose 
of makmg both Chinese entities quah宣edto be seated in the 
UN, is meaningless now; and, seemg that al members of the UN, 
states for as well as agamst seating the Mainland Regime, 
dance in the UN under the puppetry of the Mainland Regime, 
the picture appears to be rather ridiculous. 
But even if the China problem, and its part the UN Chinese 
representation issue, be so complicated and be worsened day after 
day that a special solution should be carefully prepared, the 
two-Chma theory is not at al the only solution. 
What makes a two-Chma theory necessary is the apparently 
unchallenged rule ‘one State, one vote〔onemembership）’ in the 
UN as a result of the五rstbasic principle of ‘the sovereign 
equality of al . members' (Article 2 (1〕ofthe Charter). This 
prrnc1ple corresponds to the pnnciple 'one State, one government’ 
m general international society. But whereas the latter prin-
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ciple, save m very few temporary exceptions, has been consist-
ently maintained, the principle ‘one State, one membership 
(vote）’ in the UN rs rather loose from the beginning, and Its 
except10n is permanent m nature USSR, though a pseudo-Bun-
desstaat, holds 3 votes since the coming into being of the UN.'"' 
Sovereign equality, m political or jundical sense, is not an 
absolute rule here. In theory, approval of quahfication of the 
Mainland Regime does not iPso ju問 or妙sofacto exclude from 
the UN the delegation appointed by the Nationalist Government. 
Something may perhaps be fought out here There are perhaps 
some other means too, and If the two-China theory remains 
‘theoretical' at present, there is every good reason for 
deliberation of a means other than the two-China dev1ce 
Freedom of action of states on this issue may therefore be 
stated m plam terms as follows. Approval or disapproval by 
the UN of the qualification of the Mainland Regime to represent 
the Chinese State necessitated by a revolution (not necessarily 
change of government because the established government stil 
surv1ves and is recognized by many member states), is a col-
Jectrve-legislative act independent of individual acts of voting 
by member states. Under the veil of a 'general (collective〕
will' expressed in an a節目native(or negョtive)vote of neces-
sary majority in compliance with law, the voters (member states) 
are free from individual risks m their respective voting attitude, 
though the qualification of either of the Chmese entities in the 
UN is thus constitutively declared by that majority vote. Under 
the legislative shield, that is to say, freedom of action of 
states on thrs issue is infinite 
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Notes 
1) See, however, note (48) of this Part and the text referred thereto. 
2〕Fora definition of r田ogmtion,see Brown in A] (1950) p. 617. 
3〕Subject,of course, to the d1ff1culty ra!Sed m the last paragraph 
of the previous Chapter. However, in this regard there is similarity 
between recognition and UN representation See Chapter 4 (II). 
On the other hand, a line should be drawn between recognition by 
individual states within general international legal order, and rec-
ogmtion (or, if tb1s term is undesirable, approval〕byUN (that is, 
“col!etive recognition”as suggested by Kelsen and Wright de lege 
ferenda〕ofthe qualification of a government to represent its state 
in the UN, which is a particular legal order constituted by. the 
Charter Cf. Alexandrow1cz-Alexander in A］〔1952)p. 630, Kelsen 
in A] (1941〕p,605. 
There are some who doubt whether the act of recognition as such 
is the necessary condition or sufficie叫 conditionfor legitimacy of 
government instituted by force ; and there is strong reason for one 
to share such doubt. On this point, see Ottolenghi，“I Pnncipio d1 
Effettivit包ela sua Funzione nell’Ord Int.ヘinScγil! vari di Dir. 
Int., vol Primo (1959) p 250, and Gemma in Hague Recueil, Inc. 
cit・， nota 39 Cf Fenwick in A] (1944) Ed. Comment 
To avoid misunderstanding, it is helpful to note here that at the 
present stage of mternational law recognition, as a legal institution, 
is, as against the hope of many authorities m the field of mterna-
tional la、＂・ stil m the process of crystallisation, hence it is 
inevitable that it brings with it some residuum of political colour 
This makes recognition somewhat different from something like 
transfer of title to, or sovereignty over, a territory. V A 
Alexander，品id.,p. 631 and p 632 Smith，日ydeand others confirmed 
this view, see Schwarzenberger m his Letter to the Editor, the 
London Times, Jan 9, 1950, Brown in A] (1950) p. 640; Ottolengh1, 
ibid , p 256, Costa in Revue General de Dr Int. Pub. (RGDIP) (1922) 
p. 51. 
But al these do not mean that recognition is a political act pure 
and simple They only draw attent10n to the fact that recognition 
involves vision and political wisdom, and that smce the mterna-
tional society is yet highly decentralised, though there exist some 
objective standards for Judgement of commission or omission of the 
act of recogmtion, this act itself nonetheless remains one about 
which individual states are apt to assume arbitrary attitude as if 
they were free to decide everything As a matter of fact, decisions 
on recognition are legally very difficult as well as politically 
highly burdensome. See Kaufmann in Hague Recueil (1935〕p.380. 
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For an account of states recogmsmg either of the two Chmese 
entities (mcluding those recognising neither), see Halpern (ed.), 
Policies toward China (1965), Appendix A. At present, states re-
cogmsmg ROC are a little greater in number, than states recog-
nising the Mamland Regime In the main句 however,it can be said 
that on this issue there is a condition of balance 
Due to the fact that our question here is one of recagmt10n of 
government, and not of state, many theoretically complicated, pro-
found and important questions are avoided. Among such questions 
the most fundamental is no doubt the controversy between the 
constitutive theory and the declaratory theory as to the nature and 
effect of the act of recognition This controversy “applies only in-
cidentally to recogmt10n of governments" (Higgins, The Development 
of Int. Law through the Political Organs of the UN (1963) p. 136). 
4〕 Thereis no general agreement as to how many, and what, condi-
tions are sufficient to justify an act of recogmtion. Many state-
ments de lege desiderata, though suggestive, remain doubtful from 
pomt of view of existing la、v The core is the weight and balance 
between the objective test and the subjective test, though writers tend 
to go to the extreme of one and exclude the other. More concretely, 
the real point is whether willingness to fulfil international ohliga-
tions, like ability to fulfil same, has the same weight as measure 
for judgment in a particular act of recogmtion (hence of withdrawal 
of recognition), and whether, say, Jefferson’s formula ‘the will of 
the nation, substantially declared，’ is as vital as the condition of 
effective control over people and territory See Lauterpacht’s arti-
cle in the London Times (Jan 6, 1950〕andSchwarzenberger’s cri-
ticism thereof (m his Letter to the Times (Jan 9, 1950) op. cit , 
directly on the China problem). See further, Chen, op. cit., p. 118 
f., Fenwick in AJ (1948) Ed Comm p. 865 and in ibid (1953) pp 
658 660, Sperduti in RDI (1953) pp. 49 50. As a matter of fact, 
the d1stinct10n bet、.veenthe obiective and the subiective tests can 
never be absolute: objective test seen from another angle may 
become subiectzve test, and vice versa. But there is no doubt on the 
statement that “effective control" is the greatest common 
measure amongst writers on recognition, as in fact it is at least 
a necessary condition for recognition (Cf. Miaja, El Pnnc1pio 
de Efectividad en Derecho Int. (1958) note 8 and pp. 12, 27) 
After al, in most cases it is change in physical control over a 
people and a territory by political entities, that makes necessary 
foreign states to reconsider their recognition policies. 
5) In a certam sen田， thisprinciple is the basis of evidence to Justify 
recognition, subject to the negative aspect of the same principle itself. 
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See the followmg paragraphs. 
6）“Effective control" applies also to other matters, e g., prescription, 
but we deal here only with its relation to recognition of government 
7〕“Effectmty'’isasserted as a fundamental legal principle, that is, 
a pre-juridical norm (Ser em, Dir. Int. (I) (1956) pp 112-3〕； asa 
rule that interprets a factual situation (Barile, I1 Dir. assoluti 
nell’Ord Int (1951) p. 204); as a principle not normative but 
informatory, i.e., as evidence (Sperduti in RD! (1953) op. cit., pp 
48-9 and m ibid. (1959〕p 149 ; cf Ottolenghi, op cit , p.324 et 
seq, where effectlvity is explamed as something having no norma-
tive function). It is also denied by some the nature of a "general 
prmc1ple of law recognized by civilized nations”（Miaja, op cit., 
p 83), it is, again, even conceived as a 'fiction’〔idem〕
Thus, the nature of 曲目 rule（？〕 isfar from clear. However, it 
seems reasonable and safe to follow Visscher, when he says 
that “L’effectivite est une notion qui occupe en dro1t mternational 
une place particulierement importante, mais encore mal d五fime"
which statement suggests that effectlvity is at the present stage a 
presumption (C. de V1sscher in RGDIP (1958〕pp.601, 609; cf “The 
Tinoco Case" (1923), in Scott & Jaeger, Cases on Int. Law (1937) 
p. 96 f., and Briggs, The Law of Nations, Cases, Document' and 
Notes (1938〕p.115 f.). 
8〕Whilethe maxim ex g削urianon oritur j山 isupheld by maionty 
of writers, the contrary maxim, ex factis ins oritur appears to be 
true for others 〔cf.Salv1oh m R1vista int. di Filosofia del Dir 
(1931) p. 585, and m Hague Recue1l (1933〕（IV)pp. 51-54; Verdross, 
Die Verfassung des Volkerrechtgememschaft〔1926〕S.129 et seqふ
Thus one might be obliged to have recourse to Jellinek’s 'normative 
force of facts' which calls for epistemological issues between the 
Sollen and the Sein. 
9) Verdross, ibid., SS. 90 91. There is every reason for one hke 
Fenwick to challenge the traditional criteria from historical view-
pomt, supported by the clear fact that techniques of ‘control’（to-
ward the standard of‘effective’〕 haveduring the past years been 
improved (and better, have become more‘tricky’）， to the extent that 
the concept“control" has been altered qualitatively. See on this 
point, Fenwick in AJ (1953〕opcit., pp. 659 660, Carreau in Pol 
Etrangier (1959) p. 79. 
10〕Fenwickin AJ (1944〕＂Ed.Comm人 pp.448 9, 452. 
11) Once more attention is drawn to the rule that presumption is m 
favour of the established government Prediction on the success or 
failure of the established government is inadmissible, see supra 
note (13) of Part I and the text referred thereto 
12) Cf Mrnia, op cit , p 24, where conditions for effectuating a factual 
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situation are given as origm, intensity, and duration 
13) See supra Chapter I (III) (3). Putting these two points together, 
and we have a further question of government-in exile or state-in-
exile. Attempt to realtze a‘split-state’theory would become some-
thing more than probability here 
14) Lauterpacht, Recognition rn International Law (1948〕，quotedby 
himself in his article in the London Times (Jan. 6, 1950〕 The
"isolated fortress" extremity was used by Q Wright, mistakenly 
too, to deny the Nationalist Government its legitimacy (in AJ 
1955, p. 323〕．
15) Recogmtton in Int Law, ibid., § 38 This was reproduced in his 
article in the London Times, ibid, in the form of“reasonable 
prospect of reasserting its authority”. In this respect, it must be 
reminded that Lauterpacht is proved to be incorrect m his negative 
prediction of the Nationalist Government’s survival, which predic-
tton would be correct in ordinary cases, see, supra note 20 of Part 
I and the text referred thereto. 
16) See supra, the concluding parts of Chapter 1 and Chapt~r 2. 
:17〕 Chen,Int. Law of Recognition, op. cit., p. 291, italics mine.“The 
de facto governmentヘhecontinued on something having regard to 
our Taiwan issue，“although wielding actual power in the territory 
under its control, may not, according to the traditional view, be 
regarded as the sovereign of the territory. ”And then he went to 
the extreme, by saying that“This is true even if the de jure 
government has been completely ousted, or, indeed, has disap-
peared.”（idem〕.Concur, Starace, op ci仁， p.80. 
"18〕 Ruiz,op cit , p 69. Ruiz and others go to the extreme in some 
other aspects, e. g., moral standpoint, Carreau〔inop cit.,) went 
so far as to say that Mao’s regime represents nobody Cf. Hornbeck 
in Foreign Affs (1955-56〕．
19) It is therefore equally possible for one to cast doubt on the‘one 
state, one government’principle with equal weight of reason 
・20) Cf. Wright, AJ (1955〕p.325; Fenwick, ibid. (1953) p. 660; 
Sperduti, op cit, pp 48,49, 55 
・21) Supra (I) of this Chapter . 
. 22) The practice that recogmtion of a new government by a foreign 
government must be accompanied by withdrawal of recognition of 
the established government by that foreign government, hence automatic 
withdrawal of recognition of that foreign government by this es-
tablished government, is the result of the principle“one state, one 
government"; see nザra(III〕ofthis Chapter. On the nature of with-
drawal of recognition, see Kelsen in AJ (1941〕p.611 It is, of 
course, not inconceivable that there exist political, informal, rela-
tions between these two through a third state, thus the situation is 
576 
similar to one in time of war between enemy states, or that between 
states having broken diplomatic relations. But in the former case 
there is a hostile character between states and not between govern・
ments, and recovery of peaceful relations is anticipated. In case of 
states breakmg diplomatic relations, their mutual recognrhon 
remains intact The natures are not the same 
23) This differs from “representation”of a state in an international 
organization (e. g.・theUnited Nations〕which1s understood as a 
particular mternahonal legal order. On the nature of‘representa-
tion’of a state, v. Sperduti, m RD! (1953) p 336 and note 68 idem. 
24) Sperduti, ibid .pp. 56-57, Donato Donati in RD! (1914〕p346 and'. 
notes (1) and (2) idem. 
25〕Cf.Jellinek, Die Allgemeine Staatslehre, Italian transl (1921〕p
617. The second pomt has another aspect on representation in an 
mternational organization (interrelations among states in a par-
hcular legal order and relation of a state to that international 
orgamzation), reflected in the‘one State, one vote (one membership)" 
pr_inci_ple, see infra Chapter 4 (V). See further, on this pnnc1ple 
proper, Ottolengh1, op. cit., pp. 237, 250 
26〕 Silvainin “Revue Politique et Parl’ヘ， tom.225 (1958〕
27) R田olutionof Gen. Assembly, 1668 (XVI) 1961. In 1950, the issue 
)Vas disposed of by the Special Com血 itteeappomted by the General 
Assembly no agreement could be reached on this issue at the 
Committee In 1951. the General Assembly, through a Resolut10n of 
February 1. declared that the Mainland Regime 1s an aggressor in・ 
the Korean War. The validity of this Resolution would later 
become a disputd, because it directly concerns the ‘peace-lovmg•· 
condition (Article 4 (1〕ofthe UN Charter on admission of new 
members) asserted to be applicable analogically to the present 
issue. In 1964 (the 19th Session), due to antagonism among Great 
Powers on the expenditure of UNEF m the Congo, the United 
Nations met a fmancial and political crisis; that Session was. 
declared to postpone sine die, and substantially m that Session 
there was no discussion on this issue. 
28〕 Fordetails on voting attitudes of states in the General Assembly 
on this issue, see Halpern (ed.) Policies toward China (1965), op 
cit., Appendix B 
29) The terms 'adjective law' and ιmaterial law' refer to the proce-
dural provisions and the substant阻Iprovisions respectively They are 
used here to avoid confusions with the terms ‘procedural matters', 
etc町田 usedin the Charter which bear different meanings 
A line may be drawn, on the one hand, between the Chinese 
representation issue and other possible future questions of the same 
nature about states non-permanent members and not directly mvolv-
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ing struggle between Great Power groups; on the other hand, 
between representat10n questions and pseudo representation questions. 
Thus our present issue differs in either of these two aspects, from 
the Indian-Pakistani Case (1947, state succession), the Czechoslo-
vakian Case (1948, successful coup d’etat), the Hungarian Case 
(1956, suppression of revolution by foreign troops), the Case of Iraq 
(1958〕andthe Case of Yemen 〔1962)(both quest10ns of representation 
proper), and also from the Case of the Congo (Leopoldville〕（1960
61, domestic political vacuum, absence 。fa legitimate E。vernn
All the above listed cases were disposed。fas questions of cre-
・dentials’but in none of them was there a dual-government phenom-
enon like the one existing in China. The present issue therefore 
fmds no precedent in the history of the United Nations, and ad-
祖国s1bilityof disposal of this issue as matter of credentials is ques-
tionable Cf Memorandum of the UN Secretary-General, Feb. 1950, 
“Legal Aspects of Problems of Representation m the UN”（S/1466; 
・SCOR. V, Supp. for Jan. May 1950, pp. 18-23), Higgins, The De-
velopment of Int Law through the Political Organs of the UN, op cit 
p 152 f. Due to legal difficulties and political complexity of the 
pr田 entissue, the General Assembly passed a Resolution _(Dec. 14, 
1950, GAOR V, Supp 2日， A/1775,on p. 24〕suggestinga highly 
abstract and, to speak frankly, ambiguous, criterion：“in the light 
of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstance 
of each case" 
:JO) No doubt, the wordmgs of Article 18 (2〕and(3) and of Article 
27(2) and (3〕arenot the same. One step further, they bear clearly 
different forms and implications While in Article 18 weight is put on 
‘other questions' (not “all" other questions, hence a little restrictive) 
and it gives extensive meaning to paragraph (2) which is not at al 
exhaustive; m Article 27, weight is put on 'al other matters' (non-
procedural, hence perhaps more important, matters) The meanings 
are, in result, not the same 
'31) Memorandum of the UN Secretary-General, cited in supra note 
29. See also Higgins, op. cit., pp 133, 157 and notes, pp. 158-164; 
Aufricht m AJ (1949) p. '699 f. 
'32) Quadri, Diritto lnternazionale Pubbl., Il Ediz (1960〕p.490. 
.3〕 CfKelsen, General Theory of Law and State 〔Wedbergtransl , 
1949) xvi, Monaco, Manuale di Diritto Int. Pubb! , (1960) pp 316-
317. On 'representation’and 'agent’in various senses and on their 
natures, see Kelsen, ibid, pp 83, IOI, 107-8. and p. 289 f , Holland, 
Jurisprudence, 8th ed (1896) p. 264; Ledlie, Sohm’S Institutes of 
Roman Law, 3rd ed. (1907) pp 219 ff, 431 f.None of these authors 
deals with‘representation’which we are now questioning; in fact, 
hardly is there a definition of“representat10n in the international 
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orgaization＇’available m textbooks of international law. 
34) Cf. Sperduti m RD!, op. cit , note on page臼， wherethe pomt時
pushed deeper, that Sperduti technically denies the state its 
qualification to represent the people. 
35〕 W.W Boyer. in Pol. Science Quarterly (1961) No 3, p, 338 
36) In this connection, smce the wordings and forms of Articles 18 
and 'l:/, hence their meanings, are different 〔supranote 30 of this 
Part〕， andbecause the Chinese representation issue seems to be no 
less ιimportant’than some of the‘important’questions expressly 
illustrated 〔hencenot exhaustive) in Article 18, it may not be un-
reasonable to say that, by analogy this issue could be mterpreted to 
be one of the important Question 'included’under Article 18〔2).
And if so, one step further there would seem no reason why a vote 
is always neccessary on whether this issue is or is not an‘important’ 
question. If this mterpretation be admitted, then, to push one more 
step, m case a resolution be passed in the General Assembly, to the 
effect that the present issue is an •uniロiportant' question, this might 
amount to a de facto amen曲目ntof Article 18〔2〕m spirit if not in 
strict wordmg; although, however, it must not be overlooked that 
this may also be justified under Article 18 (3〕asmatter of inter-
pretation. 
37) Similar logic may also be said of the Aggressor-Resolution of the・ 
General Assembly (1951). In other words, this Resolution may 
function as a lrnk between the Chmese representation issue and' 
Article 4, m the sense that the condition ‘peace-loving’m that 
article would be directly against the position of the Mainland 
Regime, whether the Mamland Regime is really interested to be・ 
seated in the UN notwithstandmg. 
38) Wright in AJ (1955) p 337, Fitzmaurice in Yearbook of World' 
Affs. (1952) pp 37, 39 and 43-44; Brohi m Hague Recueil (1961) 
〔I〕（1962〕Tom 102, Lecture V, p. 198, p, 199. See also the case of 
credentials of the Ethiopian delegation in 1936 (League of Nations), 
in Aufricht, op. cit., pp. 682-683 Ruiz. op. cit pp. 8, 89, 91, 94, 95. 
96; Kelsen, The Law of the UN (1951) pp. 945-946; Higgins, op. 
cit., p 151, p. 157; International Conciliation, No 534 (Sept. 1961〕
p 32; Klooz m AJ (1949) pp 250 1. 260, Kerley in AJ (1959〕p.325; 
Briggs in Int. Organisation (1952〕p 208; Appleton in Pacific Affs 
(1962) p 167; A. Alexander m AJ (1952) p. 639. 
The recourse to effective control, be it noted, is an admission of 
the applicability of Article 4(1〕tothe Chmese representation i自由
39) Ruiz, op. cit , p.91, Briggs, in AJ (1949〕p.121. Ruiz, by assert-
mg that the Chinese representation issue involves change of state・ 
personality, brings forth the question of state continuity of the 
Republic of China In theory, besides this point, there is a question 
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of vacuum of China’s membership in the UN, hence also the question 
of re-adm1ss10n in case the Mainland Regime is to sit m the Gen-
era! Assembly, should the Nationalist Government be driven out of 
the UN Perhaps due to this, together with the possible fear that 
such vacuum at the Security Council or in the General Assembly 
might give chance for realization of a two-China theory, the Main 
land Regime has been cooperative in maintaining the civil strife in 
the Taiwan Straits by shelling Kinmen, etc., with a view to support-
ing its rival to temporarily remain in the UN, til it really intends 
to step mto that organizat10n. There are, furthermore, also question 
of change of name〔fromthe Republic of China into the “People's" 
Republic of China), and of possibility of expulsion of a permanent 
member (see Kelsen, The Law of the UN, op cit., pp. 948 49, Fitz-
maurice, op cit, p. 54). 
40〕Evenif this be true, there still remains the problem of the 
meaning of the rule of effective control. This 1s similar m the case 
of recognition, see supra Chapter 3〔！）.In fact, the UN representation 
issue requires something more than effective control. 
41) Feinberg m Hague Recueil (1952〕（！） pp 336-7; H1ggms, op. cit目，
pp. 164-166; Rosenne in BY (1949〕p.447. Cf. Kelsen, The Law of 
the UN, p 947 note; Y L Liang in AJ (1951) p 689. 
42) Higgins, op. cit, p 132; Rosenne, op. cit .p 447. Wright used 
the term ‘recogmtion of status quo', but in substance it is nothing 
different from recognition of qualification, see Wright in AJ (1950), 
Ed. Comm’t, p. 552 ff and m ibid (1955) p. 325. 
43) See !CJ Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1948, on“Conditions of 
Admission of a State to Membership in the UNヘ！CJReports, 1948 
The same is also true of the condition of "willingness to carry out 
UN obligations” In fact, such willingness is another name for 
“peace-lovmg” 
44) Supra Chapter 3〔1)and (I〕
45) Higgins, op. cit., p. 158; Brohi, op cit., pp. 195-96. Cf. Cuban 
representative in the Committee of Experts, UN Doc. SC /1/SR 113, 
pp. 3-4, quoted in Liang in AJ (1951) p. 692. Contra, Rmz, op. cit., 
pp. 91-92. See further, Kelsen, The Law of the UN, pp. 946-47. 
46) Friedmann, The Changing Structure of Int Law (1964) p. 32. 
47〕 InUSA, however, the two China theory is rooted in Dulles' idea 
of separatrng Taiwan from mainland, which presupposed the 
町 nbiguous’statusof Taiwan. It was given expression in the 
Chiang-Dulles Joint Communique of Oct 13, 1958. 
48) For the two China theory, see, Memorandum published by the US 
State Dept. (Aug. 11, 1958), Kennedy’s speech at the National Pr田S
Club immediately before he became US President (Jan. 1960〕，Pamph-
let entitled“Looking Ahead" series (No l〕 published by UK 
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Labour Party (1961). About theory, see Seligman, The US Should 
Change Its China Poltcy (1958〕； Scalapinoin The Conlon Report 
(1959) and his Analysis on US North E町tAsian Policy (1961); A. 
Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (Japanese Tr 1961 p. 486 
ff.); Stevenson in For. Affs. (Jan. 1960〕， ChesterBowles in ibid. 
(Apr 1960〕 Secretaryof State Rusk, too, has been one of the 
zealous supporter for a successor-state style two Chma 
49) The Mainland Regime showed its clearest attitude in the latter 
part of 1965, by imposing counter-conditions for its bemg seated 
in the General Assembly. The conditions include amendments of 
the Charter, nammg USA an aggressor, and re-examination of the 
qualifications of the UN members. See Chen Yi's statement on Sept. 
29, 1965. 
Such attitude is, however, not surprising. On the contrary, it 
should have been anticipated. Every year, before and during the 
plenary session of the General Assembly, the Mainland Regime as a 
rule takes steps to block any move to fight for its bemg seated in 
the UN (including a two-China theory); and, curious enough, the 
degree of fury of its attitude has appeared to be in propnrtion to 
the extent the move seems to be favourable to its being seated in 
the UN. 
50〕 Frankel.The Making of Foreign Policy (1963) p 13. 
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PART THREE 
JAPANフSCHINA PROBLEM 
The title “Japan’s China Problem" bas specific implications 
It sigmfies that for different states the Chma Problem, or an 
lSSue thereof, bears 副首erentmeanings, due to their respective 
international environments and/or domestic conditions This 
presumes that position of State A may not be the same as 
posit10n of State B, m face of the same issue of the Chma 
problem In this sense, every state is m a special position 
when faced by a situation/problem. Proper criticism for/ 
agamst a certain action 〔inaction)of State A may not claim 
to be equally effective for/against that of State B as a matter 
of course. There is no general standard for criticism of act10ns 
of states in the China problem (and m other problems too〕．
CHAPTER 5 JAPAN’S MARGINAL POSITION-THE 
RESTRICTIVE ISSUES AND OTiIER Lll¥UTATIONS 
In the above Chapters, freedom of act10n of states in general 
in the China problem is to some extent clear. What, then, is 
Japan’s freedom of act10n in the China problem, m particular? 
General freedom of action of states is a measure for compar・
ison, in case of checking whether a particular state is more 
restricted in its action radius, or is given a caγte blanche due 
to its special position m face of a certain situat10n giving rise 
to some problems. Such restriction or carte blanche !S, in most 
cases, a result of existence (or absence〕 of special legal 
relations (e.g, treaty, etc.〕．
In dealmg with the China problem, Japan bears special restric-
tions m this sense There are of course many other restric-
tions, pohtical in nature But so far regardmg the China 
problem, for Japan the Juridical is in essence far more vital than 
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the political. This is so, because there exists a peace treaty, 
and that is, a treaty basic in nature, between Japan and ROC 
This peace treaty, in law as m fact, becomes the source, and 
in fact the bounds, of restrictions on Japan’s actions m the 
China problem. Study of such restnct10ns must also start from 
discussion of this source 
The legal effects of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (1952) is 
therefore the main pomt for this Chapter. Polit1cal/d1plomatic 
restrictions, formal or informal, from USA on Japan’s 
actions are presupposed, because for the Japanese Government 
US attitude on the China problem has always been the 
paramount factor, though it must be added immediately that 
some resistance has in fact been made with success 
I. The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (1952〕ー B田，kground
Durmg the past years, doubts have been cast upon whether 
this peace treaty is a Peace treaty, and disputes have arisen 
about interpretation of the territorial sphere of application of 
this treaty目
Since this peace treaty was made under very peculiar circum-
stances, and smce interpretat10ns of treaty provisions (and 
documents attached thereto〕cannot be divorced from such 
口rcumstances,the background of the makmg of this treaty 
becomes greatly relevant 
In 1951, immediately after sigmng the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, Japan was confronted with a necessity to choose one of 
the two Chmese entities for the making of a separate peace 
treaty with the State of Chma. Due to pressure from USA 
and to considerat10n of nat10nal defence, the then Prime Mimster 
Yoshida, in a letter (The Yoshida Letter of December 24, 1951〕
to J. F. Dulles, then Special Envoy of US President to Japan, 
pledged that Japan would choose as 'China’the Nat10nalist 
Government of the Republic of China, and would make with it 
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“a treaty to reopen normal relations" Yoshida also asserted 
that Japan “has no intention to make bilateral treaty w1th the 
Communist regime of China”. " It was also made clear that the 
application of the treaty to be made with the Nationalist 
Government would be limited withm the area under actual 
control (and areas that may in future come under the control) 
of that government. The content of this Letter was rea!Ized 
in the Smo・ Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952, and the point as to 
“applicat10n”was adopted in the form of Exchange of Notes 
attached to that Treaty 
At the t1me when th1s treaty was being made, there was 
indeed disagreement as to whether 1t should be named a 'peace 
treaty', or otherwise 'basic treaty’or ‘treaty of friendship' 
which would be local m nature without necessity to insert a 
territorial app!Ication clause. This involved exclusive legitimacy 
of the Nationalist Government and Taiwan’s status. Whereas 
Japan, in order to keep a free hand m future for its possible 
relat10ns with the Mamland Regime, intended to make a treaty 
“to normahze relat10ns between the two governments”ペ hence
to make it w1th ‘one of the Chinese governments’（a so-called 
’limited peace') ; the Nationahst Government msisted on making 
a‘peace’treaty which would imply that 1t was the only govern-
ment representing the State of Chma " Here lies the ongin of 
di旺erencesin the interpretat10n of this treaty 
Be this as it may, by compromise th1s treaty was at length 
named a‘peace' treaty, and the form and content followed 
those of a typical peace treaty. Quid Pro q悶o,Japan succeeded 
in restnctmg its ternttorial applicat10n, which would be under-
stood in the Exchange of Notes that .“The articles of the 
present treaty, in respect of the Republic of China, will apply 
to all territones at present under the control, and territones 
that hereafter may come under the control, of the Government 
of the Republic of China”. In addition to this, Japan also ob-
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tained, as considerat10n, from the Republic of China the “sign of 
magnanimity and good-will" to“give up war indemmty from 
Japan to Chma”.＂ In this way, Japan succeeded in her double-
blade play: on the one hand, it put an end to the state of war 
between the two states, on the other hand, for the future it 
kept a free hand for herself to deal with the Mamland Regime. 
Taking advantage of the status quo in Chma, therefore, Japan, 
a defeated country, realized a dream of unprecedented victory 
in her diplomacy. However, 1t became clear later that her 
double-blade was unworkable. From the very beginning, the 
Mainland Regime denounced this treaty (by its claim of legit-
imacy) and the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 (on the 
maxim Paeta tertiis nee noeent nee Prosunt)," and declared that 
it reserved the right to demand war mdemmty from Japan的．
Evidently, m the context of such denunciation and reservat10n, 
it also hinted that the demand could be about 50 billion US 
dollars." This made Foreign Minister Shigemitsu of the 
Hatoyama Cabinet say m the Diet that the Nat10nalist Govern-
叩 entis 'the’legitimate government of China, and since then 
that government has been formally so treated by Japan. The 
Sino Japanese Peace Treaty was thus made general in nature; 
and m logic there exists no more question of war mdemnity 
from Japan to Chma But this Peace Treaty nonetheless remains 
one sui ge岬gγis,departing that 1s from an ordinary peace treaty 
at least m so far as terntonal apphcation is concerned. And 
this also 1mphes that, hke it or not, Japan has to support the 
theory of constructive〔formal)control of the Nationahst Gov-
ernment over mainland, which leads to an admission of the 
existence of a civil stnfe in China today. 
JI. The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (1952〕－Re・interpretation 
。fthe Fundamental Points'' 
Consequently, whatever argument・ may be put forth, this 
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peace treaty is a‘peace’treaty and has ever since its being 
made become the basis of post-war relations between the 
Republic of Chma and Japan. 
By this peace treaty, the Chinese Government headed by 
Chiang Kai shek and the Japanese Government headed by Yosluda 
Sh1geru recogmzed each other as representmg China and Japan 
respectively. In theory, the former iPso jure also recogmzed 
the fact that the defeated State of Japan became an independent 
state.'' In this manner, this treaty simultaneously concerned 
recogmt10n of the Government of Chma and recognition of 
Japan’S independence and of Yoshida’s government to represent 
Japan. The choice which Japan seemed to have been forced to・ 
make in 1951 was therefore not one as to whether or not to 
make peace with China, which makmg was accordmg to mterna-
tional law a necessity to put an end to the state of war, but 
one as to which of the two Chmese‘governments’was to re-
present Chma as far as Japan was concerned There might, 
however, m the logic of war, be some reason for the Mamland 
Regime to deny the existence (hence vahdity〕ofthis peace 
treaty, and to assert for itself the right to opt in the matter 
of making peace with Japan for the trmmg and the form, etc., 
and even, like the Japanese Government did m 1951, to choose 
“a”Japanese Government as the other party to such a peace 
treaty. Provided that Japan tries to recogmze the Mamland 
Regime, the latter has the legal initiative in making peace. 
But there is also something for Japan to say The treaty of 
1952 between Japan and the Republic of China is a peace treaty. 
A peace treaty, according to international law, is “the normal 
means to restore peace”， and serves a double-purpose : ter・
minat10n of a state of war and settlement of questions which caused 
that war and questions which were given rise dunng that war." 
And since a state of war exists only between states, and because 
Japan, legally, chose the Nat10nal!st Government as represent 
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ing the State of Chma, the state of war between Japan and 
China came to an end with that treaty, and with it all questions 
commg mto being before and/or during that war were hquidated 
once and for al. IPso jure, that is to say, there will be no 
more legal necessity for another peace treaty between the two 
states with a view to endmg the state of war of 1937-1945, which 
would otherwise be required for restoration of peace and nor-
malization of diplomatic relations; hence to Japan there appears 
no ground for the Mamland Regime to demand any reparation 
for that war." In this sense, the view, preva1hng m Japan, that 
this peace treaty made・ a partial peace or limited peace, 1s 
hurtful for Japan herself. 
However, it is pointed out by some that Japan’s recognition 
of the Nationalist Government 1s a special kind of recognition, 
in the context of the dual-government phenomenon 川 Interms 
of effective control (hence the effectivity of the provisions of 
that peace treaty is mvolved〕， asunderstood by the parties in 
the Exchange of Notes this treaty is automatically broadened in 
its terntonal sphere of application or is susceptible of losmg 
validity, according as the Nationalist Government may be success-
ful to return to the mainland or as the dual-government 
phenomenon may disappear. In this sense, it is submitted, 
it is a treaty at present not covering the mainland area. 
But it is mainland that is vital for the purpose of making 
peace between Japan and Chma. Recognition of the Nationalist 
Government as the legitimate government of Chma, m law, 
seems to give the peace treaty general validity for the State of 
China. Thus factual effectivity of this treaty does not adapt itself 
to its sphere of validity. In other words, regarding Taiwan, the 
peace treaty is fully valid and effective, concerning mainland, 
its e百ectivity(and, perhaps, validity〕isconditional. 
The condition appears in the Exchange of Notes. It is a sus-
pensive one It means that the p田cetreaty will apply also to 
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mamland when and if the Nationalist Government regains its 
power over mainland (legal validity to follow factual effective 
control〕Acontraγ'io, so long as the Nationalist Government can 
not in fact return to mamland, the peace treaty applies only as 
far as Taiwan and the Isles of Kmmen and Matsu. The Exchange 
of Notes bemg an mtegral part of the Peace Treaty, it seems 
not unfair to say that this peace treaty itself expressedly places 
restriction on its own validity, hence the question concerning 
its apphcabihty to the mainland may be something beyond 
factual effectivity. 
Here m theory there lies an implied resolutive condition: 
when and if the Nat10na!ist Government no longer exists, this 
peace treaty would also lose its validity. And if the Nationalist 
Government disappears without being able to touch mainland, 
this peace treaty would have nothmg to do with mainland 
because this has been understood in the Exchange of Notes. 
Accordingly, even if the Mamland Regime compromises and 
succeeds to rights and obhgations under the Sino・ Japanese Peace 
Treaty of 1952, this would only have meaning for the area of 
Taiwan. The peace treaty, in this theoretical aspect, would 
appear to be a local treaty and its validity unstable. In the 
context of the war-indemnity issue, this becomes very serious, 
and is deadly to Japan. Through the understanding expressed 
in the Exchange of Notes, Japan originally intended to reserve 
for herself freedom of act10n toward the Mainland Regime in 
future, but she also hangs her own neck through the same for-
mal understandmg Should there be no such understandmg, that 
is to say, at least in law Japan would be m the nght to assert 
that this peace treaty, by operation of the law, applies to the 
entirety of the State of Chma. There is therefore no double 
blade: it is legally impossible and logically contradictory to talk 
about a limited peace (or hmited recogmt10n), and to assert at 
the same time that the recovery of peace is not hmited. "' 
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This logic betrays Japan’S original intention. So interpreted, 
the Sino I apanese Peace Treaty, which has heretofore been 
Japan's diplomatic booty of her military defeat in a war and 
her slueld against both Chmese entities, would become a heavy 
burden for I a pan in the meantime 
However curious this may sound to some, 1t remains always 
true that this 1s only the necessary result of what is intrinsic 
to legal iustice to keep balance m iuridical relations (rights 
and obligations). 
On political plane, the consequence is the same. The peace 
treaty now m question, once Japan’s double-blade sword, has, 
fortunately or unfortunately, become a hmdrance to I a pan’s 
rapproachement toward the Mamland Regime. It is even cons1d-
ered by many as being to the detriment of Japan’s national 
interests; but this thought, of course, 1s hardly correct. What 
is sure, however, is that, this peace treaty remains as 1t 1s, there 
are some risks on the part of Japan, if m her approach toward 
the Mainland Regime she steps out of the bounds fixed by the 
iundical logic・
III. Legal Effects and Risks as By-Product of the Sino-
Japanese Pease Treaty 〔1952)
The Smo-Japanese Peace Treaty, as having been examined, 
is a peace treaty of special kind, hence 1t needs special inter-
pretation. 
Though claimed to be one made between two legitimate govern-
men ts of two states at war, poh tically this treaty is nonetheless 
one signed by one government of China representing one of the 
parties, Japan’s change of attitude some years after its bemg 
signed notwithstanding. In this sense, this treaty is a partial 
one, and its vahdity legally conditioned As a result, unless 
the conditions are fulfilled, another peace treaty would have 
to be made between Japan and the Mamland Regime, if faPan 
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attemPts to deal with the latter in a formal叩ay.And in ・this 
case another restrictive issue (the war-indemnity question) 1s 
destined to come to the forefront 
According to the logic of constructive (formal〕controlof the 
Nationalist Government over mamland, referred to in the above, 
the validity of the peace treaty (1952) would stretch to inam-
land (with some di伍culties,for sure〕.But 1f this be maintained, 
Japan would have to recogmse a civil war in China, so as to 
make this logic of constructive control theoretically convincing. 
In this case, whether accompamed by recognitiοn and 
withdrawal of recogmt10n or not, provided that the・ status 
quo in the Taiwan Straits (hence the status of the two Chinese 
entities) remams unchanged, Japan’s formal contact with the. 
Mainland Regime would be a v10lation of international law. 
What is worse is the fact that while for other states a江
answer to responsibilities for premature recognition to wards the 
established government〔theNationahst Government, for in-
stance) withdrawn recognition by such states, is ex Post facto in 
nature, that is, conditioned by the fact of established govern-
ment's regammg effective control over territory and people 
once lost to the revolutionary regime; in case of Japan, similar 
statement may not be true in similar case. The reason is that 
in such an event Japan would be liable for breach of a peace 
treaty, the gravity of juridical responsibilities and political 
consequences of which is beyond imagination. 
Let us give an example: Japan made the peace treaty with the 
Nationalist Government with the lowest price to liquidate all 
questions which were the causes of the war and those which 
were given birth by the war"'. without paying war-indemnity, 
suppose that it recogmzed the Mainland Regime some years 
later (in 1964 for instance), would this be a case m violation of 
international law? Smce there had been no change of status伊to
in Chma from 1952 to 1964, and since the status of the Nat10naト
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ist Governnient m 1952 w~s understood by Japan as qualified to 
represent the State of China, the answer to this hypothetical 
question must be in the a伍rmative.And since a peace treaty is 
permanent in nature, Japan could not resort to the clausula 
rebus sic stantibus, even if we admit that this clausula may in 
law justify such act in some instances. Recognit10n of the 
Mainland Regime by Japan, unless the Nationalist Government 
disappears, would be an abrogation of the peace treaty 
with ROC or, even if the Mainland Regime reqmres no such 
abrogation〔andthis 1s qmte unthinkable), would shake its very 
foundation. 
This is not al. From this picture there come many other 
effects and risks of what may be called by product of Japan’s 
could-be adventure in the Chma Problem. 
First, as a matter of law, because Japan's recogmtion of the 
Mainland Regime menaces the very existence of the Sino-Japan, 
ese Peace Treaty, and because this peace treaty, so far as its 
application (relevance to mainland) JS concerned, JS suspensively 
conditioned by the return of the Nationalist _Government to 
mainland, a right (of abrogat10n〕ofthe NatJona!ist Government 
would be created as a result of serious v10lation of the peace 
treaty by Japan.＂》
Secondly, the Nationalist Government might, m thJs case, WJth 
strong reasons assert: (a〕thatthe renunciation of war-indem-
mty m the Protocol attached to the Peace Treaty is ab initio 
resolutively conditioned，叫 conditioned,in concreto, by the fact 
of Japan’s recognition of the Nationalist Government as legit1-
mate 〔hencenon-recogmtion of the Mamland Regime）；〔b)that 
recognit10n of the Mainland RegJme by Japan, whether accom-
panied by withdrawal of recogmtion or not, formally denies the 
legality of the Nationalist Government to return to mainland, 
hence destroys the essential of the peace treaty; and (c) that 
renunciation of war indemmty, which had been made “as a sign 
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of magnanimity and good will" and m cons1deration of Japan’s 
recognition (choice of a government representmg China to sign 
the peace treaty), loses its basis accordingly. 
Thirdly, as another theoretical possibility, due to necessity for 
execut10n of rights, the Nationalist Government may, in case 
Japan will recogmze the Mainland Regime, resort to the ultima 
ratzo, by declaring the resumption of the state of war of 1937 -
45 between China and Japan Japan’s withdrawal of recognition 
of this government would have nothmg to do with the legal 
poss1b11ity for such a resumption of a former war "' This legal 
card becomes a guarantee of Japan’s non recogmtion of the 
Mainland Regime, and sanction supporting a demand for war 
indemnity if Japan does not maintain her non-recognition policy. 
Such action, though hurtful for Japan, bene宜tsthe Nationalist 
Government neither. But here we heve a picture wherem both 
governments may choose the 'smcidal alternative’which al 
states retam m their freedom of act10n '" 
Fourthly, and in consequence, though as a general rule the 
UN Charter must be duly considered in a case s1m!lar to our 
hypothetic event of resumption of war in the light of 'threat or 
use of force' etc. (Article 2 ( 4〕）， it is highly doubtful that 
the UN is competent to touch a question which is the continu-
ance of the last war, and to determme through its Security 
Council that such event is a 'threat to the peace', and to take 
measures accordingly (Articles 39, 41 and 42）ー For,among other 
thmgs，“Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or pre-
elude action, in relation to any state which durmg the Second 
World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present 
Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the 
Governments having responsibility for such action" (Article 
107〕shouldbe considered here. 
As a matter of fact, although it is not possible that the Na-
t10nal!st Government will intend in this case to enter mto an 
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actual state of war against Japan, and consequently it is not 
easily conceived that armed conflict would become real, such 
resumption of state of war is nonetheless serious for Japan, 
with reasons lying in other fields. For instance, with・ the re-
sumption of a state of war, the Nationalist Government may, 
according to ;us in bello (laws of war, general international 
law〕， interferem, and even cut of, Japan’s transportation 
with Southeast Asia at the Taiwan Straits, even 1f its belhgerent 
status in a civil war be not recogmsed by Japan (1f Japan 
recognises the Mainland Eegime only〕. This is of course more 
serious than what Korea actually has done: 1t would shake 
Japan’S hfe lme of trade and would greatly threaten her national 
defence as well. 
Fifthly, Japan’s act of altering the status quo withm China 
(that is, act of recognising the Mainland Regime equivalent to 
disturbing the recognition-balance of states on the Chma Situa-
ti on〕would,again, entail a more serious risk that, due to 
despair m the pohtical situat10n caused by Japan’s act10n, the 
Nationalist Government might be pressed to umte itself with the 
Mainland Regime, in which case it would not be inconceivable 
that with such return to the mainland the Nationalist Govern-
ment would, m favour of the Chinese State as a whole，由ake
use of Japan’s violation of the peace treaty, and choose the best 
timing to denounce the peace treaty so as to impute to Japan all 
legal r田pons1bihhes,includmg the obligation to answer to a de-
mand for war indemmty. On this point, the two rival entities in 
China are on the same boat, and their interests are in accord. 
All these are no mere guesses nor arguments for argument’s 
sake. In 1964, when the Nationalist Government went to the brmk 
of severing its diplomatic relat10ns with Japan due to the Chow 
Hung-Chmg Asylum Case, drastic measures differed in kmd 
but no less destructive to Japan, were for times hinted in 
Taiwan and in Hongkong, both o伍ciallyand uno伍cially. It is 
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to be reminded that the Chinese hold the records of usmg 
absurd means in dealing with what they consider betrayers. 
But some may say that the Nationalist Government is out of 
quest10n, because Japan’s recognition of the Mainland Regime 
would bnng about settlements for questions of making peace and 
of war indemnity. This is in fact a wishful thinking common to the 
Japanese who urge earlier recognition of the Mainland Regime. 
This wishful thinking is, however, hardly convincing as well as 
dangerous. Except toward a Communist or quasi-Communist 
government in Japan, the Mamland Regime would not be so 
generous, as the Nat10nalist Government once was, to show 
anew 'magnammity and goodw1!1’for nothing. In fact, it msists on 
the line that with the conservative government of Japan there is 
no true friendship. Hence, m al hkelihood the Mainland Regime 
would resort to (making) peace as a means of national policy; 
and, at least for the purpose of embarrassmg the Japanese 
Government (with the evident intention of drawing Japan mto 
its own circle-and this 1S the unalterable ultimate aim of its 
policy toward Japan〕， itwould keep the war-indemmty issue 
open, so as to make 1t the most vital item on the agenda for a 
give-and-take negotiation and a bait for “friendship” Sl口rnl-
taneously. 
This is more likely, when Japan offers the Mainland Regime 
recognition (thus for the Mamland Regime this should be accom-
pamed by withdrawal of recognition of the Nationa!Ist Govern 
ment). Such an event means that its nval〔ROC〕woulddisappear 
at least so far as Japan is concerned. Accordingly even if the 
Mainland Regime shows 'friendship’by lowering the actual 
amount of war indemnity, etc., Japan would have to sacri自ce
greatly m other matters (for instance, services, etc., simJlar to 
that which are provided in Article 14 of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty m the stead of paymg war reparation) The Mainland 
Regime is, in this case, a casting-vote holder. And, more 
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unfortunate （ηis the fact that smce Japan is in a condition of 
high prosperity, the reasons for renunciation of war indemmty 
in 1951-1952 are no more valid; but she could not, nor is 
she prepared to, satisfy China on this matter. Japan’s non-
recogmllon of the Mainland Regime was used in exchange for 
renunciallon of war indemnity from the Nationalist Govern・ 
ment; on the other hand, her recognit10n is a trump for ad・ 
miss10n by the Mamland Regime of the renunciation of war indem・ 
nity made before by the Nationalist Government. Both would 
lose their force m our hypothellcal case and it is undesirable 
for Japan to have the war-indemnity issue discussed with 
the Mainland Regime, even if it be quite clear that as a matter 
of fact the latter might give it up. 
Politically, Japan’s recogmtion of the Maml.and Regime 1s also 
conditioned by world situation at large, by US attitude, by the 
moves of the two Chinese en titles 〔hencetheir predictable reac・ 
tions towards Japan’s act10n〕，andby Japan’s pride as the lead・ 
ing power m Asia, and by many other factors, domestic and 
international. She is not easy to move in the China Problem. 
There are of course for Japan some ways out of this risk・trap. 
First comes to one’s mmd in this respect is the two ・Chm a the・ 
ory, through realization of which to mamtain the legillmate 
status of the Nat10nalist Government to represent 'the Republic 
of China' which is the real party at war with Japan And to 
evade legal responsibilities Japan would prefer realization of a 
two-China theory in the UN, to the realization of same by 
way of individual recognition. But this agam is quesllonable, 
even if Japan be wise enough to avoid takmg mitiative ‘to 
attempt recogmzing a two・Chma situation'. Toward Japan 
China is m a stronger position. Both Chinese enllties once 
more are concurrent against any form of two-China by whatever 
means.町 And,tit for tat they may also counter-attack on 
political plane: they may, for instance, deny Japan’s rights to 
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Okinawa and instead claim Okinawa’S independence in future"' 
(that 1s, when USA is to restore Okinawa to Japan〕， by
raising a question of 'territorial status of Okmawa’on which 
China as the once sovereign and as a co・victorin the Secnnd 
World War would have legal and historical voices. Japan’s demal 
of Chmese sovereignty over Taiwan would meet the same 
response So would it be the case, too, 1f Japan recogmzes Outer 
Mongolla and settles the quest10n of war indemnity with it: A 
two-Japan situation will not be a fable here 
JV. Japan’s Marginal Position 
The above imagmable, and mdeed probable, situat10ns would of 
course be highly destructive to Japan’s national mterest, to her 
international political position, and to her domestic pohtical 
conditions. Smce politics is said to be the art of the possible, 
al the above risks should be taken into due account when one 
is to know Japan’s position in the China Problem. 
With the above iuridical givens, that Japan’s posi hon is one 
marginal, in comparison with those of other states, .seems to 
need no more comments. But what are ・the concrete 'margins’ 
for Japan’s (freedom of) action, then ? 
(A) The Cause-Issueー TheCivil Strife in China 
In theory, Japan would have to recogmze, tacitly at least, 
that in China since 1952 (when the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty 
came into force) there has been a state of civil strife, a war 
de facto if not de jure (note that this civil strife is something 
more than a civil war de facto though less than one de ;ure〕
The Notes exchanged for the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty depend 
on this pomt. 
In fact, such recognit10n (actually Japan seems to have done 
this tacitly) is to Japan’s benefits. If there were no such civ!I 
strife, there would be no legal ground for Japan to assert, when 
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she will recognize the Mainland Regime, that the latter shall 
succeed to the rights and obligations under the Smo -Japanese 
Peace Treaty of 1952. In legal logic, Japan at least may not 
expressly deny the existence of the civil war in China. Her 
posit10n on this point is therefore far more hmited than states 
in general, whose freedom of act10n 1s not far from maximum.町
(B〕 TheCause”Issueー TerritorialStatus of Taiwan 
As a consequence of the above, Japan would also have to admit 
that Taiwan 1s part of China She may not assert otherwise. 
Nay, she may not even have a voice to so admit; for, having 
renounced Taiwan, in law she has no voice whatsoever about 
this territory. Thus, though Japan may by changmg her re-
cognition pohcy recognise the other Chmese pol!t1cal entity to 
exercise sovereignty over Taiwan, she may not, while other 
states may, take the view that Taiwan is Chinese territory 
pending something, e.g., pending an answer to the question as 
to which of the two entities is to exercise sovereignty over this 
territory_ Demal to China her sovereignty over Taiwan would 
make it impossible for Japan to urge as against the Mainland 
Regime that the state of war between Japan and China had 
been ended; and denial to the Nationalist Government its legal 
competence to exercise Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan would 
not only be unreahst1c, but would also mean that Japan made 
a peace treaty with a government〔state〕withoutterritory (a 
government-m-exile or a state-m-exile〕， inwhich case a peace 
treaty endmg a state of war between the State of China and 
Japan is not far from being a juridical impossibility.＇明 Besides,
as having been pointed out, in both cases there will come a 
revenge urging a two-Japan theory. Japan’s freedom on this 
issue 1s, again, far more restricted than that of the other 
states-zero, although the latters’freedom is equally near the 
mimmum."' 
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(C) The Means-Issue-Recognit10n 
Recogmtion of the Mamland Regime by Japan, cond1t1oned or 
not by withdrawal of recognition of the Nationalist Government, 
gives a legal claim to the Mainland Regime, in the name of the 
Chinese State and as legitimate government thereof, to require 
of Japan to make a peace treaty anew, hence also gives room 
to that regime to raise the war-mdemnity issue as a topic for 
negotiatmg peace In addition, on the recognition issue Japan 
also has to mamtain the status quo in the Taiwan Straits and 
the world balance of recognition. For the sake of Japan’s 
nat10nal interest, unless it be very clear that the Mainland 
Regime admits ROC’s renunciation of war mdemmty and unless 
it be absolutely beyond doubt that the Nationalist Government 
will disappear one way or the other, the costs for a change of 
recognition policy at improper timing and under bad conditions 
would be unbearable for Japan Accordingly, though Japan has 
not the least intention to go with the Nationalist Government 
to the extent of committmg double-suicide〔shinju),it is likely 
that she will nevertheless have to become the last state that 
will recognize the Mainland Regime. If Japan is not sure that 
her national mterests would not be Jeopardised, it 1s not at all 
impossible that she might stil maintam her non-recogmtion 
policy even 1f USA goes one step ahead to recognise the 
Mamland Regime (m this case, of course, Japan’s justification 
for such policy would be the uncomprom1sed attitude of the 
Mainland Regime on the issues of peace treaty and war m -
demnity). 
Japan’s legal position on this issue is, therefore, this ・ in 
regard to action (to recogmze the Mamland Regime), Japan’s 
freedom of action 1s extremely restricted to the extent of no 
freedom at all; with reference to inact10n (to maintain the 
non-recognit10n凹 hcy〕， however,Japan, l!.ke other states, has 
maximum freedom so long as the dual-government phenomer.岡崎
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1ιsts, as Japan is under no obligat10n to recognise the Mainland 
Regime so far as the latter has not yet been in effective control 
of whole China 町
CD〕 TheMeans-Issue UN Chinese Representation 
On this issue, on the other hand, behind the shield of callee-
tive-legislative will〔adec1s10n of the UN〕Japanmay have 
infinite freedom of action like that possessed by other 
states.町 Butin the context of the Peace Treaty with the 
Republic of China, hence of the war-indemnity issue, like m 
the case of recognition Japan would have to support the Na-
tionalist Government to the last moment. This needs a few 
words as explanation. 
Represen tat10n in the UN, as havmg been shown m the 
above, can not be cut off from the quest10n of ind1v1dual recog, 
nition And because determination on the UN Chinese repre-
sentation issue is matter of legislation-pre-Juridical, hence po-
htical, the non田juridicalfactors (political, etc.〕occupy greater 
weights Here US attitude, Japan’s national defence, and 
transportat10n through the Taiwan Straits 〔fearof blockade 
action by Taiwan〕cometo the fore and become predominant 
factors. Unless there be a way out of nsks, e g , realization of 
a two-Chma plan, Japan would mamtain her non-recognition 
po llcy to the ・lastmoment for her own sake UN approval of 
qualification of the Mainland Regime to represent China with 
the result of ousting the Nat10nalist Government (in this case 
the juridical logic of makmg peace and that of war indemmty 
become the issues〕， would,due to domestic pressure, make 
Japan’S individual recogmt1on of the Mamland Regime inevit-
able. Unless there is in UN a way out of the risks, therefore, 
Japan is obliged to cast a negative vote and, if necessary, to 
do this m a more active manner as a leading power, against 
・moves for such UN approval. This is within her freedom of 
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action, and entails no iuridical respons1b1hty. Thus US pres-
sure, seen from Japan’s own stand and needs, 1s not at all a 
serious factor here even if there were no US pressure, Japan 
would also have to do the same thmg as she has done 
with US in the UN smce 1961 (that is, to become a co-sponsoring 
state of the "Important Question" proposal〕Inthis meanmg, 
Japan may not exercise her freedom simJiar to that which 1s 
actually enjoyed by other states m the extra-legal world. 
(E) The Obiect-Issue One Chma, or Two Chmas ? 
Ironically, whJie reahzation of a juridical two Chma situat10n 
seems infeasible m the foreseeable future, m theory such 
two-Chma situation appears to be the most desirable for Japan-
it adapts to her purposes of solving the difficulties lurking 
behind the peace-making and war-indemnity problems. Whether 
realizat10n of such a situation ・might be made by way of recog-
mt10n, in the UN, or through an historical fait accomph, 
depends on Japan’s foreign policy line.町 Nodoubt, for Japan at 
the present the UN -means appears to be the most suggestive 
and desirable. This, on the one hand, will give Japan a chance 
to avoid being drawn mto risks; this, on the other. hand, fits 
Japan's tradition of resisting a strong Chma by makmg another 
China or by helpmg one to stand if there has already been 
one. 
But in doing so, as we have seen, whether Japan takes the 
.initiative or not, she would have to face political attacks 
(status of Okinawa, hence a two-Japan theory, etc) from both 
Chmese entities. Due to the highly political nature of the 
object-issue of the China Problem, therefore, besides being 
subiect to other poiitical restrictions simJiar to those which 
other states are also sub3ect to〔e.g.,without consent from both 
Chinese ent1t1es, an international war would be needed if one 
tries to impose a two-China situation, etc.), on this ISsue Japan 
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bears peculiar risks. Under no circumstances may she take the 
initiative. In this sense, Japan’s freedom is more limited than 
that of other states too. 
From the above, it becomes very clear that on al the 1Ssues 
of the China Problem, and that is on the China Problem as a 
whole, Japan stands at the marginal line on the brmk of“pomt 
of no return”. Pushing one step forward, and she would be 
thrown into a very dangerous posit10n deadly detriment to her 
national interests 
It is in such a picture, that we have Japan’s marginal position 
in concreto. 
Being in such a marginal position, Japan naturally has to act 
very prudently. Especially insofar as‘action’is concerned, to 
describe in a little literary way, she is in the ‘China web' with 
both hands and feet bound by uncounted and unbreakable 
legal, poht1cal and strategic threads. There is no surprise that 
she has always appeared to be in a state of standstill in her 
diplomatic China front. 
Such apparent state of standstill is understandable. However, 
it has been seriously and continually criticized by the Japanese 
themselves And, curiously enough, though many of the steps 
taken by the Japanese Government may be objectively evaluated as 
bemg m pursuance of Japan’s own national interest, they are un-
reasonably, and sometimes even maliciously, denounced by some 
Japanese of fame, mcludmg many a specialists, as nothmg but 
acts done to dangle after US lines (or Imes of other states) 
But what otherwise could have possibly been done by a govern-
ment responsible to its own people, and what in fact can Japan 
do with so many juridical and political negative-givens and 
their effects on the back? 
We are not to apologize for the Japanese Government; but we 
can not but say that most of the criticisms have not at al been 
just. But how do these criticisms come, and what is the 
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measure for their evaluation (for criticism of these criticisms)? 
This is another fundamental question. To answer this we have 
to describe the state of affairs about the China Problem 
inside Japan, to which we now turn 
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1〕 Onthe content and interpretat10ns of this Letter, see Terasawa m 
GendaihO to Kokusarshakai (J〕（1965)pp. 286-92, Omura, Futatsu no 
Chugoku (J)(l961) pp 191-2, 193, Jrji Tsushinsha (ed.), Peking, Tai-
wan, the UN〔J〕（1961)p 25; Kajima, Nrhon GarkO no Temb6 CJ〕
(1964) p. 125. There are many in Japan who seem to doubt the 
validity of this treaty, with the reason that Yoshida was threatened 
by Dulles that if Japan should choose the Mainland Regime, it would 
be di伍cultfor the San Francisco Peace Treaty 〔1951)to be ratified 
by the US Senate But it is an indisputable rule of international law 
that even duress is no legal excuse for mva!idating a peace treaty. 
See, for instance, Crandall, Treaties, their Making and Enforcement 
(1916) pp. 3 4 Besides, Japan's choice was not solely a result of 
Dulles' threat ; consideration of strategy was also an important 
factor. 
2〕 Sincewar is a relation between states, and not between their 
governments, a treaty between two “governments”would not be a 
'peace’treaty havmg legal effects of ending the state of war between 
Japan and the State of Chma as a whole A treaty local in nature 
would, as will be shown below, be against Japan’s interest, in 
later periods, therefore, the Japanese Government, when referring 
to this peace treaty, would emphasize that “the Nationalist 
Government is‘the’government of China". 
3) The situation is somewhat similar to the case of the Basic Treaties 
between Japan and South Korea (The Republic of Korea〕of1965, 
and there have already been instances of dispute about their tern-
torial application. It is also predictable that if Japan should make a 
‘peace’treaty with Outer Mongolia, similar dispute would appear as 
between Japan and the two entities of the State of Chma. 
On the making of the Sino・JapanesePeace Treaty, see Ueda m 
Asian A世田rs(J) (1955, No. 6) p. 42 , Omura, op. cit, pp. 193-4. 
4) Protocol, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (1952), in Cont附•Porary
Japan (195ι 1ー954)p. 162. It is doubtful whether this includ田 thelo目。fovers田 Chinesein Malaya dunng the 2nd world war. 
5) V Phillipson, Termination af War and Treaties of Peace (1916) p. 
111 f' p 172 
6〕 Asearly as 1951 (August 15), Chou En lai declared such reserva -
tion More concretely, from 1955 onwards, the Mainland Regime, 
through Chou En -lai, Chen Yi, and Kuo Mo・r6,has so hinted for 
several times. On August 16, 1955, its Foreign Office even formally 
stressed the reservation exceptionally strongly. In 1958 (May 28) 
the Ta Kung Pao (Pekmg) made this pomt much more unequivocal. 
7) Interpretation of a 'p田ce'tr田tydiffe四 frominterpretation of tr田ー
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ties m general m many r曲P包括， S配 thepr自由twriter’s study in 
Takano (ed.), The International Court of Jn.<tice-A Case Study (J) 1966, 
pp, 300 f. 
Cf. Green m the Eを昨bookof World Affairs (1952), p 幻 As a 
general rule, a war between two states has nothing to d.o with the 
continuity of their international personalities, nor ordinarily with 
mutual recognition of their governments (if both are 1dent出ablein 
law during the war〕 Butthe situation now at hand is not an ordi-
nary one First, Japan unconditionally surrendered, but unlike Germany 
(v. Kelsen m A] 1945), she retamed her state contmmty, though 
due to unconditional surrender and US occupation she had once 
lost her formal independence (Yokota in the Journal of luternational 
Law and Diplomacy (JILD) (J) vol. 45 (1946〕 Secondly,dunng the 
war with China the Japanese Government withdrew its recogmtion 
of Chiang’s Nationalist Government which had been the real opponent 
in that war against Japan, and made a 'Treaty on Basic Relations’ 
in 1940 with another ‘Nationahst Government' led by Wan Ching-we1 
(JILD, vol 40 (1941) pp 19ι一日7〕． Though in Chmese Jaw W問、
“Government" was illegal (traitorous〕， in the relation between 
Japan and Chma durmg that period Japan’S withdrawal of recogm-
tion of Chiang’s Government must also be counted In law, therefore, 
the peace treaty of 1952. functions to nulhfy ・this 1llegally made . 
Treaty with Wan. See, on this point, Article 4 of the Sino-Japanese 
Peace Treaty 
S〕 SeeStrupp-Schlochauer, Wdrterbuch des Volk. (1960) Erst Band, 
S. 590 ; Berber, Lehrbuch d白 Vo1k. 〔1962)Zweiter Band, S. 103, Op-
penheim Lauterpacht, Int. Lo肌 vol.I, op. cit., p 610; Lord Stowell 
in‘The Eliza Ann Case (1813)' in Briggs, The Law of Ns川 op.cit., pp 
ド・412 and 414; Phillipson, Termination of War, op. cit., p. 173, p. 180. 
Cf Schwarzenberger, The F1何 ntiersof Int Law (1962) p. 100. 
9) It must be noted that this is so because of the vah出tyof・ this 
peace treaty and of the existence of the Protocol quoted above (see 
supra note〔4〕ofthis Part〕，hencethe correctness of this statement 
in strict law is subject to risks demonstrated below, see infra (IV) 
of this Chapter. 
10) Nishimura in Sek由 ShuhoCJ〕（Feb.28, 1961) p. 31. 
11) Cf. Kai1ma, oρ口t.,p. 126; JiJi Tsushmsha (ed.), Peking, Taiuan, 
th' UN, op. cit, p. 26; Omura, op. cit., pp 193-94. On other inter-
pretations of the Exchange of Notes see Terasawa, op. cit, pp 292£., 
K Irie, Ryodo to Kichi CJ) (1959) pp. 137-138. 
12) Questions causes of the war refer to Japan’s aggression in Man 
churia early in the 1930’s, etc , ・and questions given birth by the war 
refer to war reparation m the narrow sense, that is, covering only 
China’s actual loss of lives and propertie' during the war, etc They 
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13) Oppenheim-Lauterapacht, Int. Law, vol. I, op. cit., p 616. 
14) Note that renunciation of title etc. to Taiwan by Japan has noth-
mg to do with renunciation of war indemnity by the Republic of 
China, because Japan was the defeated, while ROC the victor, in a 
war, and because the renunciation of title to Taiwan had been exe-
cuted long before the commg into being of the dual-government 
phenomenon in China and, indeed, before the i:nakmg of this Peace 
Treaty. Note also that formal renunciation of title to Taiwan by Japan 
in the San Francisco Peace Treaty was executed simultaneously 
with the coming into effect of that peace treaty, whereas renunciation 
of war mdemnity by the Republic of Chma, due .to the peculiar 
nature of sphere of application of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, is 
executory and always conditional in nature. 
15〕 Onpossibility of resumption of a state of war, see Phillipson, o品
cit., p 164, pp. 205 6 and p. 216; Crandall, op cit, p 358 Cf Kunz 
叩 AJ(1952) Ed Comm, p 115, p 116 It is also to be reminded that 
recogmtion has been a frequent casus beli or reason for war. For 
provisions of peace treaties to similar effect, see, e g., Articles 42---
44 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (v Tamura, Seka1 Gaikoshi CJ), 
vol. II (1963), p. 11); see for a legal precedent, ob臼町 dictum,Lord 
Stowell in The Diana (1803), in McNair, The Law of Treati由（1961)
p, 554, and on other occasions, pp. 556-57 m ibid. See for cases 
denouncmg peace treaty, Oka, Gendai Oshuse1j1shi (J) (1949) p 185 
note !. 
16) Frankel, op cit, pp 2, 132, 173 and 200 
17) It is clear that both Chinese entities take the same step on this 
point For instance, in 1958, the Nationalist Government attacked 
Japan before, and the Mainland Regime did it after, the Nagasaki 
Flag Incident See Chen Yi's speech on May 9, 1958, and the Editorial 
of R師 minRibao followmg it. 
18) The claim for an independent Okinawa has long been made by 
both Chinese entities officially and unofficially, though the motives for 
such claim are not at al the same See material relative to this 
point, Murao in Today’S Topi田 CJ〕（March1966〕， pp25 f , especially 
p 28 They may ev叩 make田 eof the“blood debt" question of 
overs四 Chmesem Malaya to embarrass Japan-Malaysian relations. 
19) Siψ開 concludingpart of Chapter 1 
20) On this issue, see Ine, Ryodo to Ktcht, op cit., pp 137-8 and his 
article m S抽出 CJ〕（Apr.1955〕p63 and p. 94. Cf. Tabata m Horztsu 
Jiho CJ〕（No.IO, 1956, vol. 28〕p.1161. 
21〕 Supγaconcludmg part of Chapter 2. 
22) The negative result of the principle of effective control legally 
iusttfies the policy of non-recognition Of course, other non-juridical 
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factors such as US attitude and Japan’s own national defence also 
function greatly, but what we are concerned here is the juridical 
aspect For freedom of states m general on this issue, see supra 
concluding part of Chapter 3 
23〕 Forfreedom of action of other states on this issue, see supra con 
eluding part of Chapter 4. 
24) Japan’s畳間tp口nciplein the宣eldof foreign affairs is“Centre be 
put m the UN” Other principles are subject to this. In the sense: 
given in the text, this order of precedence of foreign pohcy pnnc1ples 
is advantageous to Japan at least so far as her .China Problem is 
concerned 
However, the answer to the question of whether md1vidual rec-
ognihon is subiect to, is parallel to, or takes precedence of, the UN 
representation issue, vanes from state to state. UK takes the、
!me opposite to that which is adopted by Japan; US puts same 
weights on both issues toward the Mainland Regime,. and USSR' 
takes the same lme toward the Nationalist Government 
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PART FOUR 
JAPAN’S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CHINA PROBLEM 
NATIONAL CONSENSUS 
It is sai.d that on foreign affairs, and on the China Problem m 
particular, there is no consensus in Japan. This may or may 
not be true, according as different definitions be given to the 
term 'consensusヘ
‘Consensus’， to follow the most authontat1ve d1ctionanes of 
the chief languages in the world, means 'agreement’or 'accord’． 
There 1s universal consensus on this meaning of the term 
‘consensusヘ
But the question for Japan here is rather the“meaning”of the 
meaning of consensus. There exists sharp split in Japan’s 
natrnnal opinion as to what may be called a national consensus 
on a certain international problem. And this is best symbolized 
in the Japanese Diet. 
In the sense that there is, and has been, in this world no 
“national”consensus in a perfect, hence strict, sense on a 
concrete international (and even on a domestic) issue, not even 
in a totalitarian state m time of war, consensus m a symbolic 
and general form can. only be found in the domestic political 
power-balance (diet, committee, etc ) according to the rule of 
democracy (and this is the very meaning of democratic politics). 
In this sense, there is national consensus in Japan on the China 
Problem (and on international issues m general), seeing that 
many a decisions on the China Problem, always the vital issue, 
have been made, and the conservative force m Japan remains 
stable in power. If there had been no natrnnal consensus on the 
China Problem, for instance the Ikeda Cabmet would not have 
been maintained after France’s recognition of the Mamland 
Regime〔January1964〕wherethat Cabmet determined not to take 
action in the situation.り Inthis sense, it is not necessarily true 
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of the predominant opinion, that Japan’s national opm1on IS 
split on the Chma Problem. Nor would it be undesirable or 
unfortunate, even if such split be in existence. 
Such national consensus may for the purpose of the present 
study properly be named absolute national consensus, m the 
context of the rule of absolute maionty. This kind of consensus 
1s also the basis of partial/specific consensus of the same 
society on similar issues, 1t 1s discoverable through analysis of 
the results of public polls (public opinion in the strict sense〕
and the views of the Press 〔publicopinion in a broad sense) 
But in a democratic system,. diversity of opinion on concrete 
issues other than those which touch the very system itself, 1s 
desirable, and indeed inevitable. In contradistinctmn to the 
absolute national consensus, therefore, we have also what 
may be named average conse抑制， meaningthe greatest common 
measure among the different opimons 同 thebasis of the 
absolute national co1日目指us(because the average consensus, in 
the final analysis, comes from, and returns to, the absolute 
natzonal consensus). To this kind of consensus belong the opin-
ions of the critics, experts, professors, and mtellectuals i1 
general 
These two sorts of consensus will be treated of in this Part. 
CHAPTFR 6 ABSOLUTE NATIONAL CONSENSUS-
RESULTS OF PUBLIC POLLS AND THE PRESS 
Public polls are chiefly conducted by the press, hence their 
results are, for many reasons well known, to a greater or small町
er extent influenced, if not controlled, by the press, even if 
we take for granted that the questmnnaires are prepared by 
people of objective mind In this sense it seems necessary 
that the press, for better or worse, is considered a part of ‘public 
opinion' only in a broad sense (meaning that it represents 
public opmion in a loose sense). However, the press in Japan, on 
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the one hand, appears to be emotional, and at times tends to 
sensat1onahsm〔tending,that is, to move by moods), it is to・ 
much inclined to. criticise the government for the sake of 
cr1tic1sm, as a result of anti power tradition; and sometimes. 
〔e.g.,on the Chma Problem) it is clearly m contrast with 
truer(?) public opinrnn as seen from results of pubhc polls. The 
press, on the other hand, to claim for itself qualification to 
represent public opimon, should generally follow the line of this. 
pubhc opinion In view of these two facts, we put weight on the 
results of the polls, and treat opinions of the press as subsidiary 
means of knowmg public opinion. Although, certainly, we do・ 
not deny that the press remains the vital means to check （加
lead〕‘publicopmion', when on a certain concrete point 'public• 
opimon' IS unknown or is in a state of confusion Results of public. 
polls, bemg scientific conclusions, will be considered here as 
symbolising public feeling which underlies public opinion (in a 
strict sense〕.Replies in pubhc polls are the ne p!us ultra, though 
naive expression, of potential social feeling so far obtainable. 
I. Results of Public Polls about the China Problelll 
In Japan, the populace talks about the China Problem whlle 
knows nothing about the China Problem.句 Thishas its cause 
in the fact that, mass-communication dommatmg Japan, the 
Japanese of・ general standard understand the Chma Problem by 
believing what is printed m newspapers, in magazmes and what 
on the TV screen. In result, on the China Problem generat 
people are colourl.ess and are highly susceptible of bemg inten-
t10nally and calculatedly stereotyped through contmuous proc 
paganda. 
On the China Problem, most pubhc polls have been conducted 
by newspapers, and some by other agencies.町 Allof them cen -
tered on the general feeling about the dual-government pheno-
menon (hence the object-issue of the China Problem〕， andthe 
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issues of recognit10n and UN representation, of necessity, have 
become foci for the polls.勺
On April 2, 1961, the Yomiuri Shimbun made known the result 
of a survey of public feeling (nation-wide straw poll) specifically 
<>n the Chma Problem. This is perhaps the first of the kind 
since the Ikeda Cab¥net succeeded the Kishi Cabinet in July 
1960. 
This poll, however, did not touch the issues of the Chma 
Problem, but pomted to the Chma Situation as a whole. And 
.the points were as follows : 
( i) Agreed pomt crystalhsat10n of the two-Chma s1tuat10n 
was both possible and desirable , 
(n〕 Disagreedpomt some thought this situation should be 
solved by the Chinese people themselves 〔domesticaffairs), 
some, that it be solved in the United Nations (international 
affairs〕，
(ni〕 Asto the form of such two-Chma situation, no concre.te 
suggestions were made so far ; 
(1v〕 Themajority was cautious, m that 1t asserted that Japan 
should not try to take the mititiative to solve this quest10n. 
The result of this poll was confirmed by another poll done by 
the Chuo Chosasha (The Central Survey Institute, presumably 
dose to the government) m July 1961〔nation-wide）.円Theresult 
of this poll was rather simple・ with a DK group of 59%, among 
.either 41% more than a half 〔24%)suggested recognitiOn for both 
Chinese entities as independent states As to the form for reali-
sation of the two-Chma thought, agam, there was no ma1ority. 
A comparison of this result with a survey made by the same 
Institute on the same problem m November 1959 shows that the 
two-Chma theory as a means of solvmg the China Problem had 
been deeply rooted In 1959, the result of the poll was that, 
with a DK group of 55%, a maJonty of those who had answered 
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the questionnaire (24%〕affirmedthe desire for crystallisation of 
the two-China situation; but there was no maJonty opmion 
as to the means of reahsrng this two-China situation which is 
itself a means to solve the Chma Problem (in narrow sense）.勾
There are other polls to check the above results. 
In a public poll held by the Tokyo Shimbun in September 1961 
(within Tokyo area and made known to the public on October 
3〕， theresult again shows the potential desire for a two-China 
solut10n It is significant that, m nat10n-w1de polls as in polls 
of the Tokyo area, the same thought was confirmed and re-con-
firmed: this tells that the two-China thought, seen from both its 
depth and its width, had become a concrete absolute national 
consensus On other internat10nal problems, the results of public 
polls rather show differences in different areas (and according 
as the polls are undertaken on nation-wide or regional basis). 
On the means-issue of recogniton and of the UN representa-
tion, however, Japanese public opinion seems to have been 
highly prudent. 
It must be warned that the above results, and results of 
polls to be analysed below, must be understood as being condi-
tioned by the fact that the questionnaires were given without 
consideration of the mterrelations among the issues of the 
China Problem, hence the answers to the questionnaires were 
also given without consideration about the effects, juridical as 
well as political and diplomatic ones, which might come from 
such interrelations. This, as having been seen m Chapter 5, 
signifies・ that, had such interrelations been duly taken mto 
account, and had warnmg been given in the polls (albeit, surely 
thi.s is no easy job〕， theresults might have been more cautious 
and, mdeed，立iorecorrect. 
In a poll conducted m November 1961〔inNagoya area〕， when
asked whether・ Japan should recognise the Mainland Regime even 
at the eゅenseof fapaがsfγ'iendsh争withUSA, the 45.2% that 
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supported UN approval (admission〕ofthe Mainland Regime 
(with 9.7% .opposed) dropped to 8.6%, and 41.4% put a condi-
tlon“to the extent not worsening Japan’s relation with USA”on 
recogmsmg (in the wordmgs of the poll recovering formal dip-
lomatic relations with) the Mainland Regime, with another 18 9% 
asserting that“there is no need to recover diplomatic relations 
(even) to the detriment of (Japan’s〕relationswith USA”， thus 
making a highly remarkable rate of .60.3% for those who were 
reluctant to affirm recogmt10n of〔orapproval by UN of Chinese 
representation m favour of〕theMainland Regime uncondition-
ally.'' 
In a poll on the UN representat10n issue, conducted by the 
same Institute in September 1961 (nat10n-wide), the result was・
37 .4% for, 9% against, UN approval of qualification of the 
Mainland Regime, with a DK group of 53.7%. The 37.4% affirm" 
ative for the Mainland Regime dropped to 20.6%, when asked 
whether ‘admission’of the Mainland Regime may be done at the 
cost of ROC walkmg out of UN (implying also the case where 
ROC be ousted from the UN by a vote in the General Assembly 
to this effect〕， andthe other 16.8% contained 4.6% opposed and 
12.2% DK. The public became cautious on choosmg one of the 
Chinese entities to the exclusion of the other.'' This is a natural 
result of a post war psychology of the Japanese people disliking 
the extremes.'' It shows the hope for crystallismg the two-China 
situation by means of a vote in the .UN (through determining 
the UN representation issue), for, logically (but no more than 
logically〕， ifone can not or will not have a clear cut on the 
Chma Problem (and it is in fact very difficult to have a clear 
cut at al〕， aslong as the status quo m the Taiwan Straits exists 
the only thing for one to choose would be a two-China situat10n 
when one tries to solve the China Problem. This is especially 
true in case of the Japanese people. 
Another poll on the UN representation issue, in particular, 
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was undertaken by the Tokyo Shi：叩bun(in the Tokyo area) 
also m September 1961. The result was: 52.5% for, 8.4% agamst, 
‘admission’of the Mainland Regime mto UN. But within this 
affirmative majority of 52.5%, 62.3% (equivalent to 32.7% the 
total answers to questionnaires〕alsostressed ROC pos1t1on in 
the UN (asserting that the Nationahst Government contmues to 
represent the Republic of China), with 18.6% (9.8% the total 
answers〕opposedthereto. Excluding the DK group (31.2%〕，
and more than half the total replies were in favour of some form 
of two-China situation by means of solving the UN representa-
tion issue. The fact that similar results were had m nat10n-
wide and in area polls is again noteworthy. 
Thus, 1t may be said m conclusion that, albeit there was no 
distinct consciousness about the precand1t10ns for 〔formand 
means for realisation of) a two-Chma situatjon, and though 
cautious attitude to avoid Japan bemg drawn into danger of the 
struggle (hence oddly in expectation for natural solution of the 
status quo by passage of time) remamed prevailing among the 
Japanese, there was at the least potential consensus (natinoal 
feeling), too reahstic perhaps, on a two-Chma solution, candi-
tioned by the timing for 1ts overt expression. And, considered 
as the obiect-issue of the China Problem, the question 'one China, 
or two Chinas’， to the Japanese by and large, was not at al 
unsolvable. There is therefore not much justificatrnn for one to 
assert that on the China Problem there 1s no consensus m Japan 
(and this is the prevailing opimon m Japan〕. The cone! usion 
may be simply stated in this way : the Japanese people desired 
a more flexible policy on the Chma Problem with the aim of 
solving it through passage of time, and, to them less desirably, 
through realisation of a two-China situation in some form and 
by some means, and at best timing. 
This consensus had been maintamed throughout the Ikeda 
period. Comparing this with the results of polls of the pre-Ikeda 
perrnd，め onemay discover some vital similarities. Thus though 
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,the two-Chma thought appeared to have been withdrawn mto the 
background for a certain period, the consensus just referred to 
remained Japan’s absolute national consensus. And this statement 
is proved in 1964 by the impact of French recognition of the 
Mainland Regime, in which situation this Japanese consensus 
came to the surface and was expressed in an except10nal!y 
strong forロ1.
In January 1964, when France recogrnsed the Mamland Regime, 
Japan’s public opirnon, naturally, centered on the recognition 
issue. In the polls undertaken in those days when the impact 
was hardly measurable, there was no notable departure from 
the potential consensus that had been shown in the previous 
years. 
To take as a good example the poll conducted by the Yomturi 
Shimbun immediately after French recognition (made known to 
public on Feb 20, 1964, nation wide, straw poll), the percentage 
for and that against Japan’s recogrntion of the Mainland Regime 
were nearly equal. It was pointed out by the editors of the 
column concerned when they made known the result of the poll, 
that at the begmning of the poll an overwhelming maiority had 
urged for immediate recognition of the Mainland Regime, and 
that caut10us attitude became prevailing after the ROG severed 
diplomatic relations with France (thus making impossible re-
alisat10n of a two-China theory). However, it remains true that 
the current went toward recognition of two Chmas This 
strengthened the convincmg force of the thesis, which seems 
pragmatic and too realistic, that the two-China thought had been 
Japan’s absolute national consensus on the China Problem and 
that what differed were only means, form and timing of its 
being realised 
When the recognition mood given rise by the “de Gaulle-heat" 
had become cool, the Yom山内 Shtmbunmade a public poll on 
the same issue (nat10n-wide, made known on April 19, 1964〕.The
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result was agam not so far from what had been obtained two 
months ago : 22% against, 15% for, immediate recogmt10n of the 
Mamland Regime, with 14% for conditional recognition (among 
the conditions was raised 'peace lovmg’） and a DK group of 31%. 
On the UN representation issue, the result was. 34% asserting 
Japan’s gradual approach to the Mainland Regime, 18% urging 
Japan to follow the majority in UN, 11% c!aimmg immediate 
‘admission’of the Mainland Regime (3% against such admission〕，
with a DK group of 34%. On a two-Chma policy, furthermore, 
the answers show 23% for, 11% against, with a DK group of 
43%. It is remarkable that the 23% for a two-China policy 
warned that Japan should not take the mitiative This confirms 
our above conclus10n. '" 
II The Press Public Opinion in a Broad Sense 
Public feeling or national consensus of a people, good or bad, 
is not subject to criticism, not, especially, to criticism from 
outsiders. A people is responsible to itself. 
However, the press (meanmg newspapers in the main), being 
public-feelmg leading opmion (instrument〕， 1saccountable for 
such feeling. This should be true in every country, and 1t is 
truer in Japan because of highest degree of freedom of speech, 
of the marvelous circulations of the newspapers and of the 
magazines (no less than a total daily circulation of 20 million 
copies for newspapers, and annual circulation of monthly and 
weekly magazmes, synthetic or otherwise, counted by hundred 
million〕， andbecause of the fact that the Japanese believe what 
the press says. This no doubt 1s the reason why the press is 
vital in every sense. 
It is unfortunate, however, that m conducting public polls on 
the China Problem the press does not explain the effects of 
mterrelat10ns among its issues田川 In fact, this is not even done 
in daily spaces The Japanese press is in this sense answerable 
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for mistakes or preiudices existing in pubhc opm10n (feeling) 
as we have demonstrated above. 
It must be confessed that it is no easy thing to know the 
concrete and contmuing stand of Japanese press This sounds 
.strange, but it is exactly the reahty m Japan. The Japanese 
press, due to reasons to be given, seems to be in want of con-
s1stency, and sometimes, of identity as the 'press’which must 
be cool and objective. 
While the most certam means to know the stand of a newspa -
per is to read its editorials, in Japan such means hardly serves 
this purpose. The reason is that people m general do not read 
editorials at al, and the cause for this m turn hes partly iri 
the fact that editorials are difficult to understand and that, in 
particular, there is no 'stand’（in a strict sense of the term) 
that can be seen from editorials. More concretely, Japanese 
newspapers do not as a rule have continmty m their stands, 
and ed1tonals on foreign affairs are, nearly without exceptions, 
written in a manner not affirmative nor negative, but are rather 
written so ambiguously as to impress the outsiders that the 
editorial writers (Ronsetsu Im) try to sit on the fence. rarely, 
.except m time of crisis (in 1960 for instance〕andon domestic 
affairs, 1s there firm and concrete assertion amounting to 
represent the stand of a paper discoverable m editorials."' 
Such a strange phenomenon comes from the characteristic of 
the Japanese press itself. Besides the anti-power tradition and 
the above-referred emotional nature, the Japanese press 1s apt 
to playing hula -hoop.同 Thereis also hardly any denial that 1t 
is 1deologically left-leaning, as a result of its volition to be 'pro-
gressive’and due to some extent of control by the commumst 
or communist-sympathizers. In addition, though the Japanese 
press bas so far not lost its nationality, 1t apphes its principle 
of“being just and neutral" even to the China Problem; thus 
it appears to be critical of the government for the sake of 
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cnt1cism, and about the China Problem, for times 1t seems to 
side with the Mainland Regime. 
If a stand must be found out for Japanese press, then there 
is a common stand ・exceptsome TV and radio stations, the 
Japanese press as a whole is anti-anti”communist叫（butnot 
exactly pro communist). This for times impresses one with the 
cynical fact that, as agamst its real aim, the Japanese press in 
consequence does profit the communists. 
On Smo・Japaneserelations in general, the press, especially 
during the Ikeda period, urged a positive attitude for normah-
sation of refat10n with the Mainland Regime'", with the relation 
between ROG and Japan kept in tact This on the one hand is 
m hne with the logic underlying the nat10nal feeling of an ideal 
peace-to be friendly with all on earth' this, on the other hand. 
is a result of the trad1t10n critical of government position. 
From this it follows that a two China theory was contem-
plated. On this pomt, once more, Jananese press was in con-
form1ty with the logic of Japan’s national feeling of that period, 
and may be considered to have represented public opmion. On 
,the two-Chma lme, the press left no doubt, and sometimes the 
editorials were rather inclined to defend government position. 
It may be doubted whether, on this point, the Japanese press 
had not mtent1onally functioned to lead pubhc feeling in the 
polls through hints, by way of making the questionnaires m a 
specific form This may be inferred from the fact that no poll 
has been o旺eredto the pubhc with clear explanations on the 
interrelations among the issues of the Chma Problem. And, at 
』eastso far as editorials were concerned, that the Chmese Civil 
Strife of the 1940's had been ended was taken for granted, and 
that Taiwan’s territorial status had.remained undetermined was 
implied in all cases. The recognition issue and the UN Chmese 
representation issue have been discussed on these two presup-
・posit10ns. In this picture, there is no surprise that the Japanese 
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press was again critical to the government, which is responsible 
to the Japanese nation, hence mnst be highly prudent In any 
case, on appearance at least public・ feelmg and the press are 
close to. each other on the issues of recogmtion and UN repre-
sentatron. 
On. the question of making peace with the Mainland Regime 
and on the war-indemnity issue, Japanese press once more sup-
ported the government under the par.amountcy of national in-
terest. It rs therefore presumable that the Japanese press delrb-
erately hid the interrelatrcins aロ1ongstthe issues of the China 
Problem and the effects thereof, so as to make a‘publrc poll' 
follow its technical lead. 
These can be seen in time of crisis. In the situation of French 
recognition of the Mainland Regime m 1964, al newspapers ex-
ceptionally made clear their stands through their editorials. Most 
of them were, not unexpectedly, similar on one pomt・ they lost 
their presence of mind, tottering befween recognition and non-
recogmtion, and between one-China and two-Chma "' Accord-
ingly, rf it be true to say with the Japanese press that the 
Japanese government had no firm stand in the Chma Problem, 
rt may equally be true to say that the Japanese press, like the 
Japanese people, is not immune from the poison of‘mood'_ 
However, in time of cnsis, as a rule the press would take a 
prudent, wait-and-see llne, as would the government, on the 
China problem. And the reason lying behind this is this: the 
Japanese press knows well enough that, the status quo m Chma: 
remains as it is, there rs no easy and once-for-all solution for 
the Chma Problem, and that Japan should be prudent because 
quest10ns lurking behmd the mterrelatrons of the issues of this 
problem will not be to Japan's interest, rf Japan tries to go 
her way against reality. In this respect, the Japanese press is 
inconsistent and pragmatic (and not only sensitive〕 Itdoes not 
explain why Japan’s non-recognition policy must change, and cannot 
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tell how it may Justify itself in its critiCism of government 
daily decisions ( e.g., denouncing as dangerous the decision of 
the government to jom the 'important quest10ns’proposal at ・ the 
16th Session of the UN General Assembly on the UN Chinese 
representation issue), which in fact were based on the prudent 
wait・and・see !me latent under the current of the press itself. 
From the above, it may be concluded that so far as the Chma 
Problem is concerned the Japanese press had less benefited than 
hurt Japan: while leading public feelmg in an invisible way, it 
hid itself under the veil of public opimon and committed many 
mistakes. In this sense, it was supplementary to public feeling 
which may he known through analysis of scientific results of 
polls And, insofar as 1t discarded the interrelations among 
the issues of the China Problem in their public polls, while in 
reality 1t was conscious of, and hmted on, such interrelat10ns in 
terms of Japan’s national interests only m time of crisis, the 
Japanese press can not be free from criticism, in that it is hahle 
for the ignorance of the Japanese populace about this cardinal 
problem in Japan’s foreign affairs 
But・ we do the Japanese newspapers m1ustice, if we do not at 
the same time stress their functions in leadmg public opimon, 
and if we hesitate to msist that they are at the least far more 
objective and pure than the Japanese periodicals Here we have 
to search.for the situation among the chishikijin (the Intellectual 
or bunka1in〕， incontradistinction to the journalists that are here 
understood as chiefly belongmg to the category “the press”－＂＇ 
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CHAPTER 7 AVERAGE CONSENSUS OF INTELLECTUALS 
The stratum “mtellectuals”町， asused here, will include the 
critics and writers, professors and specialists in al fields (whether 
they are famous figures in the society or not), and those jour-
nahsts who occupy some space also in the periodicals (the Sago 
Zasshi synthetic magazines), etc It will mclude, in other words, 
the chishikijin, the・ yushikisha, and the bunkajin, etc. These 
sub-categories are equally able to have their voices heard, chief-
ly if not solely, through the Soga Zasshi. 
Sa far as they participate in leading public opmion, the intel-
lectuals, like the press (hence the Journalists and colummsts of 
the newspapers〕， function as public-feeling leading stratum; 
but so far as they are in a position to criticize the press, as in 
fact they always do, the mtellectuals bear more responsibility 
than the press should 
Frankly speakmg, to search for agreements, if any, among 
Japanese intellectuals is a far more difficult iob than to try 
doing the same thmg in the case of the press. The reason is 
simple: Japanese mtellectuals are most deeply mfluenced by 
some ideology(perhaps more deeply preoccupied than the Saciahsts 
are, to the extent that sometimes their nationality may well 
be doubted〕.As a natural result, the Japanese mtellectual circle 
happens to be the most hardly compromised in personal preju-
dice, and most discrepant and diversified m opmion We have 
here a situation of mtellective confusion if not turmoil or an-
archy目 Andsmce the figures of thrn circle are apt to be self-con-
tradictory m their views given on different occasions, the tru盟国，
that a state of opinion-excess is worse than a state of opmion-
vacuum, holds good in too many cases 
Be this as 1t may, it is nonetheless necessary to know the 
average stand (average consensus〕ofthis too powerful and 
authoritative group, without whose consensus nothmg can be 
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talked about the Chma Problem, and directly against which no 
government attitude-policy could possibly be maintained for long. 
The root of the confused state of affairs within the mtellec-
tual circle on the China Problem (and on other international 
quest10ns as well) is this, that, whereas opimons of this circle 
are given for the purpose of criticizmg the government position 
(and they are, as the Japan Quarterly once pointed out correctly, 
in tradition stern to their own government〕， there・is no agreed 
criteria for criticism. Thus we have a condition of hundred-
flower blossom・ criticizing the government becomes a passport 
to go into this“club，” and everybody has his own standard of 
making criticism agamst government po!Icy. The meaning of the 
'China Problem' is considered self-evident, and the mterrelations 
among its issues are pushed into the dark. 
Under the circumstances, some doubt whether many of the 
intellectuals really understand what the Chma Problem is"', and 
some assert that 1t is highly necessary to make clear what the 
China Problem is meant町.Unfortunately, these appear to be 
the correct prescriptions for the chaos just -referred to. 
In describing the average consensus, if any, of the intellectual 
circle on. the China Problem, we shall, as it should, exclude the 
extremes of the right and the left, and rarne opimons of the 
somewhat representative figures generally so recognized m the 
Japanese society＇り（ andthis not solely according to judgments of 
the present writer, thus avoidmg sub3ectivity), and will try to draw 
out the average along the lme of the absolute加 tiona[co問自制s
already estab!Ished, if possible. It is, however, quite fortunate 
that there have been some important polls on the Chma Problem, 
which were specifically undertaken among the intellectuals. 
But m analysing the results of the polls (and even m choosing 
one〕specificallydirected to this circle, two pomts at least become 
of cardmal importance・ 〔a〕unlikethe pre田（ina strict sense, that 
1s, newspapers) which is to a great extent ideologically neutral 
621 
and is obiective m the main, the periodicals〔thepress in a 
broad sense) have their strong ideological histories and back・ 
grounds more or less distinctly visible and are resolute in their 
editorial policies (not infrequently contributors of articles, if they 
be not very famous ones, may be requested to amend part of the 
contents of their articles so as to fit the respective editorial 
policies〕；（b〕theauthors, and that is the chishikijin themselves, 
are equally ideologically coloured, subjective and furious in 
attitude, and tend to be exclusive, hence mtolerant, though they 
themselves ask for tolerance from others The results of the 
polls accordingly may not always be objective, hence we may 
not accept their face values before checking the backgrounds 
of the periodicals undertaking the polls and the general histories 
of the figures givmg answers to questionnaires町. Many a polls 
were technically well-designed to fit certain selfish ideological 
purposes-some kind of propaganda with cooperation from chosen 
personalities, and answers to questionnaires could be foreseen. This 
can hardly occur in sc1entif1c polls by Japanese newspapers 
In a public poll among mtellectuals, rare of the kind, held from 
January 24 to February 1, 1964〔nation・wide, close to govern・ 
ment) by the Naigaijosei Chosakai on the China Problem, with 
French recogmtrnn of the Mamland Regime at the background 
and asked 'how should Japan’s (China) pol!cy beγ，the answers 
show the followmg lines'": 
( 1 ) Real!sat1on of some sort of two・ China 34% 
(i〕 Independentpolicy with forward attitude 24% 
(iii) To put weight upon continuing support for ROC 21% 
(iv) Immediate recognition of the Mainland Regime 
(hence withdrawal of recognition of ROC) 17% 
(v) Cautious lme not too early, not too late, and to 
av01d Japan’s taking any imtiative on the matter 
(meaning to wait for world 'recognition mood') 17% 
〔vi) A two-China situation not good for Japan 5% 
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The general line was evidently this: a two-China line was 
prevailmg, but caution to av01d Japan being drawn mto danger 
was a condition Had this poll been conducted after February 10 
when the Nat10nalist Government severed its diplomatic relat10ns 
with France (this made impossible a two-China situation in that 
crisis), the answers (and even the quest10nnaires〕mighthave 
been greatly different. But this would mean only that the 
potential thought of a two Chma situation would retreat 
underground Hence 1t 1s rather useful to search for the real 
thought in this crisis so as to know true facts. 
Another poll may function as a check to the above results. 
In May 1961, the Tokyo Shimbuηpublished the results of its 
enquete made among mv1ted famous figures of different circles 
(the shikisha or yushikisha〕， withthe average of opinions 
(greatest common measure〕asfollows : ( i〕atwo-China solu・ 
tion, if possible; (i) not to be in conflict with USA on this 
problem, (ii) Taiwan’s importance for Japan being stressed 
(hence in the matter of recognition and of UN representation, 
policy in favour of the Mainland Regime to be conditioned by 
equal treatment of ROC); (iv〕sincefor the time being there 
was. so far no effective way to solve the China Problem, the 
wa1t・and・see line was tbe only one available.同
This average consensus is s1m1lar to the results of the 1964 
poll demonstrated in the precedmg paragraph. 
The above 1s an average consensus of the Japanese intellec・ 
tuals on the obiect・issue of ‘one Chma, or two ChmasγOn other 
issues of the Chma Problem, there seem to have existed some 
average consensus too. In fact, such issues had been examined 
carefully by most of the yushikisha (especially by experts of 
mternat10nal relations), hence 1t becomes possible to explam 
the condition a little in details. 
(1〕 Statusquo in the Taiwan Straits 
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On this ISsue, it is urprising to see that there existed unammous 
consensus among al from the extreme rightists to the extreme 
leftists, with reasons not necessarily similar but doubtlessly 
same in origin of feeling Th!S consensus found its expression 
m the reluctance to admit that there is in the Taiwan Straits a 
civil strife. The mtellectuals acknowledged neither that that war 
was (is〕extensionof armed struggle of the Chinese Civil War 
of the 1940’s, nor that it was (is) a new civil strife. Thus they 
mvited attacks from both Chmese entities, and on this pomt at 
least they mdeed looked hke ostriches in the desert. Faced by 
the reality, however, they not only were unable to explam what 
was gomg on in that area, but also desperately hid their un-
realistic conclusions on this issue behind a more dangerous 
]licture, by claiming for this armed struggle the nature of an 
faternat10nal (perhaps a world) war, a war, that is, probable 
between USA and the Mainland Regime (and USSR would be 
involved too〕. In this way, on the one hand, their ideal of 
absolute peace, which has become the vertebra of Japanese life, 
was itself menaced, on the other hand, the potential feelmg of 
two-China came to the surface unconsciously. In other words, 
like the general public the mtellectuals shared the same feeling 
of hatred and fear toward another full-scale war. They recog-
・nized that a series of facts in the Taiwan Straits was one 
between the two Chinese political groups and was abnormal ; 
・nevertheless they considered this m terms of 'one China, or 
two Chmas ?'. Thus the two totally different issues were con-
fused, and it is natural that no correct conclusion was reached. 
Questions however were raised by the experts (including 
professors of mternat10nal law and of international politics〕．
Most of the specialists, due to their knowledge in their respec-
tive subjects, asserted the contrary, to the effect that there 
is m exIStence of a civll strife in the Taiwan Straits. But 
this assertion had so far not been accepted by other groups 
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belonging to the same stratum of intellectual, hence it re-
mains the minority opinion subject to pacifism町
(2) Territorial Status of Taiwan 
Since there is mdivisible relation between this issue and the 
status quo in the Taiwan Straits, and also a log1cal lmk of cause 
and effect between them, denial to the first its・ nature of a CIVIi 
strife necessarily demes Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. But 
the intellectuals m Japan did not follow this logic, and this 
issue is in fact the ideolo耳目aldivide'" between the two chief 
groups belonging to the category chishikijin ・ the reformist 
group urged for Mainland Regime sovereignty over Taiwan〔thus
Implying necessity of Japan’s recogmt1on of that regime); the 
conservative group, however, claimed the correctness of UK 
theory of 'uncertam or undetermined’status'" (thus logically 
denymg both Chinese entities qualification to exercise “sovereign-
ty”there, hence amountmg to saymg that ROG was a state-
in-exile, which IS a novelty in mternational law and m diplomatic 
history) The majority, however, seemed to have considered 
at the middle line, that, on the question as to whether Taiwan was 
or was not Chinese territory Japan had no voice whatsoever, 
(thus av01ding the nsks of making a dangerous and difficult 
choice〕， butthat It was desirable that this pohtically and stra守
tegically important island be kept out of the Mainland Regime 
for Japan’s mterest問（andnot necessarily in favour of ROG). 
Overwhelming majority of the experts, especially the interna-
tional lawyers, affirmed the opposite theme: Taiwan was under-
stood as belonging to China as a result of strict legal obliga-
tions under the wartime arrangements, even though there had 
been no formal cession.町
The average consensus of this category on this issue may 
therefore be stated thus. whether Taiwan was or was not Chinese 
territory, and whether there did or did not exist legal obliga-
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tion for the Allied Powers of the Second World War to have 
this island transferred to China, it was des1rahle for Japan not 
to concern herself in thrn issue, hut what Japan hoped for was 
that this island, being closely connected with her nat10nal 
defense, be kept m the hands of a friendly and non-Communist 
country, whatever that country may be. 
(3) Recogmt10n and the UN Representation Issues 
These are always the centres of disputes among the mtellec司
tuals They are most subiect to ideolog1cal preferences in Japan-
The discrepant condition in the Gaiko-kondankaz叫 ishighly 
instructive here. 
The discrepancy existed at this round-table conference(m 1961〕
ranged from necessity of recognition to extreme non-recogmt10n 
of the Mainland Regime. No conclusions were reached, except 
a confirmation that this issue 〔recogmt10n〕was too complex 
for decision. 
Many proposals were submitted by the most famous members 
of the conference. The first was a non-recognit10n proposal, 
with the reasonmg that the Mamland Regime had been aggres-
sive ; the second suggested a“realistic”view of recognismg both 
Chinese entities, and the third was one of gradual recognition, 
conditioned by the solut10n of the Taiwan quest10n, etc."' 
But despite such discrepancy, there were some points in con-
cert There was majority that 1t was stil early to recognise 
the ・ Mamland Regime, and underlying this was the poten trnl 
tendency of a two-Chma thought through solution of the repre-
sentation issue m the UN "' 
This condition was, however, not umque of this conference. 
Studies by other groups showed similar tendency 叫 Asa matter 
of fact, this situation, added by the Socialist view of immediate 
recogmtion, became the miniature of Japan’s reahty on this 
issue. 
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Here we have the average. On the one hand, as the chairman 
(Kiuchi) of those meetings of the Gaiko-kondankai on this par-
ticular ISsue said after the discrepancy had become evident, that 
“it was clear (m the meetmgs) that the China Problem is so 
complicated in nature, that it is of no benefit to talk about 
recogmtion heedlessly; and this is the great harvest of our 
discuss10ns”. On the other hand, though there existed in Japan 
at least seven attitudes on the recognit10n issue, the difference 
lay in “timmg”only, and was no matter of principle.叫 Astudy 
of the interrelations among the issues necessarily led the in-
tellectuals to adopt caut10us attitude. 
On the UN representation issue, on the other hand, there 
existed clear majority opmion which would make its solution (for 
Japan) subject to the condition ofヘil'Oridopinion' 〔andthe 
‘world opinion’in the UN was said to be a two-China solution〕．町
Though it was true that many acknowledged that admission of 
the Mainland Regime in to the UN would be necessary in remote 
future, immediate, absolute, and unconditional solut10n of this 
issue in favour of the Mainland Regime occupied no significant 
posit10n in the stratum of intellectual.'" 
(4) The Restrictive Issues-The Peace Treaty with ROC and 
War Reparation 〔Indemmty)
Strangely, while it seems a matter of course that as Japanese 
the chishikijzn should not divide amongst themselves on these 
points which would seriously compromise Japan's nat10nal in” 
terest, in actuality the most serious splits among the intellec-
tuals were exactly on these issues. Thrn is so, because most of 
the chishikijin had their own logic (rather, starting point) of 
reasonmgs 
The progressives asserted for the Mainland Regime a nght,. 
and imposed on Japan an obligation，町 tomake peace ; the 
conservatives demed any such right and obligation叫 Theroot 
627 
of this dispute was whether the peace treaty made m 1952 
between Japan and the Nationalist Government was a peace 
treaty at al, and if so, whether 1t was a peace treaty applying 
to 'China’as a whole. 
Cn the war reparation issue there existed similar disagree-
ment. Whereas the progressives generally predicted that the 
Mamland Regime would not demand war indemnity from Japan as 
a cond1t10n for makmg peace；附 theconservatives, logically, 
denied any ground for the ・Mainland Regime to make such 
demand at all."' 
There was therefore on appearance no average consensus, 
bacause the two camps within the intellectual stratum showed 
fundamental differences at the point of departure, m the reason -
ings, and hence in conclusion, due to ideological stands which 
were likely to be mamtamed at the cost of national mterests 
However, as will be seen in the next Part, the progressives 
(the Communists being excepted), when they met with the 
choice between ideological consrntency and national interest, 
preferred the latter to the former."' It is due to this reason 
that Japanese progressives had not believed in their ideology on 
an internat10nal plane (e g, international commumsm); and from 
this indeed there comes a possibility for an average consensus. 
Such average consensus may be stated in this way : Both 
camps withm the intellectual stratum admitted that the Sino 
Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 was (is) a peace treaty, and the 
only point on which they differed was its territonal applicat10n; 
hence there came the difference between a‘limited peace 
treaty’and a peace treaty in ordinary sense. But though this 
is not only a matter of terminology, it remains true that in the 
context of our reasonmg on the effects of the Exchange of Notes 
concerning territonal applicability of this peace treaty,"' the 
difference between the ‘lrmrted peace treaty' and the 'peace 
treaty in ordmary sence’loses its meanmg. Both, in other words, 
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tell one side of the picture, hence they are not at al uncom ・ 
promismg. And if this treaty is a peace treaty, whether another 
peace treaty with the Mainland Regime would be necessary, 
would depend rather on the attitude ahout recogntion, which, 
as havmg been pointed out, was dominated by a two-China tend・ 
ency. If the chishikijin grasped the concept of the China Problem 
in its organic meanmg (understood the interrelations among the 
issues〕theywould discover that they had something in com・ 
mon; and that 1s, to Japan’s mterests, with strong reasons there 
would be no other answers than the one to claim that no peace 
treaty would be needed for Japan to deal with the Mainland 
Regime. And this in fact would be so made more in terms of 
the war・reparatwn issue than for the peace-treaty issue itself 
Without the war-reparation issue, many say, there would be no 
harm for Japan to agree that it 1s necessary, or desirable, as 
a matter of form, to make peace anew with the Mamland 
Regime-and this indeed was one of the grounds on which 
assertion of the progressives m the Ikeda period was based. 
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Notes 
1) The contmuation of the absolute majority position of the ruhng 
Liberal-Democratic Party m the Diet Prima facie proves the exist・ 
ence of the national consensus, though imperfect, on the Chma 
Problem However, this is not to say that with an absolute majority 
in the Diet al actions (mactions〕ofthe Ikeda Cabinet were polit-
ically wise or may be justified ex post facto. If it is the basic 
principle of democratic system that the majority rule be followed, it 
is the other aspect of the same principle that minority opinion 
should also be respected This is especially true in case of foreign 
policy which degree of success depends m the first instance on the 
extent of national supports. 
2〕 Maeda,m Minutes of the Gaiko kondankai CJ) (quasi-governmental 
and con宣dentialdocuments) 4th Meeting, Oct. 25, 1960, p. 42. 
3) For fear that observations be led to onesidedness, to retain objec-
tivity we include in this Chapter results of al influential polls ob 
tainable, undertaken by o国cial (governmental), semi-o伍cial,and 
unofficial units with different stands and starting-points, with no 
deliberat10n as to what their results are 
4) Pulic opinion (feeling) on other issues therefore will have to be 
sought in the average consensus〔seeChapter 7) But the omission in 
making these other 】ssuessubjects of the polls may be interpreted as 
a hmt expressive of the view of the press/units that conducted the 
polls. e.g., the fact that the nature of the status quo in the Taiwan 
Straits has never been mcluded in quest10nnaires, shows that press 
view seems to be that the Chinese civil war of the 1940’s has come 
to an end, etc. 
In this Part, what concerns us is consensus, 1f any and of whatever 
kind, existing in the Ikeda Cabinet period For the situation of 
public opinion on the China Problem in the pre-Ikeda period, see D. H 
Mendel, Jr., The fap四zescPeople and Fore；.訟1Policy (1961), Japanese 
transl. (1963) pp. 306, 327 f., 347-8. It is significant that in that 
γolume Japanese press (newspapers and magazines〕wassaid to have 
given "only the views of scholars and pohtlcians＇’ and “Sc1enti五c
surveys are the best way to discover true public opinion" (Prof 
Ueda's opimon, quoted by Mendel on p.18 1 c.) This is the correct 
view about the present situation in Japan, though we do not deny 
that the Japanese press has had other vital functions. 
5〕 Reporton‘Japanese View on Chma' CJ), Cabinet Secretariat (Cab-
met Research Office〕PublicationNo. 30 (Survey Material on Social 
Tide句 Dec19臼） p. 12. Cf. similar result of majority a節目nationof a 
two-Chma solution was had in another survey (nation-wide) con-
ducted by the same Chuo Chosasha in September 1961, ibid pp 9-
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10. 
6) Report on‘Japanese View on China’， ibid • p 10. This, of course, 
may not be naively understood as to mean that the Japanese people 
attached absolute importance to friendship (in the pure sense) be-
tween Japan and USA "There is a considerable part of Japanese 
people that casts doubt on recognition of Communist China, from 
viewpomt of Japan’s national security＇’（ibid. p. 6〕， and it is USA 
that was, and stil is, relied upon for Japan’s national defence. 
7）晶id.p. 9 
8) Concur, zbid., p. 10. Neither, therefore, does the Japanese people 
attach importance par excellence to Taiwan’s strategic value for 
Japan. This psychology, mixed with the feeHng of deep historical 
relations, cultural closeness and ethnic homogeneity, makes the 
Japanese reluctant to deny either of the two entities in China. This 
is the root of a d田irefor a two-China. 
Such psychology, as it were, is rooted in a strong pacifism which 
controls the Japanese minds in the post-war period, and from this 
pacifism comes the desire to be friendly to al countries on earth, 
includmg the Communist States Though such desire is no more 
realisable than the thesis of permanent peace, it remains a real 
factor in Japan’s foreign policy. See, on this point, Matsumoto in 
Halpern, op. cit, p. 128. 
9) See Mendel, op. cit., p. 329 f., p. 333. In fact, as early as 1952, in a 
poll by the Asahi Shimhun (nation-wide), replies desiring “nor・ 
mahsatioぜ’ ofdiplomatic relations with the Mainland Regime were 
57% (opposed 11%); and in 1956, a nation wide poll by the Pnme 
Minister's O伍ceshows that 53同 wasin favour of Japan’s (general) 
intercourse with the Mainland Regime. With such easily discernible 
line at sight, it is not necessary, nor is it desirable, to inqmre 
into the ideological split among the minority which always hides 
itself behind the omnipotent name of 'public opinion’． 
10) In al the p,ols on foreign a旺airs,the Japanese public always 
shows a high percentage of DK-more than 50% Though high rate 
of DK group is common to polls in al countries, the exceedmgly 
high percentage is nonetheless characteristic of post-war Japan 
11) See supra (I〕ofthis Chapter 
12) See on this point, Uchikawa in the Chuokoron (June 1966 issue〕p.
143, quotmg criticism from tlie London Times, to the e宜ectthat 
editorials of Japanese newspapers are explanatory rather than giving 
conclusions. Cf the Sogo ］，酎陪rizunmKenkyu CJ〕（Feb1965 issue), p. 
14 f. However, it would go too far if one says Japanese newspapars 
have no stands at al We mean here only that their stands are not 
expressed clearly in their editorials, thus they may at any time export 
mistaken image to the readers (if these readers read the editorials 
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at all) and, more vitally though indirectly, they dominate the results. 
of the public polls See supra (!) of this Chapter. 
13〕 Seethe Sogo Janarizumu Keukyu, op. cit. 〔Feb1964) p. 11 f. 
14〕 TheFree World (J〕（May1964 issue〕p.49, p. 52 
15〕 Matsumotoin Halpern, op. cit., p. 139 
16) See a 180。changein attitude of editorials of the Asahi Sh出品un・
(Jan. 19 and Feb. 12, 1964), and of the Maimchi Shimbun (Jan. 19 
and Feb 12, 1964). The Yomiuri Shimbzm, instead of giving an edi-
torial, made known on Feb. 20, 1964 the result of its poll, above 
analysed, which was tantamount to a sudden change of attitude 
simtlar to the other two papers〔cf its editorial of Jan 21, 1964〕．
NHK ton fell mto this confusion, which was known from its news 
commentary program on Jan. 20, 1964. January 19 marks the start of 
the impact of French recognition of the Mainland Regime, while 
Feb 12 is the date when a two-China situation was made impossible 
All these three big papers first predicted, and indeed hinted, with 
techmque, that the French Recognition Situation、.vasdesirable for 
Japan because a two-Chma situat10n would become feasible, three 
weeks later, however, they retreated by strongly denying such 
feasibility and urged for caution. The secondary papers〔andin fact 
the pro-government papers), on the other hand，、~ere rather cautious 
from beginning: and facts proved that they were so far correct See 
the s，田・zkeiShzmbun (Jan. 21, 1964) and the Tokyo Shimbun (Jan. 24, 
1964). 
17) It is m fact hardly possible to m品目 asharp distinction between 
journalists of the press, on the one hand, and the chishikiJin (bun-
kajzn) occupying spaces of the periodicals, on the other. In a loose 
sense the two may overlap each other. It may even be correct to 
say that many of the chzshiki7in (bunkajin) are also journalists, just 
as many a critics are at the same time experts or professors. It is 
due to convenience only, that a distinction is made here. 
18〕 Formany reasons, the term “intelhgentsia”is not used here It 
must be confessed that it is no easy thing to make distinctions 
among the chishikiJin, the yushikisha (the chishikijin of the chish・ 
出jin?) and the bunkaJin, because they are nearly the same. There 
is furthermore the question as to who are ‘intellectuals’and 
'chishikijin’， etc. But we do not inquire too deeply. We need only 
exclude before hand the てpseudo-,semi・〕mtellectuals’， whobecome 
such only because they belong to the constituency of a high喝class
periodical hke the Sekai or the Ciuzokoγmi (disregardi昭 whetherthey 
actually read and really understand what they have read if they do 
read; see on this point, Oda M., Nih岬nno Chishfkijzn (1964〕p.122), 
because they do not function in leadmg public-feeling. Cf. Hidaka, 
quoted in Shakai Kagaku Quarterly (J) (Feb. 1964, No. 2) p 81 
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19) For rnstance, Eto S. m Today’S Topic (J) (Apr 1965 issue) p. 11; 
Kumano m Report No. 8, Synthetic Study on China (Dec 15, 1959) 
p. 12. 
20) s田 for instance, an article m the ]iyu CJ〕（Apr1964 issue〕Wtth 
the pregnant title“What is the China Problem l” 
21〕Sameof the famous figures m this circle are not necessarily 
representative mall respects, though m the main they do lead publtc-
feeling. For, on some vital points they may have isolated themselves 
from their fellow countrymen as a result of ideological loyalty. Due 
attention is therefore paid to this fact, in choosmg the ‘representa-
tive opinion’of a certain person of fame on a particular point. 
22〕 Oneof the examples is an enquMe by Sekai in October 1958 (p. 29f.〕
immediately after the Nagasaki Flag Incident had occurred. From 
the timing, the way of putting the questionnaires and persons 
chosen to reply, and even from the motive (clearly stated to be rn 
opposit10n to government wait-and see pohcy on recogmtion of 
the Mamland Regime〕， thoseanswers can hardly be said to have 
been representing 'public opm1on' of the time. Another example ts 
a poll conducted by the Clmokoron (made known in its March 1963 
issue, p. 148 et seq.〕about“view on China，〔meaningon the Marnland 
Regime〕.The way of conducting the poll was kept unknown, and the 
answers ranged from one extreme to the other, that no average 
consensus may be had (note that a Chinese who is well-known to be 
anti-ROC was also invited to give answers〕， while through 
techniques it tned to impress on the readers that there had been a 
consensus rn favour of the Mainland Regime There are many 
others of the kind. In this sense, polls undertaken hy newspapers or 
scienti丑cresearch institutes are more reliable. though, of course, 
not without danger too 
23〕 Reporton“Japanese View on Chinaヘoρ cit.,pp. 20-21. It must be 
pointed out that in those days most of the intellectuals tended to 
recognition of the Mainland Regime but were annoyed at the exist-
ence of ROC (md, unconsc10usly, at the invisible importance of the 
island of Taiwan). At that Juncture, like it or not, the logical way to 
rid themselves of the trouble was a two-China situation 
24) Concludmg part of the series on“All about the China Problemヘ
No. 14 Like in the case of the 1964 poll by the Na1ga1josei Chosakai, 
this poll was undertaken with special background-in the former part 
of 1961, Japan was to join USA as co sponsoring state of the 
・important question’proposal on the Chinese representation issue to 
be subnutted to the UN General Assembly, and many newspapers 
、wereopposed to such action by the government. 
The same tendency hoping for a two-China settlement existed also 
rn some study groups. For instance, the idea・supplying group of 
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'Synthetic Study on Chma'. apparently sponsored by some govern・ 
ment source, strongly impressed one with such a tendency, see 
conclusions in reports by this group (Report No 6, Dec I, 1958, pp. 
176-177, also pp 134, 139 and 160. and Report No. 16, Oct 15, 1964, 
pp. 209 210〕TheGaiko・kondankai, advisory organ for the Prime Min-
ister and 出eForeign Mmister, was also controlled by this tendency 
See infra〔3〕ofthis Chapter and notes there 
Among international lawyers and scholarly ex-diplomats, too, the 
two-China tendency was prevailing See for the former group, 
Yokota in the Sehai (Apr. 1955) p. 61, Ohira, Asian Diplomacy日・zd
Japan-Ko河田ZRelations (J) (1965〕， p. lll, p 116 and citations there. 
Contra, Terasawa in the ]iyz( (Mar. 1961 issue), who named a two-
China situation a myth On the other hand, some like Ueda even went 
so far as toassert that there was no question of law for recognizing 
two Chinas (in tlie Internatiozia/ Af,向irsCJ), Apr 1961, p. !Of, and 
rn the ]iyu, Dec. 1964, pp 109-111〕．
For the latter group, see, for mstance, Kind.町 Ni/Ionno Gaiko 
CJ〕（1962〕p.201 But see Sakamoto in the Asa/Ii journal (J) (Feb. 21, 
1965 zssue) p. 87宜， esppp 91-92 Some even claimed that a two-
China settlement was“world commonsense”and "nghtful”solution, 
see the Sekai journal (J) (Apr. 1965 issue) p. 63. 
25) See Irie A in the China Qua吋er/y，“SpecialSurvey on Formosa" 
(Jul.-Sept. 1963‘London〕p.52, Tabata m KokIIsaimondai (J〕（Apr.
1961 issue〕P14; Kosa』ζa m ]iyu (J) (Apr. 1964) p. 31 and p 45; 
Synt!zetic Study 田zChina, Repo吋 (J),op cit No 6, pp. 17 and 46, 
etc.; Nishimura m Sekai S/zu/zo CJ〕（Feb28, 1961 issue〕p.31. 
It is interesting to see that this statu-< quo was termed ιan inter 
national local war' (and that is, an 'international’civil war somewhat 
between states〕， whichis a self contradiction in term but which 
would be acceptable if“belligerency＇’ was implied〔ReportNo. 6, 
Synthetic Study on China, pp 17 and 134, but see p. 46 where this 
status was clearly referred to as a‘state of civil warつThisis 
symbolic of the helpless cond比ionof the Japanese critics and special-
ists, but this also shows the sub conscious desire for a・two-China 
settlement This condition has its cause, besides m the general 
pacifism of the Japanese people, also, iri the logic, equivocal as it 
may be, of national defense that the “foundatzon of post-war Japan 
(the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, 
etc.〕requiresthat the Taiwan question be considered an inter-
national question" (see ibid. No 6, conclusion on p. 160), brackets mme. 
26〕 SeeKosaka in the ]iyu, op. cit., pp. 32-34. 
27〕 Cf.Kase m the Tokyo Slzimbun (Apr. 21, 1961〕
28) Representing this trend is Report No. 16, Synthetic Study on 
Ciz問α（Oct.15, 1964〕p.209, pp 301 f., 310, and 311 , cf. Report No 
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11 (Sept 15, 1961) pp. 107-108 Cf further, Hayashi in the Ge.必kan]iji 
(Aug. 1966 issue) pp 14-15. 
・29) Irie K m the Sekai (Apr. 1955 issue) p. 63; Yokota m the Asalzi 
S/zimbmんJul20 and Aug. 30, 1956; Ohira Z in the Sekat to Nikon (Jun 
1961 i田ue〕p.20 f.; Tabata m the Hontsu Jiho (Oct. 1961 issue) p 
1208荘 Cf Tajin in International Affairs (J) (Mar. 1965) p. 61., esp. 
conclusion on p. 8; Terasawa, op. ct., p 290 ; Nishimura in the 
Sek出 S/znlzo(Feb. 28 1961 issue〕p.31. 
30〕Thefull-name was "Gaikomondai Kondankai”（Round-Table Con-
ference on Foreign A百airs〕.It was an advisory organ for the Foreign 
Mimster and the Prime Mmrster In case policy making process is 
the pomt, this will occupy certain weight, although 1t is not clear 
to what extent it actually mfiuenced Prime Minister Ikeda, who was 
the top pohcy maker. In our study here, however, seeing that the 
members of this organ （ηwere al top-class chishiktJzn, yushikisha, 
critics and professors, their opinions would naturally be more in日u-
ential than other study groups, e g, the Synthetic Study Group on 
China which was informal but substantially an idea-supplying 
group to the Gaimusho (Foreign Ministry) and to the ruling 
Liberal-Democratic Party. 
:31〕 Minutesof the Gaiko-kondankai, No. 12 and No 13 (Feb 21 and 
Mar. 7, 1961, respectively) There was also opmion of recognition of 
‘one’China only, see the Inoki proposal, Mmutes No 12, pp. 30-31 
and the ・Hosoya proposal (verbal), id四九 p.34. Note that the last 
mentioned proposal nonetheless suggested a, two-China (one China, 
one Formosa) solution 
:32) Idem. Though many dr旺erenttechmques were used in the proposals, 
a careful reading of them makes one reach no other conclusrons. 
Especially see Mmutes No. 12, p. 28 (the Royama proposal〕， p.38f 
(the Hirasawa proposal), pp 44, 46 (the Kiuchr proposal); Minutes 
No 13, pp 4-5 (the Mrtarai proposal〕
33) For instance, the Synthetic Study Group on China, Reports No. 6, 
pp 43-44, p 176 , No 10 (Feb. 10, 1961〕pp164, 165; No. 16 pp. 297, 
299-300; No. 17 (Apr. 1965〕， conclusions It 1s signi丑cantthat the 
negative aspect of the rule of effective control was unconsciously 
referred to as important politically. Reports No. 1, pp. 108-109, No. 
16, p. 300 f. 
:34〕 Theseven attitudes were, and stil are (1) immediate and uncon-
ditional recognition, denying ROC any status 〔JapaneseCommumsts), 
(2) immediate recogmtion conditioned by a two-China 目白ation(ma-
iority opinion); (3〕neutraland gradual recognition by implication 
(through making governmental trade agreements or estabhshment 
of trade mission), with the Taiwan i田ue considered as a 
domestic question (Sociahst Party); (4) independent gradual rec・
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ognition, that is, de facta recognition of the Mainland Regime with 
Taiwan’s status to be determined by plebiscite (Democratic Socialist 
Party〕；（5)wait-for-chance attitude, with Taiwan’s status pendmg 
for future determination, and with the UN representation issue to 
be determined by ‘world opinion’(Ikeda’s line）；〔6)postponement 
wait-and-see attitude, weight being put on the condition of main-
taining the status qua m the Taiwan Straits〔Kisbi'sline〕； and(7) 
absolute non-recogmtion (those who followed the US .attitude). The 
most prominent among these attitudes will be demonstrated and 
analysed a httle in details in the sequence. 
35) This is a matter of course, because this issue is most closely 
related to recogmtion about which the two-Chma tendency has 
been very strong. 
36〕Minutesof the Gaiko-kondankai, No. 12, pp 25, 35, 40, and 45, No 
13, p. 6. Cf. Synthetic Study on Chiua Report, No. 1, p 37 
The same !me was also shown m a poll ( m the Hya・Apr1965 issue, 
pp. 63-65〕undertakenfor the category of intellectuals (members of o 
the Diet being considered chishikiJtn when they gave answers to 
questionnaire in this poll as pnvate persons〕. The question was 
“How to deal with the China problem zぺandthe results can be thus 
averaged. 
(1) Recovery of diplomatic relations with the Mainland Regime, 
with a two China situation crystallised. Overwhelming majority 
(2) Positive attitude on recogmtion of the Mainland 
Regime 57% 
Cautious attitude on recognition of the Mamland 
Regime 54河
(3) Approval by UN of change of UN representation 
in favour of the Mainland Regime 44% 
Maintenance by UN of representation m favour 
of ROC 42河
( 4)Recognition and approval of UN representation 
on the basis of one-China with the Mamland Regime 
representing this China 50% 
Recogmtion and approval of UN representation on 
the basis of two-Chma thought 50% 
37〕 Theexistence of the state of war between Japan and China was 
logically implied See for instance, Nambara in the S排出 (J)(Oct 
1938 issue〕p,17, p. 18; Takeuchi, m the Asahi journal (J) CJ回。
14, 1962 issue) p, 16 and in the Sekai (Mar. 1964 issue〕p55 f (contra, 
Omori in ibid. (Apr. 1964 issue), p. 141 f Cf. Matsuzaki in Study ou 
]apau' s Foreign Polic＿ヲDeαszou(J) (1964), Report enited by Ohira z 
for the Mmsbushugi Kenkyukai, pp. 240-41, where the term ‘limited 
peace’was used for this peace treaty, without considering the 
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juridical risks on the part of Japan. See also Ueda in the Chuokoron 
CJ) (1961 June p. 85, and in the Jiyu CJ〕（Dec.1964 issue), p. 110 ; Ine 
K. in the Sekai CJ〕（Nov.1955 issue〕p79, p 80, Obata in the 
Asahi journal CJ) (Jan 4, 1962 issue) p 16, and in the Sakai (J）〔Apr
1964 issue) p. 68 f 
38) This was the majority view, and indeed it was so asserted with 
clear consciousness of Japan’s interests But see Tachibana in the 
Mainicht Sim吋un (Feb. 13, 1964); cf. Kawasaki rn the Koimsai 
Seikeiji;o (J), Aichi University Publtcaおon(1954-11〕No.18, p. 34 and • 
p. 35; The Nation and Politw (J) (Mar. 1964 iS>ue) p 65 
39) See the Symposium。n
ence』，CJ)(rn the Sekα包’ Dec1954 iS>ue’p. 55 f〕、lo'heresuch predict!。n
was implied. See also Utsu山n。miyain the旦yo(J) (Apr. 1965 issue) p 
32 and in his book, Nanaoku no Rin1叫〔J)(1964), p. 160宜 Thewaト
indemmty issue was therefore not seriously discussed See severe 
criticism on this point, Kosaka, op. cit., pp 4与－4,where such at-
titude was denounced as dangerous and unrealistic See also Gaiko-
kondankat, Mmutes No. 11 (Feb. 7, 1961) p 50., and No. 13 (Mar 7, 
1961) p. 51 and p 54. 
40) Synthetic Study Group on China, Report No. 1, op. cit, pp 39-40, 
where this question was, however, treated as one of politics, though 
it was confirmed there that in law the Mainland Regime had no 
ground to demand war-reparation 
It should be noted that the conservatives rather stressed the 
negation through asserting the impossibility of existence of a state 
of war between Japan and the Mainland Regime, see The Nati由＂and
Politics CJ〕（Mar.1964 issue〕p.32. On detailed and strong assertion 
of the importance of this question for peacemakmg with the 
Mainland Regime (meaning that if peace is to be made the Mainland 
Regime will so demand〕， see Kosaka, op cit, pp 31, 42-45. Cf 
Gaiko-kondankai, Minutes No. 11 (Feb. 7, 1961) p. 50 f, and No 13 
(Mar 7, 1961) p. 51 and p 54 
41〕 Seeinfra Chapter 8 (!) (A) (B〕
42) See supra Chapter 5 (I〕．
637 
PART FIVE 
JAPAN’S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CHINA PROBLEM:-
COM:PROM:ISED CONSENSUS AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES 
AND GOVERNMENT VIEWS 
Besides the two sorts of consensus discussed m Part Four, 
there is another kind of consensus which may be qualified 
compγomised consensus This kmd of consensus 1s that which is 
expressed on domestic political plane, in other words, it 1s 
something common to and at the base of al assert10ns of the 
pohtical parties (or those of the factions w1thin the Liberal-
Democratic Party (LDP) and of the factions within Japanese 
Socialist Party (JSP〕too〕， 1f the pohhcal parties, in fact 
the1r respective factions, are to function 
Such consensus should ex1st, and indeed does exist, for it 1s 
the necessary condition for party politics to become possible at 
al As in other modern democratic countries, in Japan the 
oppos1t10n parties balance the government party in the Diet. 
Whether one thinks that in Japan there is a multi-party system 
in the proper sense of the term, or one endorses Scalapino’s 
often quoted phrase of“one and-a-half parties in Japan，” the 
balance in the Japanese Diet will leave no room for challenge. 
But such kind of consensus 1s obviously something sut g出 ens;
it is a compromised one, in .the sense of passive, and even 
reluctant, acceptonce of the assertions of the majority accordmg 
to the basic rule of democracy. In consequence, such consensus 
also comes from, and goes to, the absolute national consenst日
referred to in Chapter 6. 
CHAPTER 8 VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND OF 
THE PRESSURE GROUPS BEHIND POLICY-MAKING 
If there are opposition parties formally functioning to balance 
the policy-makmg of the rulmg party and of the government in 
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the Diet, there are certainly some pressure groups doing the 
same thing informally and outside the Diet. The most powerful 
among informal groups that exercise direct influences over the 
Japanese Government on foreign affairs are the industrialists 
(zaikai), the ex-diplomats, and the bureaucrats in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs , and their attitudes will be, as they are 
most properly to be, discussed together with the attitudes 
of the pol!tical parties here. 
I. The Opposition Parties 
A. The Japanese Socialist Party 〔JSP〕
It is well -known that policies of the Japanese Socialist Party 
are prepared for elections to show 'opposition' ag剖nst all 
policies of the rulmg Liberal Democratic Party and, in effect, 
of the government, more for the purpose of convincing the 
electorate that it “differs”from the ruhng party, than 
for ideological reasons or for the sake of politics properly so-
called." The China policy of JSP is no exception to this 
rule In fact it is a typical case for such “difference・”show. 
To know the attitude or the view of this Party, therefore, the 
above must be kept m mmd. No less important is the fact 
that, due to factional struggles〔thenght-wmg vs. the left-
wmg, etc.), and to the looseness of party control and discipline, 
within JSP there hardly exists an overwhelmmg majority opinwn 
on a vital issue, be it a domestic or an international one. 
Moreover, smce the element of ideology in the case of too many 
Japanese Sociahsts has not yet been internationalized in the 
name of consistency or otherwise, ideology has not been able to 
subiect natwnal interest to its domination. Thus there comes mto 
being a strange condition that most of the Socialists hold two 
facesー oneas a member of the JSP in the Diet, the other, as a 
Japaneseー theexpressions of which (two attitudes or views) 
are not the same and, of course, are not rarely irreconcilable in 
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themselves'' 
The Sociahst Party started from the one-China standpomt, 
with the Mainland Regime representmg“China”. " On the st at us 
quo in the Taiwan Straits, logically it did not recogmze the 
existence of a civil strife-for 1t the Clnnese C1v1! War of the 
1940’s was ended in 1949 when the People’s Republic of China 
was proclaimed. And, to explain the reahty 1t claimed that 
the Taiwan Straits situation was a result of US aggression, 
and that it was a state of hostilities between USA and the 
Mainland Regime.め
It stands to reason that the Socialist Party had no choice but 
to mamtain that Taiwan belongs to China (meaning for JSP the 
Mainland Regime). Again, to explain the reality 。f the 
existence。fthe Nat10nalist Government (ROC〕， itset forth the 
ideological thesis that that island was occupied by USA for 
aggressive purposes 
On the recogmt1。nissue’naturally JSP urged for immediate 
recognition of (recovery or normahsat10n of relat10ns with) the 
Mainland Regime and withdrawal of recognition of the ROC." 
And, for this reason, it claimed for the Mainland Regime an 
exclusive right to the seat in the UN'' 
On the restrictive・1ssues, the JSP departed from the Japanese 
Communist Party (JCP〕， insubstance 1f not on appearance.η 
On the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952, 1t.is somewhat 
self-contradictory that the JSP recognized its legal validity, 
though in the sense of a‘limited peace’， and urged that it 
should be denounced as soon as, and even before, Japan would 
recognize the Mainland Regime " 
On the war reparation issue, the JSP met with a deadlock. 
The two-face nature of the v1ews of JSP Dietmen was best 
shown here. Officially JSP had not considered this a serious 
question, because it could not help believmg that the Mainland 
Regime would give this up for friendship. In fact, however, 
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many of the JSP leaders did seriously consider this a vital 
quest10n unavoidable for makmg peace with. the Mainland Re-
gime in future." It is therefore possible if not probable, that 
the Socialist Party’S contradiction of recogmzing the legal va-
lidity of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty had come from sub-
consciousness to make the Mainland Regime admit the renun-
ciat10n of war reparation by ROC under that treaty."' If this 
be so, then to this extent the Socialist Party retained its Japan-
ese nationality, turnmg away from ideology to national in-
terest."' 
As a matter of fact, such two face phenomenon occurred 
equally about other issues of the China Problem. Even regardmg 
the territorial status of Taiwan, more than half the fact10nal 
forces in JSP, though contrary to the formal view of the Party, 
was secretly reluctant to have Taiwan given to the Mainland 
Regime unconditionally, with a view to maintaining Japan’s 
national defence and/or to keeping the issue as consideration 
of the Mamland Regime's giving up war-reparat10n m future. 
Here again we see the potential tendency of a two-Chma 
thought，山 andthis was, and stil is, one of the sources of 
controversy and struggle among the factions within the party 
i叫肝盟ー問
The most symbolic case is the French Recognition S1tuat10n 
(Jan. to Feb. 1964〕. Faced with this Situat10n, the two wings 
m the Socialist Party, with mtention also of snatching the party 
leadership, engaged themselves in a fierce struggle, which ab 
inztio took the shape of ‘national interest' against ‘class struggle' 
on ideological plane, and which was further complicated by the 
rift between the Mainland Regime and USSR. The antagonism 
m 1964 was so furious, that the JSP as a whole became par-
alysed. And m late Feb. 1964, a compromise was reached m 
the form of 'ls hi Toitsu' （‘unification of wills’L In that Situa-
t10n, JSP was unusually stimulating・Anywise,the fact remains 
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true that JSP was subject to nervous quake m reacting to 
dramatic s1tuat10ns. This leads one to think that its criticism 
of the ruling LDP on the latter’s China policy is artificial and 
is exactly what may be used to criticise itself 
In particular, with a two-China tendency (of the strong 
right wing) w1thm, m early 1964 when the Nationalist Govern-
ment severed ROC diplomatic relations with France, JSP, 
through its Secretary-General Nanta, made a statement (and 
that was the compromise between the right wing and the left 
wmg mentioned above〕tothe press to re-confirm its one-China 
line. But in that same statement, it was also asserted exception-
ally boldly that 
Nationalist Government) should be recognized as a belligerent 
because it is a fact that that government is i立 control of a 
territory called Taiwan”． 
It must be pomtd out with special emphasis that this part 
of the stateロientis to Japan’s nat10nal interest, as it is in con-
form1ty with the legal logic of the status quo in the Taiwan 
Straits. It 1s even more logical than the government view on 
this pomt.叫 Thiscompromised consensus was in conformity 
with the absolute national consensus. 
On the peace treaty between Japan and ROC, however, the 
Narita statement fell into contradict10n. After conflrmmg that 
this treaty should be abolished, it claimed that as soon as Japan 
recognized the Mainland Regime this peace treaty would in fact 
lose its effect, and that what remamed was only a formal 
question. This committed a return to its official lme But 
JSP in this case had not contemplated the alternative for the 
case where this“formal quest10n”be raised by the Mainland 
Regime as a substantial quest10n, m terms especially of the 
war-reparation issue.'" On this point, the statement stopped 
at a repentance that Japan had once afflicted great injury of 
war upon the Chinese people. Whether JSP was ready to admit 
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the obligation of paying indemnity for such afflict10n was un-
told. 
B. The Democratic-Socialist Party (DSP）＂》
The point of departure of DSP on the Cluna Problem m the 
Ikeda period was a two-China theory. For times this line was 
made a part of the party pledges to the publ!c in elect10ns. 
However, this line was not the original one, nor could it 
be immune from confusion. 
At the time of its split from the JSP, the newly formed DSP 
had taken the realistic line of‘one China, two governments’． 
In early 1961, however, it tended to a one一Chinaline, and asserted 
for the Mamland Regime legitimacy. This alterat10n invited 
severe criticism from Z初旬（right-winglabour organisation, the 
most powerful backing force of the DSP〕 Inthe party con -
ference that year, the above alteration was explained, and 
understood to have meant that 
China"."' As a立iatterof fact, the two-China thought controlled 
the party leaders, and the wait-and-see attitude was considered 
the most proper means to deal with the China Situation. 
Beginning with a two-Chma theory, DSP was silent on the 
nature of the status quo m the Taiwan Straits, but seemed to 
have asserted that the Taiwan issue (meaning to mclude the 
status q問。 inthe Taiwan Straits and the territorial status of 
Taiwan〕wasa domestic quest10n for the Chinese themselves to 
decide, and that accordingly Japan should not touch this ques-
tion.同 Butit also tended, on the other hand, towards a‘peaceful 
solution' through fait accompli (of self-determination of inhabi-
tants on Taiwan) or through the UN determmation. How to 
reconcile the“domestic question" thesis with the “peaceful 
solut10n”thesis within the party was one of the deadly points 
for DSP unity on the China Problem. 
In connection with the two-Chma theory, DSP could not 
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maintain an immediate recognition of the Mamland Regime or 
an unconditional vote in the UN in favour of that regime on 
the representation issue."' Except the point that weight was 
put on UN, the line as such, to be clearly understood, however, 
needed some guess. 
On the restrictive-issues, DSP did not make clear its view. 
According to material at hand, it seems that it considered the 
state of war between China and Japan stil existed (hence to it 
another peace treaty with the Mamland Regime would be nec-
essary) Top-leaders of this party were also aware of the 
danger to make this “another peace treaty”. But, like their 
old friends m JSP they could only hope for goodwill and friend-
lmess of the Mamland Regime to 耳目eup war-reparation.町
The under-current of DSP on the China Problem was a two-
China line in all 田 ses. It was more compromising with the 
line mamtained by the rulmg party than the line of吐ieJSP 
was. In the French Recogmtwn Situation, this lme was even 
formally declared in a special resolution of DSP as“the only 
line”.＇＂ By and large, therefore, DSP was more consistent 
than the Socialist Party _ This comes partly from the fact that 
DSP was too small a party to have serious fact10nal struggles 
(if there be any, it was only potential m nature), and 
partly from its being more logical and more nationalistic in 
warning that the war-mdemmty issue would become a very 
serious quest10n , although it suggested no e旺ectivesolution 
、11hatsoever＇勾
I. The Pressure Groups-The Industrialists and the Bureaucrats 
in the Foreign Ministry 
There are many pressure groups behmd Japan’s political screen 
The reason why we raise as the most mfluential the industri-
ahsts and the bureaucrats is that these groups are, m a soc10－、
political sense, real rulers of Japan."' 
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A. The Industnalists 
Like in the case of the intellectuals, 1t 1s not easy to define 
this group with relative exactitude, not to say with unanimity. 
It is not even easy to name this group properly, which is termed 
in Japanese language 'zaikai'. Though the term‘mdust口alists’
may not exactly bear such meaning, it is generally used as 
mc!uding the 'jitsugyokai (the business circle）’ and the‘／zznyukaz 
（垣nancialcircle）ワり
Views and attitudes of this group centered on the object-issue 
of 'one China, or two Chmas’， and logically, also on the means-
issues of recognition and UN representat10n. 
The tradit10nal basic stand of this group on the Chma Problem 
(Chugoku kan-view on Chma〕hadfrom begmning been quite 
五rm against the Mainland Regime as a result of its dishke of 
Communist and the paramount need to cooperate with USA m 
主oreignaffairs.町 Andthis, though subject to some tri自echanges 
m nuance, is stil the under-current of today. 
Except a few figures like Adachi and members of the so・called
Taiwan-Korean-Lobby wl10 put considerable weight on moral 
ground of ‘giri (debt of gratitude〕’ towardthe Nationalist 
Government and ROC President Chiang Kai-shek personally 
(something with tbe motive to defend Japan’s m terests and 
based on the anti-communist link with ROC), this group in the 
mam had been realistic, to the extent not so far from pro-com-
munist on appearance, hence it seems that it was inconsistent 
with its fundamental position as a capitahst group. In a word, 
it had not much to like of the ROC or even of Taiwan as such 
It follows that their support for government policy of non-rec-
ogmt10n of the Mainland Regime was rather a consequence of 
its fear of in宜uencefrom that regime over Japan’s domestic 
situation, and a result of strategic considerat10n〔notmgthat in 
this regard Korea was considered far more important than 
Taiwan）町 Thereis also a poss1b11ity, if not probability, that, 
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since the leaders of this group are all old men, the group as a 
whole looks upon the Mainland Regime with contempt, as a 
consequence of the infenor complex of its leaders, 
On the object-issue, within this group the two-China thought 
was traditional and strong."' The intention behmd this was 
that, with the reahsation of this thought Japan could be free to 
get close to the Mainland Regime to the extent determined by 
Japan herself. On the recognition-issue, therefore, the wait・ 
and・see attitude was persisted, pendmg development of the 
situat10n as a result of change of the status quo in the Taiwan 
Straits, To speak frankly, this group sat on・ the fence with the 
editonal wnters 
This was natural. As members of an ant1・commmiist group, 
the industnalists are in fear of, and dislike, the Mainland 
Regime from reasons both ideological and national , as business・ 
men, they 〔especiallythe Kansai and Kyushu members not 
constitutmg the majority in the group) tended to deal with the 
Mainland Regime. For them, no doubt, ideology and national 
interest should be defended, but to gain pro宣tm trade with al 
countries irrespective of ideological taste, should also be realized. 
In trade there is no state boundary : this 18 their motto. And so 
long as they were not determ ned or had no chance to give 
final, exclus;ve determmat10n, the way open to them as busi-
nessmen was to follow the editonal wnters. 
With this dilemma, and due to the characteristic of a business-
man (distaste for drastic change with high nsks〕， theindustrial-
ists supported government po]lcy of maintaming diplomatic rela-
tions _wit'1 ROC (status quo mamtaining) on the one hand, and 
-0f pushing a line of getting close to the Mainland Regime (m 
non-political fields, especially in trade and other intercourses) 
on the other, with the motive that this policy was a necessary 
step for recogmt10n of the Mainland Regime if change of the 
status quo should so require in future. This was nothing less 
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than a two China policy ; itguided their view on the recognition-
issue as well as on the UN representat10n issue."> 
Thus the opinion that zaikai’s view on Chma was in a flmd 
cond1t10n or a‘state of nebulosity’due to di宜erencesm age, 
thinking, and view on life，町 asa general proposition, becomes 
problematical. Such individual differences exist m other groups 
too, and even among the Japanese at large. Indeed such state of 
nebulosity exists in case of crisis and common to al Japanese. 
This statement was proved by the French Recognition Situa-
tion, in which zatkai’s real view about US Chma policy also 
became plam. 
In early 1964, France recognized the Mamland Regime, ap-
parently with the intention of breakmg through the China dilemma 
with some sort of two-Chma solution, to it nearly al circles m 
Japan responded with stir and bustle, and the potential feeling 
of pragmaticれreasonableness”ofa two-Chma plan among the 
general public came onto the surface. In that Situation, it was 
the mdustrial坦tcircle and the Foreign Mmistry that remamed 
calm and mamtamed the traditional line of prudence. 
Faced with the French typhoon in 1964, the industrialist 
group, though acknowledging the seriousness of the Situat10n, 
kept in its cautious view. It is not deniable that after that 
Situation, on the solution of the Chma Problem the group 
seemed to become a little positive and active; however, within 
this group no one urged, like many intellectuals did, for immediate 
change of Japan’s non-recognit10n policy.'"' More concretely, 
this circle did not recognize the need for Japan to be in a hot 
haste, but rather warned that in such crisis Japan shoqld be 
patient and careful. On this pomt at least, 1t was more patriotic 
than many intellectuals; that is, it reacted more in terms of 
national mterest."' 
Of course, it can be observed here that reluctance to follow 
France and predict10n about the impossibility for realisation of 
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a two-China plan in the French Recognition Situation were the 
decisive factors. But it is significant that even after ROC 
severance of formal relations with France, this group remained 
(and remains up to the present) unchanged in its tradit10nal 
two-China line. 
Change in nuance, however, is discernible from this 'tradi-
tional' attitude after the French Recognition Situation ・atend-
ency in favour of the Mainland Regime in the UN, on condi-
tion that Taiwan’s status (its territorial status as well as political 
status of the Nationalist Government) be determmed by its 
inhabitants or in the UN.町 Thisis the substantial, though 
stil latent, impact of the French Recognition Situation 
This impact also gave nse to the new situat10n between USA 
and the rulmg groups m Japan. 
As a timely expression of dissatisfaction of the Japanese, hidden 
since the end of the war, with US policies m many fielお（among
them US China policy and especially US restrictions upon Japan’s 
trade with the Mainland Regime〕，Iwasa,Head of Japan’s Eco-
nomic Miss10n to USA, in his speech made in New York (in April 
1964〕， clearlyinformed his counterparts that it became a myth 
that Japan was US automatic ally anymore.町 Suchmove was not 
the least anti-US in nature, but was a natural and understand-
able request for broadening Japan's mdependence (margin to act) 
in foreign affairs the most critical issue of which is the China 
Problem. 
This is not at al a new phenomenon. It is a rmg m the chain 
of Japan’s struggle for a power position equal to or close to USA’s 
(in Asia at least). In fact, for many times has Japan shown 
resistance for the purpose of reducing the quantity of US diplo-
matic restramts-a defence for freedom of action, withm the 
limit of the fundamental principle of cooperation with USA: the 
cent 口fugalforce goes as far as the centripetal force permits. 
Once more the move of the Industrialist Circle to protract the 
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radms of Japan’s act10n was guided by Japan’s national interest 
B. The Bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry 
While the stratum of chishikijin in宜uencesJapanese press 
and periodicals, and the z aikai indirectly controls the ruling 
L1beral-Democrat1c Party 〔hencesimilar to the Gaiko-kondm成田
which at one time had informal in自uenceon Pnme l linister 
Ikeda who had the last word in the Cabinet〕， thebureaucrats 
m the Foreign Mm1stry directly and materially, though sometimes 
mformally, determme the current of that m1mstry which, in 
Japan, not only executes, but m most田 sesmakes foreign 
policies. It is well known that Pnme Minister Ikeda was a 
student of top-class bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry everi 
about the basic direction of diplomacy. 
It must be pomted out at the outset that the category of 
bureaucrat, hke the zaikai, is basically anti-communist; bemg 
bureaucrats, they respect established order of things and are 
reluctant to break existing balance. This is especially true of 
the bureaucrats in Japan’S Foreign M1mstry.＂》
In this regard, the ex-professional diplomats occupy an excep-
tionally important pos1t10n. 
Representing the ex-profess10nal diplomats group is ex-
Pnme Minister Yoshida whose opinion, at least durmg the宜rst
two years of the Ikeda period, was absolute for the bureaucrats 
in the Foreign Mimstry as well as for the Prime Mmister. 
Yoshida’S view on the China Problem m the Ikeda period may 
be summed up as follows: The China Problem was a dangerous 
bomb, and Japan must not be in a hurry to try to touch it. In 
other words, the China Problem had to be solved m the his-
torical context, and Japan should not disturb the balance m Asia 
by her selfish and heedless action, for, the present Taiwan 
Straits situation would contmue for a quite long period to come. 
Recogmhon of the Mamland Regime was therefore matter for 
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due considerat10n in the context of world situat10n and change 
thereof. The existence and status of the Nationalist Government 
were not demable so easily as many thought they were; nor 
was 1t to Japan's interest to talk about a two-China (though 
he did not deny that this remained a possibihty for remote 
future). With regard to Taiwan as territory, he was of opimon 
that its status according to the view of the ex Allied Powers 
was stil uncertain and undetermmed , however he warned 
that Japan must not say anythmg on this issue, because she 
had no voice whatsoever町
Representing the view of bureaucrats in the Foreign Mmistry 
proper, on the other hand, may be raised Shima’S opmion given 
to the Gaiko-konti，四 kai.＇町
Shima’s views on the China Problem were quite complete: 
( 1 ) The status quo m the Taiwan Straits 
Clear explanation on this point was purposely avoided, but 
inference of a negative view of the existence of the Chinese 
civil strife may be drawn from his opimon as a whole and 
from the majority opm10n withm the Foreign Mmistry.町
( 2 ) Terntonal Status of Taiwan 
Shima was ambiguous on this issue. He stated that Chma’s 
relation with Taiwan was much differed from Japan’s poten-
tial sovereignty over Okinawa. From his wordings and the 
tide among the bureaucrats m the Foreign Ministry, it ts 
reasonahle to presume that he implied that Taiwan's in 
ternat10nal territorial status was uncertain and undeter-
mined."' 
( 3) The Object-Issue 
There was no direct reference to this point, but a two-
China theory can be inferred from Shima's explanat10n that 
“the view that the state of war between Japan and China 
had been ended (a view held by the Japanese Government) 
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can be realised only when Communist China succeeds to the 
present standmg of Nat10nahst Chma, and as an actual 
question it 1s unthinkable that Commumst China will 
do so, hence recognition of Communist China, as a practical 
problem, can be made only by treating Communist China as 
a new state.川 0)
( 4 ) The Recognition Issue 
According to Shima, Japan recognised tbe Nationalist Govern-
ment to be the Chinese government exactly the same as the 
pre-war Chinese government. Under traditional international 
law, m Shima’S opinion, Japan could not recognise the Mam-
land Regime at the same time However, traditional m-
ternational law was, accordmg to him, unrealistic on this 
, point, as well as on the phenomenon of split-state in gen-
era! The implica t10n of a two-China theory-recogn即時
both-needs no comments. 
( 5〕 TheUN Representation Issue 
In the case where this issue be determined in favour of the 
Mainland Regime, he said, it was necessary to keep Taiwan 
from that regime This is a result of the view about 
recognit10n. 
( 6 ) The Restrictive Issues 
Shima thought the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (referred to 
by Shima as‘the Smo-Japanese Treaty', and the omission 
of the word ‘peace’was no doubt intentional) was made with 
the Nationalist Government not necessarily as 'the’govern-
ment of Chma, hence Japan’s recogmtion of that government 
胃aslimited recognition, although 'at present (in 1960〕the
Japanese Government has taken the stand that the Nation-
alist Government 1s the legitimate government of China.” 
In回目 ofrecognizing the Mainland Regime, Shima added, 
to put an end to the state of war the making of a document 
(peace treaty, etc.〕mightbecome neces阻ry•町
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The above clearly shows many contradictions some of which 
are far from being to Japan's mterest. It is significant, how-
ever, that nothing was said about the war-reparat10n rnsue. This 
was the general trend among the bureaucrats m the Foreign 
Ministry.'" 
Thus the general line of this group may be stated as follows 
It demed a civil strife in the Taiwan Straits and Chma's sover-
e1gnty over Taiwan; potentially the two-China thought prevailed 
within the group; recognition was considered matter of timmg; 
UN determination on the Chinese representation issue m favour 
of the Mam!and Regime was treated as the mevitable m 
(remote) future; though a peace treaty or苧omethingof the 
kind may be required for opening formal relat10ns with the 
Mainland Regime, that regime’s admission of the renunc1at10n 
of war indemnity made by the Nationahst Government would 
be a condit10n for Japan's recognit10n of that regime. 
To the Japanese Progressives, who by and large pressed for 
recognition of the Mamland Regime, the position of this group 
appeared very stif. In fact, the ambassadors, the back-
bone of this group, were s位置erin formal conferences held in 
the Foreign Ministry. For times they warned that impatient 
trial against reality of Japan’s relations with the Mainland Regime 
would be unwise as well as dangerous;"' even more, they 
requested that Japan should make herself clear of its anti-
Communist stand.均
ID. The Ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) 
The ruling party, hke Prime Mimster Ikeda, depended very 
much on the views of the ex-profess10nal diplomats and the 
bureaucrats for its making of a line of foreign policy, and its 
!me was in turn checked by the Zaikai from time to time In 
fact, experience tells that, for many reasons attitudes of LDP 
could not depart from the views of the Zaikai, of the ex-pro-
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fess10nal diplomats, and of the bureaucrats, given in the above. 
In the year 1960 when Ikeda succeeded Kishi, within the LDP 
(and within the government too), hence among the fact10ns 
therein, there were so far no concrete conclusions on the issues 
of the China Problem, nor were there true discrepancies among 
the factions on ideological plane like those which would appear 
in the present Sato Admmistration. Serious study of Chma 
pohcy however was undertaken ad hoc, and the factional 
views on China were fluid, by dint of the fact that the line 
of the Kishi Ca bmet, which evidently had been challenging the 
Mainland Regime, was stil followed by Ikeda. 
With the coming mto bemg of the Kennedy presidency in 
USA as the background, however, confronted with the predicted 
urgency of Chinese representョtionissue in the UN m 1961 due 
to delicate moves of the Afro-Asian states, the controlling-group 
of LDP, for the purpose of adjustmg opmions within the party, 
adopted a formal report on the Chma Problem. 
Entitled “Interim Report regarding the China Problem”Jめ this
report was signi五cantas well as symbolic. It was sigm五回nt,
m that it made clear for the五rsttime m a complete form views 
on the issues. It was symbolic, m that although it had been made 
by the Sub-Committee on China of the Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee and approved formally by the Party’s Executive Board 
(Somukai〕， hence had become the formal view (Togi-Party 
view or Party decision〕ofthe party as a whole and, as such, was 
bmding on the government，“＇ nonetheless in the Report it was 
shown that no unammous view had existed among the factions 
within the party. There did exist some divergences between the 
maiority and the minority，＇町 andthis pomt was clearly remarked 
in the Report. 
The content of the Report may be summed up in simple terms 
as follows: 
〔1〕 TheTaiwan Straits Situation 
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The existence of the Mainland Regime and its actual control 
of the China mamland were undeniable facts. But that the 
Nationalist Government existed was also an undemable fact, 
and Japan was in recognition of, and had a peace treaty with, 
this govern註ient.＇町
(2) Territorial Status of Taiwan 
This was considered m terms of the previous issue目 Question
of ownership of this area was“stil mternat10nally undeter-
mined”； but as the state havmg renounced sovereignty over 
Taiwan, Japan was not quah自edto voice on this issue. 
Nevertheless she could not agree that this area be made 
under the sway of the Communist Camp 的
(3）‘One China, or Two Chinasν 
According to the apology of the Report, Japan bad never 
undertaken to make a two-Chma situatwn 肉 Infact, Japan 
should not talk about this because “both sides in China bad 
been opposed to 1t.叫町 But emphasis was put on the dualism 
that “whereas Communist China is ru日ngChina mainland, the 
Nationalist Government is ruling士heTaiwan area”It affirmed 
and denied a two・Chma at the same time拘
(4〕 TheRecognition Issue 
Japan's recognit10n of the Nationalist Government as the 
legitimate government of the State of Chma, and her 〔peace〕
treaty relations with that government, the Report pointed 
out, should be duly considered when contemplating Japan’s 
recognition of the Mainland Regime. Furthermore, Japan’s 
recognition of the Mainland Regime must also be subject to 
attitude of the latter toward the international society, to voting 
tendency on the UN representat10n issue, and to opmions 
m UN ahout Taiwan's status (meanmg status of the Nat10n 
ahst Government〕.＇＂＇ And, for the moment, conditions making 
feasible (Japan’s) recogmt10n of the Mamland Regime were 
not fulfilled so far. 
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(5〕 TheUN Representation Issue 
This, according to the Report now in question, was matter of 
‘representation’of government, and not question of admission 
of new member. “'Many have discussed two ways, both pos-
sible: whether to give the Nationalist Government a new seat 
in the UN as representing the area of Taiwan, or to recognise 
Communist China as a new member to the UN”. The Report 
continues ：“However, on these (solutions) both Communist 
China and Nationalist China show strong opposition; seen 
from present international situation these questions are 
complicated and the solutions (so offered) di伍cultof reahsa-
ti on”臼〉
(6) The Restrictive-Issues 
These issues were stressed m the Report for many times It 
impressed on the readers that the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty 
(1952) was made the shield for probable claim of war repara-
tion from the 'Mainland Regime in remote future (hence on 
the recognition issue the importance of the existence of the 
ROC was not overlooked〕. In fact, in the Report the centre 
was rather put on the war-reparation issue. “Part of our 
country (men) discuss our reparation toward Communist China, 
(but m the view of the LDP) this question has already been 
resolved”. It was speci五callymentioned that the majority 
opinion in LDP was that Japan had not been at war with the 
Mainland Regime, and, naturally, that she was under no 
obligations whatsoever toward that regime. 
opinion (is〕that it should be made clear that for Japan 
absolutely there does not arise question of reparation toward 
Communist China.川均
Thus, on the face the LDP through this Party View appeared 
to be quite flexible to adapt itself to changeable world situation. 
It began with 'caution’and ended with ‘prudence’.＇＂ LDP 
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wanted to wm friendship from hath Chinese entities, but this 
could not be realised within a brief period and short of a two-
Chma solution (unless one of the Chmese entities would di田 p-
pear) But 1t nevertheless could not but clearly declare that it 
had not undertaken a two-China policy. This pushed the LDP 
to fall into a d1flicult position, and for times the Party attitudes 
were in conflict with one another Such a position, indeed, 
was less easy than to actively profess a two-China pohcy. 
The above view was, as a matter of fact, a result of com” 
promise between the majority and the minority within the LDP. 
In other words, 1t was a compromised consensus among the 
members (in contrad1stmction to the factions they might have 
belonged to) of the party as a whole 
The same was also true within the Socialist Party, and between 
this and the Democratic-Socialist Party. Indeed, such compro-
mised consensus existed, and stil exists, among the political par-
ties at large (exceptmg the Japanese Communist Party) without 
which consensus, to repeat, the multi-party system回 n not 
withstand challenges to democracy. And, again, such compro-
mised consensus among the parties should not be in direct op-
position to the nat10nal absolute consensus.＂》
With the above View, it is true that there is no evasion for 
one to conclude that the LDP on the China Problem (and on 
foreign affairs in general〕judgedaccordmg to田 sualidea, hope, 
and opportunity.町 Andthe unexpected and hazardous conse-
quences of such a pohcy lme were proved at a later date in 
the French Recognition Situation.＂》
On March 25, 1964, after the Foreign Ministry had made 
to the pubhc the uni五edview of the Japanese Government on 
the French Recognition Case,"' the LDP published the Uni五ed
View of the party on the same 回目．町 Acomparison of this 
Uni宜edView胃iththe Interim Report of 1961 just examined, 
shows that some changes did occur during the Ikeda period. 
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In a very simple manner, the cl沼ngedpoints m the LDP 
Um五edView of 1964, as seen from a comparison with the 
Interim Report 〔1961),are as follows 
(A〕 Whileduring the former part of the Ikeda Cabinet the two-
China thought had been potential and kept in ambiguity due 
to its nature of a taboo, at the time of, and after, French 
recogmt10n of the Mainland Regime, this line came to the 
surface as some sort of consensus between the government 
and the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party 
CB〕 Somecondit10ns were, however, put on realisation of a 
two Chma line, the mostly stressed one was guarantee for the 
existence of the Nationalist Government; ROC seat in the UN 
was made the pre-condition for Japan’s recogmt10n of the 
Mainland Regime (here it is no mere guess that Japan 
mtended to use this arms to debar the Mamland Regime from 
demanding any war indemnity). 
(C) Thus, the China policy of the LDP had changed in weight, 
from one debarring the Mainland Regime from 'entering’into 
the UN (hence iustifying Japan’s non-recognition policy), to 
one defending Japan’s national interest through defending the 
status of the Nat10nahst Government m the UN, although 
there was no alteration in the fact that ROC seat in the UN 
was used as justificat10n for Japan’s non recognition policy 
which m 1964 had seemingly become a little自exible.
CD) Furthermore, from 1964 Japan's conditions for recognising 
the Mamland Regime, which, except m an abstract way, had 
not been seriously considered in the former periods, were to a 
great extent crystallised, namely －〔i)if recognition be based 
on one-Chma, such recognit10n must be condit10ned by 
success10n of the Mamland Regime to the Sino-Japanese 
Peace Treaty (here the point of maintaining Taiwan for the 
Free World was pusoed to the shadow〕， and(11) if a two-
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Chma situat10n be realised, recogmtion should be pure and 
simple, that is, unconditional on tbe part of the Mainland 
Regime (thus excluding any admissib1hty of claim of war-
mdemnity of the Mainland Regime as a cond1t10n for “nor-
malisat10n”or“re-opening”of formal relations〕．
Except the above, on other pomts there were no changes 
between the two documents. But the above changes are more 
than sufficient to tell how seriously defective was the China 
policy of the LDP : it had no vision even on the starting line 
of‘one China, or two Chinas''・ And, as French recognition 
showed, a two-China situation under usual circumstances would 
be hardly feasible due to the absolutely uncompromising stand of 
the Mamland Regime〔and,as a result of Japan's margmal 
pos1t10n, this would become nearly impossible m 回 seJapan would 
take the ini tia ti ve〕， whileLDP had no m阻 nsto guide the 
Japanese government to meet this trouble. 
But if t司swas so, was the Japanese government able to lead 
LDP and the State of Japan in the matter? 
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CHAPTER 9 FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT 
The phrase ‘formal and mformal views' has special implications 
for the present Chapter. However, 1t does not signify that we 
are here to deal with both the formal and the informal views 
respectively under separate headmgs. To do so 1s by no means 
desirable, nor is it practical for our aims, nor, again, possible 
in this study. We shall deal with the formal and the mformal 
“views”as a whole. That phrase is only a guide, that is, some-
thing to show that in making iudgment on a government attitude 
m this Chapter, the informal views on certain matter will be 
duly considered as supplemental to the formal views on same 
matter, and no more. Informal views as such, that is to say, 
are not to be identified with the formal views pure and simple. 
This warning is of course vahd and necessary also in other 
cases. But we take thrn into consideration in this Chapter, 
because the most serious, and by far the most likely, errors 
occur in四時 of“governmentviews" 
Both formal and informal views express intent10n and feelmg. 
They are two important (exterior〕shapesof‘attitude’（other 
shapes being posture and action〕.In our present context, formal 
views mclude o伍cialwritten or oral statements, or quasi-official 
explanations supplemental thereto and consistently repeated, by 
competent government organs. They are government views, hence 
are views of a state toward foreign states. Informal views, on 
the other band, mean oral explanations, replies to questions, 
and statements made or postures assumed by policy-makers m 
the Diet (committee) or in other less formal, or informal, oc-
casions〔fromviewpomt of traditional diplomacy) They may be 
considered ‘formal views' only when and if there is no reason -
able doubt for it to be so treated, though, of course, they are 
in many instances highly relevant for the ascertamment of 
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‘formal views’if such formal views be ambiguous or wanting. 
Furthermore, attention must be drawn to the fact that there 
is some difference between formal or informal (oral〕views
made in usual time, on the one hand, and those m time of 
cnsis, on the other Oral views made known without delibera-
tion or without bemg repeated m time of crisis should be very 
carefully dealt with when they are subject of cnticism. That 
is to say, words/posture not result of dehberation or without 
being repeated, must not be confused with wntten views form-
ally representing the attitude of the government (hence the 
state〕oninternational plane. This difference bears the most 
cardinal importance for in terpretmg the pros and cons in in -
terpellations and replies thereto in the Diet. 
All these seem to be matter of course, but they have always 
been overlooked. Actually, not infrequent 1s the inexcusable 
but generalised tendency that a statement be wilfully, and even 
maliciously, stramed in its meaning, for the ad hoc purpose of 
justifying irresponsible criticism which otherwise would be 
clearly groundless. 
A policy-maker, be he a pnme mimster or a foreign minister, 
as a human bemg does not become wiser owmg to his specific 
capacity or position alone. Though hasty answers to questions 
are sometimes vital for knowmg true intentions, it remains 
true that discovery, companson and interpretation of contra -
dictions in oral statements (and reasons lying behind them〕m
a fragmentary way, are unjust as well as debatable. To 
determine a real intention by quoting some statements with 
the implication “he has once said so, therefore, etc”without 
provmg repetitions of the content of such statements, is, 
frankly speaking, one of the worst human habits and the chief 
reason for erroneous 3udgments. 
The above paragraphs will gmde the present Chapter 
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I. GoverI1111ent Attitudes in Usual Time 
The !me of the ru日ngLiberal-Democratic Party in the main 
was, as it should be, stereotyped in formal views of the Japan 
ese Government."' On the Chma Problem, the starting point of 
the Japanese government in the Ikeda Cabinet period, was to 
Jet it be resolved as time passed by; and to make caut10us 
contacts with both Chinese entities was, naturally, considered 
necessary and expedient.“Our country is desirous to have our 
relations with Chma mainland improved. (she is) always mind-
ful of their relevancy to mternational politics m general.”＇＂＇ 
(l〕Statusquo in the Taiwan Straits 
No formal view had been given by the Ikeda government on 
this issue, but implied reference to it could not be avoided 
because this is the basis for the views on other issues 
It is safe to say that generally speakmg the line of the 
Kishi government was followed in the Ikeda period And 
that lme, by mference, was to admit that there was some sort 
of ci吋1st口fein the Taiwan Straits. “Communist Chmese 
Regime is in de facto control of China mainland, while the 
Republic of Chma’s government is in actual reign of Taiwan 
and part of the islands along the mainland coast , and 〔this
situation〕givesnse to a very great difficulty, in that each 
claims for itself sovereignty even over the area controlled by 
the other and e:zch struggles against the other一同り.There was 
no sign of change in this position during the Ikeda Admimstra-
tion. In 1964, when France recognised the Mainland Regime, 
Ikeda’s tbis attitude was for times made clear. As a matter 
of fact, this position was reiterated, with some differences in 
nuance, m the latter period of the Ikeda Cabinet＇勾．
(2) Territorial Status of Taiwan 
On this issue, the view of the Japanese Government was自rm.
“By the San Francisco Peace Treaty our country has renounced 
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this area and left it to the Allied Powers, and 1t 1s not proper for 
us to say anythmg about it.”町 Withthe line of the LDP 
m mind, we may judge that the above view implies that 
it refers to law. However, it does not stop here.“From higher 
plane of Japan’s security and peace”， it goes on，”1t lS in 
any case necessary that Taiwan’s status quo be maintamed, or 
that Taiwan be neutralised so as to avoid its bemg communi-
sed.”叫 Ingeneral terms, Japan, like USA〔theSenate’S Un-
derstandings on the Mutual Assistance Treaty with ROC, 
referred to m the above), treated ROC as a state-in exile. 
(3）‘One China, or two Chinas?' 
As a matter of course, on formal plane the Japanese Govern-
ment had been no more careful to avoid touching this issue 
directly, for fear that lest she might be attacked by both 
Chinese entities. But, as Foreign Mmister Ohira hinted, the 
Japanese Government did not talk about a two-Chma theory 
formally"' There 1s no doubt that the Japanese Government 
had m mind a picture of two Chinas. As early as 1952, the 
abnormal content of the Smo-Japanese Peace Treaty already 
told everything."' 
On this fundamental line, there were many instances, formal 
and mforma!, where Ikeda himself repeated his view As early 
as 1960, though on Taiwan’s future Ikeda was highly caut10us 
and endea・,oured to avoid givmg stimulative statements, what 
really occupied him was the thought 'to preserve Nat10nahst 
China m the form of two-China. if possible’．町
Thus, Ikeda was a pioneer on this point. In his conference with 
Kennedy in 1961 in USA, his suggestion for crystallisation of 
Taiwan, to the end that a two-Chma settlement be adopted, 
therefore, was rather something anticipated Kennedy refused 
his suggestion, partly because it was stil infeasible for its 
realisation, and partly because Kennedy knew the Senate would 
not approve 1t.町 Thiswas at length dropped in the conference 
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between the two Heads. However, 1t reappeared m the 
form of 'successor-states’proposal on the ta!kmg-paper of the 
Rusk-Kosaka conference held immediately after the Kennedy-
Ikeda Talk.'"' 
This quasi-formal (concealed) view, however, is not peculiar 
to the Ikeda Cabinet. As havmg been ment10ned above, from 
the Yoshida Cabinet onward, the two-China line had been 
controlling the government. In the Hatoyama Cabmet, the 
Prime Minister even unreservedly declared to the public that 
he supported a two-Chma plan.'" During the Kishi period, such 
thought turned underground, and in the period of the Ikeda 
Admimstrat10n, 1t rose again Ikeda only pushed the line more 
skillfully."' 
(4〕 TheRecogmt10n Issue 
In his letter to Dulles in 1951, Yoshida(then Prime Minister) had 
guaranteed that Japan would not recognise the Mainland Regime. 
This was the guide for the Ikeda period, although the Foreign 
Ministry declared that that letter was no bindmg document."' 
Japan’s recognition pollcy in the Ikeda period, llke that m 
the precedmg periods, was conditioned by maintenance of 
friendship with the ROC. "' This was Ikeda’s first prmciple 
declared. It had many legal reasons behind it, and in fact it con-
stituted the backbone of Japan's traditional two-China theory. 
Even m the highly anti-communist Kishi Cabmet, the formal 
view of the Japanese Government was that ：“Our country has a 
peace treaty with the Nationalist Government, and has main-
tained the stand of non-recognition of Com立mnistChina How-
ever, the reality that Communist Chinese Regime holds de facto 
control over China mainland can not be overlooked ”＂＇ 
Whatever may be tbought about the recogmtion issue, it was, 
and 1s, for Japan, always and inalterably conditioned by a solu-
tion of the UN Chmese representat10n issue. Throughout the 
Kishi and the Ikeda periods, the principle of 'UN Centre' had 
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been maintained; and on the China Problem (the two means-
issues) the Japanese Government put al weights on‘world 
opimon', which was actually nothmg but the opimon in the UN 
General Assembly as shown in votmg attitudes On this pomt, 
Ikeda's China pohcy, whatever its appearance, succeeded 
Kishi’s without qualitative change."' 
Thus the difference between the thoughts of the top policy-
makers (the Prime Minister and/or the Foreign Minister〕and
the current in the Foreign Ministry was clear. The Foreign 
Ministry had considerably far-reachmg plans, but it kept them 
in its own o旺icialdom.Even the ministers may not have know-
ledge of such plans sometimes.＇り
( 5) The UN Representation Issue 
As having been said in the above, Japan’s attitude on this 
issue determines her attitude on the recognition issue, and the 
former attitude is in turn determmed by 'world opinion' (in 
the UN General Assembly〕. This position has ever smce been 
mamtained up to the present, and the reason for this was best 
demonstrated by Okazaki, actmg as Japan’s chief delegate to 
the UN, in his speech in the UNGA in 1961 (16th Session〕，
which was a clear recourse to the two・China line.＇句
As basic attitude for 1961 and 1962, on this issue Japan’s 
formal view was that this was so complicated and might greatly 
mfluence world peace accordmg as what solution be adopted, 
that hence this was to Japan a vital question to be handled 
with utmost care, that an‘eqmtable (just〕’ solut10nagreeable 
to al might be found out.町
This however must be understood m the context of the 
posture, that any solution whereby the Nationalist Government 
would be ousted from the UN, while the Mamland Regime would 
take its stead, was not helpful for solving the issue, hence that 
Japan could not agree to such solution T町 Impliedin such an 
attitude was of course nothing less than a two・China pohcy in 
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the UN. 
For the Japanese Government, accordingly，“the China Prob-
!em m general is nothing but the China Problem in the United 
Nations”．町 Thiswas the maiu current in the Foreign Mimstry 
too. Of course, it may give place to criticism that Japan fol-
lowed US Chma policy. But this on the other hand was referred 
to as Japan’S independent policy and to Japan’s nat10nal in-
terest.'"' 
(6〕TheRestrictive Issues 
There was no direct formal statement on what had happened 
to the state of war between China and Japan, hence Japan’s rela-
tion in futuγo with the Mainland Regime was also uot clear. 
But since the formal relation of Japan's havmg a peace treaty 
with the ROC had for too many times been emphasised,'" it 
may be judged with assurance that the Japanese Government 
took the stand that the state of war between the two count-
ries had ipso ju叩 cometo an end through the making of the 
S阻止JapanesePeace Treaty m 1952. 
On this point Ikeda was clear. In his replies to interpella-
tions m the Diet and m his written views at different oc-
cas10ns, he maintained the formal view wluch was exactly the 
same as that which is demonstrated in the preceding paragraph 
“I consider the war between Japan and Chma has already been 
ended as a matter of law”he said, and his Foreign Minister 
(Kosaka〕commentedthat “Japan was at war with the Republic 
of China, and she surrendered to that country (Republic of 
Chma) and made peace treaty with the government representing 
that country.”82) 
About this point, commenting on the applicab11ity of the Sino-
Japanese Peace Treaty Mr. Hayashi, Secretary-General of the 
Legislative Bureau of the Cabinet, in his additional〔supplemen-
tary〕explanationsto the Pnme Minister’S v 1ew in the Diet, 
pomted out on the same day that“Japan made a peace treaty 
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with the government of the Republic of China, and in this case, 
rt 1s a matter of course that Japan considers the other signatory, 
the government of the ROC, as the legitimate government of 
China. Accordingly, the statement that with this treaty the 
state of war was ended, is to be vahd for Chma as a whole, 
and smce it was made with the government representing this 
China, Japan's state of war with the State called China, as a 
juridical relation, was ended once and for al. In the same 
peace treaty there was also attached a Protocol and Exchange 
of Notes.〔but〕sinceendmg of a state of war is a matter of 
relations of state to state, it has nothing to do with the 
restrictions of the territorial application (under the Exchange 
of Notes）”町．
In this connection, in law as in fact the Japanese Government 
refused to the Mainland Regime any right to demand war 
reparation Stress of the peace-treaty relations with the ROC 
was considered the legal ground supportmg such refusal. Ikeda 
made this clear enough equally Sり
The Foreign Mimstry, like its counterparts m other countries, 
msists upon stnct application of international law on these 
matters. Such insistence, together with the reasonings at the 
back, has never suffered any change up to the present. And 
the juridical logic may be summed up thus：〔a〕Thecontent of 
the Sino・JapanesePeace Treaty is divided into two parts, and 
the part that is subject to restriction of terntonal sphere of 
application is that which includes m it the provisions on trade, 
civil air transportation, fishery, and nationality, which are 
“changeable provisions", (b〕theending of the state of war and 
the settlement of war reparation belong to different category, 
which is of the nature of normalismg the relations between 
the two states; (c) Japan has recognised the Nationalist Govern-
ment as the legitimate government representmg whole China, 
and has settled all these questions with that Government; (d) 
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hence restriction of terntonal application of the said peace 
treaty has nothing to do with this part of the peace treaty, 
〔underitem 〔b〕above）；〔e)accordingly the Mainland Regime 
can never have a right to war reparat10n.町
But this is only the “formal”view In the green room, the 
Foreign Ministry had at least since 1958 considered these re-
strictive issues seriously and more realistically. It considered 
the timing for normalisation of relations with (recogmhon of) 
the Mainland Regime to be closely connected with the latter’s 
possible demand for war reparation.町
No cleverer way had so far been discovered; and this perhaps 
will continue for a considerable period in the context of 
change, 1f any, of the China status-quo, of world situation at 
large, of Japan-US relations, and of the reactions and attitudes 
of the two Chinese entities toward Japan (and toward USA). 
I. Government Attitnde in Time of Crisis-
The French Recognition Si加ation(1964) and the 
Unified View of the Government on the Sitnation 
A very long story will have to be told if we intend to dis-
cuss here m a detailed manner Japanese Government views on 
the China Problem in time of crisis. Space does not allow us 
to undertake case study. Our examinat10n will be made very 
briefly by taking the most influential case as object, so as to know 
the real intention of the Japanese Government through finding 
out changes, if any, m its view and attitude. 
On January 27, 1964, France recognised the Mainland Regime. 
On February 10, the Nationahst Government severed diplomatic 
relations with France, making any form of the rumoured and 
predicted two-China settlement impossible."' All these happened 
at a time when relation between ROC and Japan had become 
no worse as a result of the Chou Hung-ching Asylum Case 
occurred in September 1963 (reachmg the pomt of quasi-
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severance of diplomatic relations〕町 Withthis high tension at 
the hackground, m Japan the French recogmt10n case appeared 
to be far more dramatic and sensational than it should be, and 
the Japanese, especially the press, the intellectuals, and the 
Reformist Camp (mcludmg their political parties), and even 
part of the LDP and of the zaikai, sensitively responded by 
urging Japan to follow France. Some time from December 
1963 to March 1964, therefore, the Japanese Government was 
in a very difficult position, and this was well reflected m its 
views and attitudes made known during this period. 
It is symbolic that the focus for Japan in this Situat10n was 
the two-Chma theory. Relative to this are, as it should be, the 
means-issues of Recognition and Representat10n in the UN. And, 
supplemental to these are the territorial status of Taiwan, 
the restrictive-!Ssues of peace treaty and war-reparation 〔these
have bee立 demonstratedin the first part of this Chapter, and 
they remam unchanged up to the present〕．
(1〕TheObject-Issue ('one China, or two Chinas？’〉
Japanese Government very forwardly pushed out its potential 
two-China line. This was made on many occas10ns (from the 
end of 1963 to the beginning of 1964), in informal, quasi-formal, 
and even in formal ones 
Thus, on January 17, 1964, government quarter (Foreign Mmis-
try〕informallycommented on French notification to the USA of 
recogmtion of the Mamland Regime, that “it is notewortby that 
there will be an increase in the possibility of solving the 
(Chma〕田tuat10nby way of a de facto two-Cbina . So far as 
Japanese Government is concerned, 1t wishes to take a soft 
forward posture not contrary to this world tide川.，
In an ad hoc meetmg of the Cabinet on January, 18, the outlme 
of the Prime Minister’s address to the・ Diet (together with that 
of the Foreign Minister’s, with similar content on the China 
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Problem〕wasdiscussed. After reiterating maintenance of the 
established line on the China Problem and expressing the will 
to restore friendly relations with the Nationalist Government 
which had been worsened by the Chou Hung-chmg Case, on the 
reported French recognition of the Mainland Regime 1t was 
stated in the outline that Japan would realist1cally take “cogni-
tion of the solemn fact that on Chma mainland there ex1st six 
hundred million people ”明
The formal content of the Prime Mmister’s address to the 
Diet (46th Sess10n), however, underwent a )lttle but important 
change, in that a two-China lme was both m word and in 
1mpl!cation made more unreserved：叫“Chinamamland lies at a 
place only a narrow strip of water away from us, and it is a 
stern fact that on th1s huge territory lives a great bulk of 
a people of six hundred million ; on the other hand, questions 
regarding Commumst Chinese Regime are world questions to be 
determined in the UN .Basing on such cogmt10ns, with my 
countrymen I (the Prime Mimster) wish to develop a realistic 
pol!cy with prudence”. "' 
As formal expression of Japan’S view on the China Problem, 
this was perhaps the most definite and provocative since Ikeda 
had come into power. It was more s1gnif1cant, if we compare 
this with Ikeda’s addresses to the Diet made theretofore,"' and 
consider the fact that precedmg the above quotat10n, in the same 
address the paragraph was on‘another China', which reads: 
“It is regrettable that recently there has occurred (a〕dispute
between us and the Republic of Chmese Government, which is 
traditionally in friendly relations with us. It has already been 
clear enough that our policy line is to maintain friendly 
diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of 
Chma (and to trade with China mainland on the principle of 
‘severing the political from the economic', etc.〕”叫
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Though Ikeda did not make it plain as to what his 'reahstic 
policy' might be, from the form as well as from the content of 
this address it may be inferred with certainty that a two-China 
line was pushed out in an unreserved manner. What was pend-
ing was timmg〔USand ROC attitude) only町．
Our above interpretation would be confirmed by a top-level 
meeting held on January, 22, 1964, among the Prime Mmister, 
the Foreign Minister, and the kanbu of the Foreign Ministry. 
Agreed upon in this meeting were some vital points, inter alia, 
that in the case where a two-China situation would become 
feasible due to the fait accomρIi of France’s recognition of the 
Mainland Regime with her recognition of the ROC kept intact, 
Japan should persuade the Nationalist Government not to cut 
off its relations with France (hence to persuade it to admit 
this two China situation〕．町
〔2〕TheMeans-Issues(recognition and UN Chmese representation) 
About these two ISsues, much more 1s to be observed 
First to be pointed out is the fact that while stressing on the 
face the tradit10nal line of maintaining diplomatic relations 
、;vith the ROC, the Foreign Ministry, contradicton!y, tended 
to urge for a change of this policy，町 thecontent of which 
change m effect would destroy the very traditional line in toto. 
This .on the one hand has a lot to do with the painfulness bet-
ween formal maintenance of 'one China' and potential desire for 
'two Chmas’．叫 It1s also connected with another point, that 
is, with the fact that the UN representation issue came to 
the surface as the absolute condition for Japan’s recognition 
of the Mainland Regime.町
The UN representation issue had been so strongly and fre-
quently stressed by the Japanese Government, that one doubts 
whether it was not made used of as a 1ustificat10n for its 
non-recogmtion po!Icy, and conditions for solution of the UN 
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representation issue was so indefmite even after the so-called 
de Gaulle Typhoon had passed, that one may judge too, that 
facmg this drastic Situation the Japanese government had lost 
its direction山〉．
This need be examined a little in detail. 
も,¥Thenasked“Under what condit10ns will the (Japanese) 
Government recognise Communist China P”， Prime Minister Ikeda 
raised as conditions 'peace-!ovmg’and 'world pub!Ic opinion' 
(in the UN), and added immediately that due to the Aggressor-
Resolution of the UN General Assembly (1951〕， theMainland 
Regime to him had not fulfilled the condit10n of‘peace-lov-
mg川り for‘recognition’． Recogniton and UN representation 
were mixed, or, when Japan faced with the French Recognition 
S1tuat10n, rocognition was absorbed into the UN issue which 
was its negath-e justification.'"'' 
On the UN representation issue m particular, the picture 
was this: 
〔a〕Japanwould not change the line of solving the Chma 
problem (recognition〕inthe UN;'"' (b) the UN was (and is) 
the mirror of world pubhc opm10n, which Japan ought to fol-
low；＇＂＇》（ c)in case Mamland Regime be recognised in the UN 
as a legitimate (rightful, seito〕member,Japan would consider 
to normalise relation with it.'"' 
The third point of the above picture 1s by far ambiguous. It 
had been doubted whether it was the formal view at al. With 
a view to making this more easily understood, Foreign Min 
ister. Oh1ra himself commented that“when the s1tuat10n 1s 
such, that Commumst China is admitted mto the UN, we ha・1e 
to duly consider and deal with it."'"' And, one week later, 
on February 27, the Government formally unified its formal 
view on this point, that“In the event Commumst China will 
participate m the UN in the form of its bemg blessed by the 
UN, Japan will consider normalisation of diplomatic relat10ns 
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With It”. Doubts remamed as to what was it meant by the 
word 'blessed’＇＂ The matter was made more mysterious. 
{3) The Restrictive Issues 
The necessity for Pnme Minister Ikeda to defend his non-
recognition policy and to add something to the conditions for 
recognition, clearly came from considerations of the restrictive 
issues that, for Japan, the Mainland Regime should succeed to 
(in case of one China) or recognise (in case of two Chinas〕the
Sino・JapanesePeace Treaty and that with this it should admit 
also the renunciation of war reparation 
In this regard, the fact that solutions of these two issues were 
made the 'precondit10ns’was not the least accidental, nor had 
it anything to do with suddenness 
Early on January, 22, 1964, before French recognition of the 
Mainland Regime, in the top-level meeting, as having been 
pomted out, the Prime Minister, his Foreign Mmister and the 
.kanbu of the Foreign Ministry agreed on some points, one of 
which was that“Japan should contmue to maintam recogmsing 
the Nationalist Government as the legitimate government of 
China due to the existence of the Sinoゾゆ抑制ePeace T向。tyof 
.1952”loηAnd, on January 29 and 30, immediately after France 
・had recognised the Mamland Regime, Ikeda stated the same 
thing in the Diet.＇＂町
Thus the war-reparation issue was, as it should be, absorbed 
into the peace-treaty issue. But this does not mean that no 
・special references were made to it in particular. 
In reply to LDP Member A1chi's quest10n, above referred, 
1keda pointed out that“it is necessary that we remember the 
宮enerosityof giving up war reparat10n and keep engagements 
with Nationalist China. I mtend to insist on this virtue of 
Japan ”＂町 Moreclearly, a few days later Ikeda stated that 
“Concerning war indemnity, Japan was at war with the Re-
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public of Chma, and has signed a peace treaty with her. It must 
be made clear that that State 〔Republicof China〕hasgiven up 
claims of war-indemnity”・＂町 Therewas to him no question 
of war indemnity between Japan and the Mamland Regime On 
this issue, the view of the Japanese Government had been 
consistent.""' 
(4〕Inconnectrnn with the restrictive issues, of particular 
importance is the fact that on the basic pomt the attitude of the 
Japanese government had been inconsistent or, rather, made equi-
vocal. This is the territorial status of Taiwan; it, as having been 
shown in Part I, is basic to al other issues of the whole Problem. 
In the top-level meeting on January, 22, 1964, already referred, 
by inference111>, Taiwan was not recognised as Chinese territory 
On January 30, in reply to Sociahst Member Yokomichi’s inter-
pellations the Prime Mimster said ・“Ido not consider the Re 
pubhc of China controls the whole of China.”＂＇ More spe-
cifica!ly, he stated that transfer of sovereignty from Japan to・ 
China had not been completed, and that hence m law Taiwan’s 
territo 口alstatus had not been determmed. And, when asked 
whether this did not mean that the ROC was a government-
in-exile, he replied that “Though the final disposition of Taiwan 
and Penghu is legally undetermined, according to the war-time 
arrangements〔theCairo Declaration〕amongthe Allied Powers. 
these territories are to be restored to the Republic of China; 
and Japan through accepting the Potsdam Proclamation also・ 
recognised this Accordmgly at that time these were expected 
to be restored to the Repubhc of China, and under this expec-
tat ion the Nationalist Government has occupied them up to the・ 
present. Furthermore, the Nationalist Government also effec 
tively rules part of the mherent territory (of China〕suchas. 
Kinmen and Matsu.”山〉
But to accept th抽出 the formal view of Pnme Mmister 
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Ikeda on this very pomt, there IS not without reasonable doubt. It 
is absurd to maintain a v1ew wh1ch 1s equivalent to saying that 
the territory of the Republic of China includes Kinmen and Matsu 
hut excludes Taiwan. In such a case, excluding the legal 
constructive control of mainland by the ROC, and we shall see 
that the result will be very serious. In connection w1th the peace 
treaty and the war indemnity issues, suppose that the Islands of 
Kinmen and Matsu be lost to the Mainland Regime in future, 
Japan would be in a very miserable position. But the Ikeda 
Cabinet did not seem to have been aware of such a juridical 
consequence of our supposition. Foreign Mmister Ohira even went 
so far as to say that “Taiwan's status is, in theory, matter for 
the Allied Powers of the world war (to decide), but what would 
become of Taiwan is a matter to be determmed by Taiwan 1tself 
(meaning by the mhabitants therein, hence not excluding a 
“plebiscite”）ヘ thoughhe added immediately that“Japan is not 
m a position to say anything in regard thereto.”＂＇ But, in fact 
Japan had said much on this rnsue, and with contradictions. 
The point therefore needs further clarification and ascertainment 
to the extent beyond reasonable doubt, before the v1ews may 
be 1dent1且edas that of the Japanese Government’s. 
Due to existence of such contradictions, on February 29 the 
Prime Mmister made a little change (to him, a little clearer) on 
this rnsue. After confirming the view that Taiwan’s status was 
undetermmed, he commented before his colleagues that “At 
present the government on Tanvan 1s m control of Taiwan, 
the Pescadores, and Kinmen and Matsu, but it does not mean 
that it has no control over mainland. . Ch1ang’s government 
represents China. For the time being its administrat10n does 
not cover Peking or Shanghai and so forth＇”U的； thenhe repeated 
the view that Taiwan did not belong to China, and echoed 
Faure's v1ew m the F1garo, by pomtmg out that he himself 
recognised that“it (the Nationalist Government) does not 
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stretch (its control) to mainland”戸内 that“this is a question 
where the law and the fact do not adapt to each other”. He 
added, moreover, that “from viewpomt of a series of facts it 
(Taiwan〕belongsto the Republic of China, but in the peace 
treaty this had not been determined ...’山内.His view thus became 
more metaphysical for comprehension. And when reminded 
that 
this Diet that ‘Taiwan is Chinese territory' . Are you not 
self-contradictory？”，Ikeda could not help withdrawing his 1961 
statement, and his real view remained unknown as before."'' 
(5) The Final View-Unified View of the Japanese Government 
on the Situation 
To clarify the replies and postures given and assumed on the 
above occasions, the Foreign Mm1stry on March 5, 1964 made 
to the pubhc the formal Unified View of the Japanese Govern-
ment on the China Problem (thus puttmg a period to the 
French Recognition Situation for Japan〕．
The relevant points in this Unified View are as follows: 
(a) Two facts are presupposed by Japan’s China policy: ( i ) 
Japan has peace treaty relation with the Nationahst Govern・ 
ment and maintains normal diplomatic relations with it; so far 
as Japan is concerned that government represents the State of 
China；〔i)Japan can not but hold some de facto relations with 
China mainland due to historical and geographical reasons, and 
this point tells everything about the differences between 
Japan’s position and US position. 
〔b)Both Chinese entities claim sovereign rights to whole 
Chma. But it 1s impossible for Japan to have diplomatic relations 
with both of them simultaneously. To recognise the Mainland 
Regime Japan will have to withdraw recogrnt10n of the ROC. 
But such policy is at present (in 1964〕 contrary to Japan’s 
national interest, and 1s also in opposition to the desire of 
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majority of the Japanese people. 
(c〕The(present) situation in China 1s not a normal one, 
but normahsation of this situation is not a task possible of 
accomplishment by Japan alone; in fact, the situation re・ 
mains as 1t 1s, severance of relat10ns with the Nat10nahst 
Government and recognition of the Communist Regime o立main-
land, are not normalisation of the situat10n, but will rather 
give rise to confusion; this is by no means a measure in the 
cause of promot10n of peace in Asia. 
(d) The China Problem, therefore, should be justly solved in 
the UN, after due discussions and with world public opmion m 
support. This is the only solution. The UN representation 
issue should be determined with care, and not be disposed of 
as a matter of form (credentials〕.This was (and is) Japan’s 
fundamental attitude. 
(e) In this regard, it is clear that the statement (by Foreign 
Minister Ohira）“In the event Communist China w11l participate 
m the UN .・” asa rightful (legitimate) and blessed member, sig-
nifies a situat10n wherem Communist China be g1ven〔its?a＇〕
UN seat in a satisfactory way, after careful discussions from 
all angles (and with world public opinion at the back), thus be 
proven tbat its”admiss10n”IS necessary and desirable for 
maintenance of peace. (Note that in such a formal document 
the word “admission”bears affirmative nuance and hints at a 
two-Chma settlement.〕
(f〕Insuch a case, it is a matter of course that Japan w11l 
consider normahsation of diplomatic relations with (and recognise) 
Commumst China. But it is too early to decide Japan’s ati・ 
tude in the 1964 Session of the UN General Assembly, for Japan 
must be sure about the direction of world public opinion."" 
On otber ISsues, however, the Umf1ed V1ew remam silent. In 
this regard, it may not be useless to remmd that tbe LDP 
Interim Report of 1961 remained valid up to 1964, and the 
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government views made known before the occurrence of French 
recognition of the Mam!and Regime, that is, government views 
in usual time, remain unchanged "" 
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Notes 
I) Fukushima S. in the Chuokoron (Aug 1956) p 72, Mmutes of the 
G出 ko-kond，酎ikai(No. 7, Dec. 13, 1960〕p39. There are too many ex-
amples, and the ‘Uni宣edView’of the Party (Aug. 12, 1963〕maybe 
cited as one of the most evident cases 
2) 15 y回目 ofintimate fri田 dshipwith, and understandmg of, Japanese 
Dietmen of the political parties leads the pr白田twriter to this 
conclusion. There is no other way than private talks and oriental 
’feelings' for knowing the true thoughts of Japanese politicians (including 
LDP Membe四） who hold two faces on the China Problem and their 
r田1attitudes toward USA. 
3) Socialist Party’s Kokumi nkoya.帥（Pledgesto the People〕Oct.25, 
1960, see the Mamichi Shimbun and the Tokyo Shimbun (Nov. 14, 
1960), Foreign Policy determmed by the Party Convention (Mar. 
1961〕，Outlineof Foreign Policy at the Party Convention (Nov. 1962〕；
Foreign Policy Line determined by the Central Committee of the 
Party (Aug. 27, 1963〕， etc This was the basic line of the JSP. How-
ever, there were for times dehcafe nuances in its top leaders' 
explanations of this lme Even a leftist leader like Sata, when he 
was the Ch日fof the Party’s Bureau of International Affairs, said 
in 1951 (in his reply to the Tokyo Shimbun) to the effect that though 
his Party considered the regime on Chma Mainland the only legit・
imate government, the real answer as to which of the present regimes 
in China had legitimacy, was to be determmed by world public 
opimon (and this was the line of the ruling Liberal-Democratic 
Party). Cf Kawakami (chen Party Chairman) in the Yomiu口 Shimbun 
(Apr 7. 1961〕．
For JSP stand on the status quo in the Taiwan Straits, see Sata 
m the Tokyo Shimbun, Series‘All about the China Problem' (J〕，
No. 8, Apr. 1931, Eda in the Asahi Shimbun (a discussion with Foreign 
Minister Kosaka〕Jan.3, 19;2; Kawakami's press conference on Sept 
20, 1953 (Outline of the Party’S Policies for the General Election). 
4〕 ForeignPolicy determined by the Party Convention (Mar. 1951); 
Eda m the Asahi Sh1mbun, Jan. 3, 1962. This was another basic line 
of the Socialist Party, and 1t was subiect to the double face pheno-
menon of the JSP members in the Diet 
5) Party Pledges t。thePeople m 1960, Television-Discussion among 
Leaders of the Three Parties (s閏 theYomiun Shim bun, Nov. 17, 1960); 
Foreign Policy determined by the Party Convention (Mar. 1960); 
Party Pledges for the Eleotion of the Councillors (Jun 7, 1962); Out-
line of t!ie Party’S Foreign Policy at the Party Convention (Nov. 
1952〕； Wada(then Chief of the Bureau of International A百airs),
“The Foreign Policy of the Socialist Party”（Feb 12, 1963), Um自ed
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View of the Party (Aug. 12. 1963); Foreign Policy determined by the 
Party’S Central Committee (Aug. 27, 1963); Policies for the General 
Election (Oct. 25, 1963); The Shakai Shimpo (a JSP o伍cialorgan), 
additional issue on“The Smo Soviet Conflict”（Feb. 10, 1963), and 
ibid, editorial (Mar. 8, 1964). 
6) Foreign Policy determined in the Party Convention 〔Mar.1961), 
Outline of Party’S Foreign Policy (Nov. 1962); Wada’s“The Foreign 
Policy of the Socialist Party，〔Feb.12, 1963); Foreign Policy deter-
mined by the Party’S Central Committee (Aug. 27, 1963); Policy for 
the General Election (Oct. 25, 1963); Editorial of the Shakai Shimpo 
(Mar. 8, 1964) 
7) Japanese Commumst Party would deny the reality to the ex-
treme. But the assumption that the state of war stil exists between 
China and Japan, hence that Japan shall make peace anew, was 
common to both 
8〕 Fore1ghPolicy determined by the Party Convention (Mar 1961〕2
Sata's reply to the Tokyo Shimbun in 1961, cited m supra note 3 of 
this Part; Kawakami’s interpellation (representing the Party) in the 
40th Ordinary Diet (Plenary Session, House of Representatives〕Jan.
23, 1962; Outline of New Foreign Policy approved by the Party Con-
vention (Nov 1962〕；Wada’Sview at the Party Conference 〔Feb23, 
1964, the Yommn Shimbun〕； Wadain the Gekkan Shakaito〔aJSP 
O缶cialorgan, the “Socialist Party Monthlyつ， Apr.1964, pp. 84f. This 
peace treaty was even considered as the ‘N 1kka Ki hon J oyaku’（Basic 
Treaty between Japan and the Republic of Chma), but recognition of 
the validity of this treaty remains unchanged, see ibid discussions 
among top-leaders of JSP, p 88 and p. 89. 
9〕 Forinstance, Wada at the Party Conference (see the Asahi Shim-
bun and the Yomiuri Shimbun, both of Feb. 23, 1964), the Gekkan 
Shaka1to〔Apr.1964) p. 85 and editorial on p 87. 
ID〕 Wadaat the Party Conference, ibid. It must be pointed out that 
th1s Conference had the French Recognition Situation as background; 
and only in time of crisis is it possible to know the real intention 
behind o伍cialattitudes. 
11〕 Thiswas so due not only to the balance of the right-wing force 
but also to the fact that dunng the Ikeda period the Socialist Party 
was substantially controlled by the somewhat right-tended Sohyo of 
that period. Sohyo, as is well known, 1s Japan’s most powerful labour 
organisat1on and the only strong sponsor to JSP, hence it may be 
considered in terms of informal m自uencelike LDP’s zoik.酎. Though 
Sohyo favoured “recovery of diplomatic relations" with the Mainland 
Regime, it was nonetheless a Japanese labour organisation. The 
Socialist Party was therefore different from the JCP in quality. 
12〕 Thiswas a strong tendency in the nght-wi昭.and was similar to 
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the line of the Democratic-Socialist Party. Homogeneity to Com-
munism disappears before national interest. The Socialist Party 1s 
after al a‘Japanese’political party, and it is also a‘Socialist’party 
having the mclination similar to that of its brethren the Democratic-
Socialist Party, so far as the latter’s“one China, one Taiwan＇’po hey 
is concerned See (B) below. 
13〕 Onthe UN representation issue, the Kawakami and the Wada 
factions even formally retreated from Japan’s‘pushmg forward' 
attitude (to vote in favour of the Mainland Regime) to Japan’s 
abstention from voting in the UN, see the Asahi Shimbun, May 28, 
1963. The China Problem, like in case of the rulmg LDP, is the 
typhonic centre within the Socialist Party. See on this point, the 
Tokyo Sh1mbun, Feb 18 and Feb. 20. 1964 
14〕 Seeinfra Ch. 9 (I〕（1)and (II〕(1).
15〕 The Gekkan Shakaito (Apr. 1964〕opcit., pp 9ルー 91;Katsumata, Chief 
of Bureau of International A旺airsof JSP, in砂o(Apr. 1965)p 24丘
16) This party, though at present not strong enough to hold a casting 
vote in Japan’s politics, is, however, the only party that has many 
top leaders of the chishikijin category (especially the most famous 
critics and professors) at the back (and in fact it is named by many 
as 'a party of the critics and professorsワ， hence its view is more 
sigm宣cant than other opposition parties such as Japan田eCom-
munist Party or the Komeito (the Sokagakkai) Though it may be 
interesting to know the views of the latter two parties, we skip 
them because m the Ikeda period they were so far not counted as 
significant political forc田 Fora representative and complete view 
of DSP, see Sane E. (a DSP top-leader〕mthe Japan Quarterly (Oct.-
Dec., 1957) pp 437-438 
17) Party Pledges to the People, Oct 25, 1960 , Sekai, ・Nov. 1960, P 111 ; 
the Tokyo Shimbun, Series on 'All about the China Problem', Apr. 
30 and after, 1961, No 7; Katayama, ex-Prime Mimster and DSP 
supreme advisor, representing the Party in reply to the Toky。
Shimbun m early 1961. Cf. Nishio (Party Chairman〕mthe Yomiu口
Shimbun, Apr 7, 1961. 
18) See the Tokyo Shimbun, Nov. 19, 1960 (Policies of the Four Parties〕L
. Katayama’s reply to the Tokyo Shimbun in 1961, op cit.; Sone 〔Party
Secretary-General) m the Tokyo Shimbun (Jan 5, 1962, in“A Sym-
posium among Top-Leaders of Three Partiesつ．
19) Party Pledges to the People for Election of the Counc1llors, June 7, 
1962 , Party Policies for the General Election, Oct 25, 1963. In the 
policies for general election m 1963, it is rather significant that 
Japan’s relations with US were strongly emphasised, and the line 
toward the Mainland Regime on‘recovery of state relations' was 
expressed in the wordings of 'expansion of economic and cultural 
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exchanges’目 Thiswas, and stil is, exactly the line of the rulmg 
LDP (and that of the government). For this, and for other reasons too, 
DSP has, improperly, been called 'the second govermnent party’As 
a matter of fact, DSP cares very much to draw a line between itself 
and the ruling party, and another line between itself and JSP 
And exactly due to these two lines, DSP has been very much 
pamful・pohcyof the ruling party is criticised by DSP as something 
“following US", while that of JSP is refused as‘pro-communist 
diplomacy’It seems that DSP wants to follow the line of the 
European Socialist-Democratic parties But this, though welcome as 
nationalistic by many chzshzkijin, has not been well understood nor 
accepted by the people at large. 
20) Katayama’s reply to the Tokyo Shimbun in 1961, op cit , Nishimura 
(Party Secretary-General) in the Mamichi Sh1mbun, Feb. 1, 1964; 
the C/molwγ・on (July 1961〕p100 
21〕 OnFeb. 22, 1954, after the Nat10nahst Government had severed 
relations with France, Nishio, Party Chairman, in his press conference 
unreservedly asserted that there would be no other solution except 
a 'one China, one Taiwan' plan 
22) This warning was expressly or impliedly made m nearly al the 
views of DSP，。出cialor otherwise 
23) It may be challenged that the Japanese press and the chishikijin, 
etc, too, are part of the invisible Japanese government. But from 
the viewpoint of strong grouping and of‘control without heteroge-
neous opposition, (that is, absence of anti government nature), our 
treatment of these two groups in our way may be iustified. See on 
this question, Fujiwara, Kanryo (the Bureaucrats〕CJ〕（1964)p. 21丘
24〕 Cf.Suzuki, Sei;i 8 Ugokasu Keieisha, (Thoughts and Act1ous of 
the‘Industrialist World’） (J) (19筋） pp 14, 15-16, and pp. 29-30. The 
question as to whose opinions are representative of this group is 
agam di而cultto answer. It is fortunate, however、that,unlike the 
case of the chishikijzn, in the industrialist group there is at the 
least a minimum consensus traceable from the Mainstream (within 
the al embracing organisations hke the Keidanren, the Nikkeiren, 
and the Shokokaigisho), owing much to the fact that there exists m 
this group no serious ideological spht among the representing fig-
ures. 
25) Kato, Zaikai (19節） p 186 
26) Cf. Oyama in the Economist CJ〕SpecialIssue (Apr 1964) p. 51. 
27) The Economist 〔J)Oct. 9, 1962, p. 7. 
28) Some went so far as to suggest publicly that Japan should be 
pre?ared for a two-Ch'na situation given birth by probable sud-
den change m the status quo of the representation-issue in the UN, 
see report on 'Japanese View on China', op. cit., p 19. 
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29) The Seka1 (Dec 1963 i自由）p. 65. Note that at the time this issue 
was published (sometime m Oct.-Nov 1963〕therehad so far been ne> 
crisis yet 
30) See Oyama m the Economist (J). op. cit., p. 51. But cf. the Mainichi 
Shimbun Feb. 12, 1964, in which it was also stated that a umfied 
view was not possible for this circle which mcluded rightist, neut四I,
and ev凹 leftistmembers. But there are in fact too few really ‘left-
is ts’m the m品ai. Some of the industrialists are leftists, 1f they 
are leftists at al, not because of ideology, but because of their 
attitudes, disguised or otherwise, necessitated by trade with mamland. 
This is different from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of the 
Sato Cabinet period, within which party many members become so 
much ‘left’m ideology than the Soc1ahsts, that we may cast doubt 
on their party-identi宣cation.
31) Jn this regard, it 1s noteworthy that no one within this group 
would say with the leftists that the Mainland Regime may claim 
war-reparation from Japan. On this point, see Fujii in the Sekai fourna[ 
σ） (Apr. 1964〕SpecialI田ueon the China Problem, p. 7. 
32〕 Seerepresenting this line, Fujii in the Gendaiηo M' (June 1964 issue) 
pp 102, 103 and in the fitsugyo no Sekai (Jan 1965 issue) p. 7 This ten-
dency can also be clearly seen by inference from the zeal-cooling-down 
attitude of the Taiwan-Korean-Lobbists like Adachi and others in 
the Situation and after, in that they seem to lean toward South 
Korea instead of Taiwan Some of them, indeed, even become 
compromising with the Mainland Regime m later period. 
33) Zaikai, op cit , p.190. 
34〕 Seeresults of a secret poll among the bureaucrats referred to m 
Fujiwara, The Bureaucrats, op. cit., p. 147. See for a hst of confidential 
mvestigation of 1deolog1cal stands of Japan’s bureaucrats, the Zenbo〔J)
(Nov. 1965 issue), p. 11. It must be noted that on the China Problem 
as well as on more fundamental qu田 tions (coop町ation with US 
for instance), there are di旺町enc田 amongtop-o伍cialsof the Foreign 
Mmistry, see Yada in the Eco即 mist(J), (Dec 15, 1964 issue), p. 18 See 
further, the Yom1uri Shimbun, Apr 7, 19fil and the Chuokoron, (Jan. 
1965 issue) p. 122 
35) See for mstance hts article in the Tokyo Shimbun, Mar. 31, 1961 
Yoshida’s view during the Ikeda Cabinet pe口odhad been consistent, 
though in the last months of that Cabinet he seemed to have given 
d宜erentnuance in similar suggestions, by asserting the desirab1hty 
of making Taiwan a show-window and a distinct political unit 
There were of course some in this group against Yoshida’s line. 
One example is Nishi, in the Mainichi Shimbun (Feb. 16, 1964) and in 
his Reflex10師側 Jap師、 Dip／岬昭cy〔J)(1965), pp 210, 211, 213ー」5
By and large, however, overwhelmmg majority of this group adopted: 
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the !me similar to Yoshida’s, though on details opinions may not 
be unanimous. See Kase in the Tokyo Shimbun (Apr 21, 1961), in Kind由
Nikon no Gaiko(l962〕p.190, and in the Tokyo Shimbun (Sept 18, 1963〕，
Okazaki m the Tokyo Shimbun (Sept 27, 1963〕； Ohnoin the Yomiun 
Shimbun (July 14, 1964); Matsumoto in the Jiyu (Apr. 1964〕，pp73, 74, 
75 (on page 76 the war-reparation issue was also considered), but cf. 
the Nation and Politics (Mar. 1964) p. 47, Asakai in the Economist CJ) 
Nov 1, 1964, p 42, Fukushima in the Sago Jahnarizumu Kenkyu 
(Dec. 1964 issue) p 5 and p 6. Cf also Sugihara, Gaiko no Kangaekata 
(1965) pp 158, 179 80, Kaiima, Japan’s Foreign Policy CJ) (1966) pp 
38, 245f., where renunciation of war reparat10n is declared a condition 
for Japan’s recognition of the Mainland Regime, but on the rec 
ognition and UN representation issues, a two-China line was mam-
tamed. On the status quo in the Taiwan Straits, the territorial 
status of Taiwan, and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952, see 
Nishimura in the Sekai Shuho (Feb. 28, 1961), cited supra , Taiin in 
the International Affairs〔J)(Mar 1965) pp. 8-9. 
36〕 Thoughthese views, when given, were expressly modi宣edas‘per-
sonal', due to Mr. Shima’s quah畳cationof a top-o田口alin active 
secvice (Katめゆ ofthe Foreign Ministry and to the quasi o伍ロal
nature of his presence at the Gaiko-kondankai, they nonetheless re-
presented the main current of the bureaucrats in that ministry 
But attention must be drawn here to the fact that there 
was m the Foreign Ministry no agreed view on the China Problem, 
especially on the timmg for recogmtion and change of Japan’s votmg 
attitude in the UN However, on other issues there was minimum 
consensus among the bureaucrats. Though such consensus was not 
made known to the public in a p!am form, the丑guresof different 
streams m this catego町 wereidentified See the Mainich1 Sh1mbun 
Feb. 9, 1964, Yada m the Economist CJ〕Dec.15, 1964, p 19 f. 
37) The Chuokoron〔Jan1964), p. 117 f.; Yada, 1 c. 
38〕 Mmutesof the Gaiko kondankai, No 9 (Jan. 17, 1961) p. 5, and 
materials cited m not白 36and 37 above 
39〕品id.,No 12 (Feb. 21, 1961) pp.19-22, translat10n and brackets mine 
40) Minutes of Gaiko-kondankai, No 8, Dec. 27, 1960, p 5 f.,and Mmutes 
No. 12, Feb. 21, 1961, p 19f, translation, brackets, and italics writer’s 
On the application of the Sino Japanese Peace Treaty, Shima was 
once more ambiguous, see Minutes No. 9, Jan 7, 1961, pp. 54 et seq. 
41〕 Thishas its origin in Yoshida's view when Yoshida was the Prime 
Minister. In fact, as early as before the peace-making period, amongst 
top-o伍口alsin the Foreign Ministry 〔thenunder control by the UN 
Supreme Commands〕他国 pointwas to some田 tentconsidered, see 
Hag1wara, Kowa to Nikon (1950) pp 7ι－73, 85f., pp 208-209. 
42) The Tokyo Shimbun, July 1, 1961 and June 13, 1963 
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Such kind of formal conference (Kokancho Kaigi) is held periodi-
ca!ly. It rs not clear to what extent are conclusions of these con 
ferences in日uentialupon top level dec1s1on-making However, it 
does express another current among the bureaucrats outside, in con 
tradrstmction to that which may exist inside the Ministry. As a rule, 
before or after such conferences the participants are invited to discuss 
with journalists on problems of foreign affairs. In such cases, the ambas-
sadors/ministers would give no more than what have been made 
known. But from the nuances of what they have said, rt is interest-
ing to see that differed from the case of formal conferences, in such 
discussions they rather incline to express the real thought which 
they could not tel m formal conferences. And the real thought on 
the general line for the Chma Problem among the ambassadors/min-
isters in the Ikeda period were that: （！〕 cooperationwith US was 
the categorical imperative; (2) support for the Nationalist Government 
was absolutely necessary, (3) it was, however, somewhat unnatural 
(or abnormal) that Japan remained for so long m the condition of 
holding no relations (meaning formal relations〕withthe Mainland 
Regime. See the Tokyo Shimbun, July 4, 1961; :bid., Jan. I, 1963, the 
Asahi Shimbun, Aug 7 1963 Under the circumstances, there seems 
no need to prove that for this group the only way was a two-
China settlement 
43) The Seisaku Geppo, LDP ofi口alorgan, vol. 64, May 1961, pp. 48-52. 
44） 晶id.,p. 52; Repo仕 ofthe Foreign Affairs Committee of LDP, July 25, 
1962, p 116 This was subject to doubt as to its actual effectiveness 
ov町 partymembers. Formally, however, it had remained effective up to 
1964 when the Party made its Um貴edView on the China Problem to 
put an end to the French recognition situat10n, s目 infrachapter 9(11)(5). 
45) In thts Sub-Comm1tt田 therew町ethree main streams on the China 
Problem （！〕 Wart-and-s田 line,(2) gradual-push line, and (3) for-
ward-positive line At the last stage, due to factional discrepancy the 
choice was left as a question for final judgment by the Party President. 
And Ikeda could not 〔or,considering a high probability of worsemng 
factional struggles, would not) give his畳間lpol出caldetermmation. 
Cf The Asahi Shimbun, Apr. 17, 1961. 
But though “the view of the Liberal-Democratic Party was divided 
at the宣nalline'九sinceno ideological colour had been involved so 
far，“when the Party view is uni直ed,there wr!l come m sight a 
wait-and-see pohcy”despite the fact that“the Party as a whole could 
not but take the wait-and-see ‘attitude’（hence no policy)", so long 
as the discrepancies remained as they were; Studymg Group on 
Chma, Report No. 10〔Feb 10, 1961〕， pp179 180, and p 181 See 
also the Bungezshunju (J〕（1957Apr issue〕p76, where policies of 
LDP were referred to as 'political tactics' or as‘abstract lines’ 
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which could not be 'basis of policy (cf. the la匝 Prof Otaka T in 
ibid. Apr. 1956, p. 117). 
On the other hand, the line laid down in this Interim Report was 
rather traditional to LDP; 1t had its origm going back to the 
Kishi period, and had suffered no material changes during the Ikeda 
p町 10d,s田 Wagaton6 Kihon hoshzn, LDP Pub!., Feb 1961, Jul 1962, 
Jan. 1963, and Jan. 1964, Questions and Answers on Policy (J〕，
published by House of Councillors (LDP Policy Study Committee) 
May 1962, pp. 17-19 ; The Advan口ngJap阻ーExpl阻 ationsof Pohc1es 
(J), LDP Pub!. (1962〕， pp86 88 , The Bases of Our Party’s New 
Policies (J), published by the Political Affairs Committee of LDP 
(Sept. 1963) pp. 15 and 26 ; the Sekai to Nihon (Oct. 19臼）， LDP 
Publ , Commentary on Pohcy, Appendix, pp. 191, 198. 
46〕 Itwas not clear as to the nature of this status quo, but it at any rate 
implied the starting point of a two-China settlement, though without 
going田1yfurther. 
47) This seems to have been the agreed pomt among al members to 
the Committee. Confirmmg this point, see Chairman of the LDP 
Political Affairs Committee Tanaka’s interpellation (representing the 
Party〕inthe 40th Ordmary Diet (Plenary Session, House of Repre-
sentatives Jan. 2, 1962). see the Se1saku Geppo, vol. 73, Feb. 1962, p. 284 
and Reference Materials, special issue, Interim Report of the Sub-
Committee on Asia, in Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the LDP (July. 25, 1962〕， p.7. Cf the Yomiun Shimbun, Jan 24, 1961, 
where Nomura, then Chief of the Foreign A旺airsCommittee of LDP, 
even said that since Taiwan was not Chinese temtory there was no 
question of two-China 
48〕Thisof course can not be accepted with its face value. See the 
Economist (J〕Oct9, 1962, p. 12 and p 13, where 1t was pointed out, 
correctly, that the two-China lme had been basic and potential m 
the LDP. See also infra pomt (5) of the present Section. 
49〕 TheSe1saku Geppo, op. cit., p. 50, translation mine. The evident 
contradiction reflects Japan’s pam on the China Problem The picture 
was the same in a formal statement by LDP Secretary General Maeo, 
agamst the Joint Communique made between the Mainland Regime 
and JSP, see Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., p. 130 
In fact, even as among the Taiwan-Lobbists the two China idea was 
deeply rooted, and was considered the only solution practicable, see 
on this point, the Economist (J〕May23, 1961 issue, p 29 and ibid, 
May 30, 1961 issue, pp 12-ー13.
50) This made clear the principle that in solving the China Problem 
the issue of UN representation takes precedence over the 
means of recognition. The former 1s the shield of the latter. it is 
indeed the justi五cat10nfor Japan’s non recognition policy toward 
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the Mainland Regime. This would guide Ikeda’s China pohcy dunng 
the whole period , and it was given expression in the statement “The 
China Problem must be solved accordmg to world opmion (opinion 
in the UN)", corr畳間iedand recon宣rmedby Ikeda and his Foreign 
Mimsters See the Tokyo Shimbun, Nov 9, 1960; Ohira (then Secre・ 
tary-General of LDP) m a television discussion with top leaders of 
other parties on Nov. 17, 1960, and his Party’s formal Promised Policy 
Line to the Electorate (general election〕，mthe Maimchi Shimbun, Oct 
25, 1960. In the Outline of Japan’s Asian Policy CJ) (July 25, 1962), it 
was stated that“We mamtarn our existing relations with the Republic 
of Chma. (and〕especiallyattach importance to such relations”（Inte・
rim Report of Sub Committee on Asia, in Report of the Foreign A宜airs
Committee, op. cit., p. 2, and pp. 7-8, translation and brackets mme). 
51〕 Translat10n,brackets and italics mme This is the same picture as 
in the case of the obi配t issue, af五rmingand denymg a two・ 
China policy at the same time, see supra pomt. (3) under this Section 
and note (48) of this Part Vahd 1usti宜cationof Japan’s non・recog・ 
nit10n was found m the UN representation issue, but no effective 
shield in turn could be given to the latter. Thus, contradict10n could 
not be hidden 、ll'ithoutthe matters' being pushed to the point of non・ 
sense This however is not new of the Ikeda period. In and even 
before 1957, the situation was, to quote an authority, that“funda・ 
mental condition of Sino Japanese relations.should be founded on the UN 
Charter, the circumstance inthe UN is therefore .the precondit10n" 
〔Prof.Royama M., Kokusaise17i to Nilzongaiko, 1959, p目284,my trans・ 
lation) 
52) ・Translation, brackets and p町田thesesmine. Even the ‘Progressive’ 
(pro-Mamland Regime) leaders in the LDP agreed on this point, 
see the Sekai Jo町田1CJ), Special Issue on the China Problem (Apr. 
1964), p 5 The stress on the importance of the Peace Treaty also 
appeared m the Um宜edView of the LDP (Jan. 26, 1962) agfilnst the 
Joint Communique made betw田nJSP and the Mainland Regime, see 
Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., p, 128. 
Be this as it may, some of the Party lead町sdid consider the 
reparation issue seriously, hence they urged for cautious and gradual 
'diplomacy by de町田ヘ andwarned any move to attempt solving the 
China Problem at a stroke, so as to avoid leavmg room to Mainland 
Regime for a claim (and that is, on the other side of the picture, to 
make more probable the Mainland Regime to succeed to obligations 
under the Smo・ Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952〕， S田 theTokyo Shimbun, 
Se口eson‘All About the China Problem', No 1, op cit. 
53〕 Aboutone ye町 later,the conclusion of cautious attitude reached at 
the Sub-Committ田 on China was translated m more emphatic 
terms." . The question of breaking through our relations with Com-
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munist China, though important, should be solved in the ide of world 
politics In other words, the question .does not stop at bemg a problem 
cone町ningour country only, but ought to be discussed向。listically,
cautiously, and steadily. ”（Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
op. cit., p. 8, translat10n, italics mine) Note that this was fully in 
line with ex-Prime Minister Yoshida’s“advice" m the Tokyo 
Shimbun on March 31, 1961, referred to in the above 
・54) It is therefore conceivable that such consensus among the parties 
(and the consensus within the LDP as shown in this Party View) 
might have changed had the balance of power among the parties (or 
among the factions w1thm the Party) alt町ed.This may be said even 
more emphatically of the present Sato Cabinet In any case, it was 
due to the merits of such consensus, compromised or ad hoc as they 
might have been, that the LDP did not spht and Japan’s party 
system survives al political, social crises. Cf. The Economist (J) 
June 30, 1959, p. 15. 
55) Fukushima in the Chuokoron, Aug 1956, p 73. 
56) For inside stories and sharp criticism, s自由e Mainichi Shimbzm 
Feb. 10, 1964 ; E印刷間ist(J) Special Issue (Apr. 10, 1964) p. 53. 
57) s配問•fra Chapter 9 (I〕（5〕．
58) This was formally entitled “The Unified View of the Liberal-Demo-
cratic Party on the Chma ProblemぺseeKaiima, N1hon no Gatko 
Seisaku （羽田〕 pp.144 f. esp. pp. 14←146. Materially, this uni制
view went no forth町 thana confirmation of the unified view by the 
Foreign Ministry. To avoid repetition, we will give only a v町ybrief 
account of the results of comparison betwe田 thetwo party views 
59) But there may exist (informal〕‘viewof the Foreign Ministry’as 
distinct from the view of the Japanese Government The former is the 
gr田testcommon m田sureamong the bureaucrats who in fact stil“hold 
high degree of influence (on policy-making) not far from absolute" (The 
Chuokoron Jan. 1965, p. 119, translat10n and brackets mme). Such ‘view 
of the Foreign Ministry’may not follow the formal view of the LDP, 
it may ev田 notalways be harmonious with that of the Prime Minister 
and of the Foreign Minister （田ceptwhen such ministers are ex-pro-
fessional diplomats and町ealso strong pohtical leaders). As a matter 
of fact, disagreement between the Prime Minister and the Foreign 
Ministry has not been rare, and repulse of the latter against the former 
四国herthe rule than the exception V. The Sekai (Dec. 1963〕p.65 
60) Translation and brackets mine. Waga Gatko no k削除。（Gr田n-book
of the Foreign Ministry〕No.5 (Aug 1961〕， coveringthe period as 
from Jan. 1960 to Mar 1961, p. 5 This basic attitude was not far from 
that which had been maintained in the Kishi penod, that " .Th町eis 
n目出sity(for Japan) to consider the future of her relat抽出 with
China mainland which is historically close to ur country Adjustment 
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of relations.. consists of many essences that should be solved in the 
tide of world politics”（ibid, No 4. Jun. 1960, covering the year 1959, 
p. 6, translation and brackets mme). 
・61）再＇agaGaiko no Kinkyo, No. !, Sept. 1957, covermg that year, p, 45, 
translation, italics and brackets mine 
・62）晶1d.No. 9, 1965. covering the penod as from Apr 1964 to Mar. 
1965, p. 21. Note that here the‘Communist Chinese Regime’1s referred 
to as‘the governm田 tof the PRC’Cf !Ind. No 8, Aug. 1964, cover” 
ing the pe口odas from Apr. 1963 to Mar. 1964, pp 14-15, where 
such position can only be scrupulously mferred in juristic logic See 
Ikeda’s attitude in 1964, in匂作。 〔I〕〔4)of this Chapter. 
•63) Formal view of the Japanese government, quoted from the Yommri 
Shimbun, Apr 7, 1961, my translation. See also Foreign Minister 
Kosaka’s reply to int町 pellatlonin the Diet (Standing Committee for 
Budget, House of Representatives) on Feb 4, 1961, Speech by Am-
bassador Okazaki in the UN General Assembly, Dec. 7, 1961, in 
Cai間 <Sha(Foreign Mmistry〕 PressReleases, 1961, p. 59 and p. 60. 
Prime Minister Ikeda himself, on the other hand, repeated the same 
view in the Dret at least twice 
From here comes the image of a two-China situation, though the 
Japanese Government would leave the initiative to USA and/or UK. 
喝の The Tokyo Sh1mbun, Dec 1, 1963 
・65) The Tokyo Shimbun, Series on 'All About the Chma Problem' No. 10, 
op. cit. and ibid, Apr 8, 1961 Since the Yoshida period, this had 
been the established lme m the Foreign Mm1stry, s民 theChuokoron, 
Jan 1965, quoting “confessions”of top-offi口alsof the Foreign Mm-
istry, on p. 119 f. 
•66] The Mamichi Sh1mbun, Sept 16, 1960, The Yom山口 Shimbun,Jan. 
24, 1961. To tel the truth, Ikeda was one of the stoutest protagonist 
for a two-China policy In 1954, when he was the Secretary-General 
of the LDP, this fact was well-known to al. See the Sekai to N1hon, Jun 
1961, pp 11ー 12 On demonstration of Ikeda’s mtent10n for realisation 
of a two Chma, s田 aspecial report in the Economist CJ) Aug 8, 
1951, pp 33 et seq. 
・67) The Economist CJ) May 23, 1961, p, 29. 
・68）品id.Jul. 18, 1961, p目 7and pp. 9 10. But there was strong op・
position against this line within the LDP at that crucial point of time, 
see ibid. pp 17-18 On opposition against Ikeda’s two-China plan in 
the conservative camp in general during and immediately after 1961, 
see the Fr記 WorldCJ) May 1964, editorial and p. 51 I. c 
Cf. Ikeda’s thrs mt田 tronat the last phase of his administration, 
in his address at Fukushima (The Tokyo Shimbun, Nov 4, 1963), and 
in his New Year Message to the People of 1964; see also his replies 
to interpellations in the Diet (Standing Committee for Budget, House 
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of Representatives, Jan 31, 1964, etc.〕
69) In a press conf，町田cewith foreign coπ・espondents m Japan, Mar., 
14, 1955, cited in the Sekai Shuho, Nov. 1, 1955 issue, p. 37 , also the、
Chuokoron Apr. 1955 issue, p, 63 
70) s田 theAsahi Journal 〔J),Jan. 14, 1962, p. 9. "Ikeda’S contention that 
Japan’s relations with Communist Chma were al private m nature is 
some kmd of sophism Many a members of the Diet and many a. 
leaders of the LDP, who went to mainland or got into contacts with 
Communist Chinese leaders, did talk about matters highly political m 
nature ; and al these had been undertaken with prior understandings• 
from Ikeda＇’（Report No. 16, Study Group on China, Oct , 15, 1964, 
p. 376, my tr田 slation).This is best mterpreted as Ikeda’s preparation 
of the way to reccgnise the Mainland Regime in case of urgent need ,.
and is also the reason why Ikeda’S view and attitude on the China 
Problem were always made ambiguous. There is no denial that this. 
special way of handling vital problems ts a result of Ikeda’s pecsonal 
character which t田 dedto play double blade sword. In other words, 
he applied his political technique of dealing with the right and the・ 
left camps ms1de Japan, to treatment of the two Chinese 四 titiesHe 
even applied this to deal with the Free World and the Communist 
World, the Afro-Asian states and their European counterparts. 
For Kishi’s two-China line; S田 theSeka1 Shuho, June 22, 1957, p. 32 f. 
In this regard, it may not be irrelevant to point out that Ikeda’s 
express10n of his two-China line was the principle ofιsevering the、
political from the economic', which had been laid down originally in 
1957 by Kishi equally expressive of the two-China thought (Waga-
Gaiko no Kinkyo, No !, op cit, pp. 45 46). This is d田plyrooted 1ロ
Japan’s diplomatic tradition of weakening any possible nval, especially 
a strong neighbour (China), by whatever means available. On the 
two-Chma line, therefore, the diff，町田cebetween Kishi and Ikeda is 
only matter of degree. 
71) Northedge in Yearbook of World A万"airs(1957) p 171. On th.e legal 
nature (binding force) of the Yoshida Letter of 1951, see Yokota, cited' 
in note 24 of Part Four 
72) Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo, No 8, Aug. 1964, covering the period from 
Apr 1963 to Mar. 1964, pp. 14 15. 
73〕 IbidNo. 1. Sept. 1957，ゆ.cit”pp.15-16. Cf. The Japan Quarterly(l955)' 
p 24 It must not be forgotten that rn the Kishi period non-recognition 
was emphasized (Wag a G副知 no Kinkyo No 1, p. 15 and pp. 
45-46), but in the Ikeda period, such emphasis disappeared and a 
two-China line became more evident S田 ibidNo 9, p 21. 
74) Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo, No.1 p 7, pp 45-46 , ibid. No 2 (cover 
ing the period from July 1957 to Dec 1957〕pp5-6 and p. 7. Ikeda 
and his foreign ministers, Kosaka and Ohira, had made clear this• 
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-condition of world opinion on the recognition issue m al circumstances 
.during their respective terms of of五ce. This was so far in line with 
:the formal view of the LDP 
However, like m the case of the LDP, the formal view of these min-
isters was not the unanimous opmion within the government, e. g., 
not within the Foreign Mmistry officially. From the end of 1960, in 
compliance with instructions from the Pnme Minister, the Kanbuk田
(top-official meeting) and the Policy-Planning Committee of the Foreign 
Mimstry started considering the question of recognition of the Mainland 
Regime The study was completed in early 1961, with the result that no 
.agreed opinion could be suggested; instead, m叩 yseparate reports were 
submitted to the Fo四1gnMimster. The reports may be d1v1ded into 
two main groups (a) those which tried to promote a two-China theory 
as a necessary means of maintaimng Taiwan in the hands of the 
Free World, and (b) those which put weight on 'admission’of the 
Mamland Regime into UN, and treated the two-China theory as matter 
.of expediency. S出 onthese reports, the Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 17, 1961; 
Lin Ch1e shan in Szudaz戸戸ng(Chinese) (C〕Hongkong.vol. 14, No 7, 
Apr. 1, 1962, p. 18. There were of course some a耳目edpoints among those 
reports too：。〕 Therewas inevitability of 'admission’of the Mamland 
Regime mto the UN (in remote future), and 1t would be necessary for Japan 
to recognise that regime in that event , (b〕whetheror not, and the 
timmg, to recogmse that regime, must be determined with highest degree 
・of prudence, since. the China Problem should be dealt with from 
-viewpomt of world politics at large and in a long-range manner, (c）‘at 
present’〔in1961) it was too early to. recognise that regime, and (d) 
reservation should be made on a two-China situation, by way of keeping 
Japan’s attitude equivo田 I.s由 theYomiuri Shimbun, Apr. 7. 1961, The 
Tokyo Shimbun, Apr 8, 1961 The conclus1on of the Foreign Ministry 
itself was that the matter should await political .judgement (of the 
:Prime Minister〕
At the end of 1961, Foreign Minister Kosaka instructed the Foreign 
Ministry to make overall reconsideration of the China policy (recogm 
tion) A provisi。n悶alconclus 
tus”（status of the ROC〕wasstressed as a prec。ndition,and con-
t】nuat1。nof the wait-and see attitude、＂assuggested "because at the 
present 1t is di市cultto m叫ceCommunist China to recogr主iseth1 s 
precondition” 
75〕 Yadain the Economist O〕，oρ cit,p. 17. In fact, Prime Mmister Sato 
may be raised as one of the exampl田 Theline of the Foreign Mimstry 
on the China Problem did not become concrete til 1960’s In or before 
1958, this line had already been established (the Seka1, Oct. 1958, p. 121 ; 
the Economrst(J), Feb. 28, 1959, p 14). But the ruling LDP, described 
by some as the counterpart of the pre-war military authorities so 
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far as foreign policy makmg-process is concerned, blocked any pla!l' 
from the Foreign Ministry that might not adapt to the reality of the 
ad hoc power balance situation in the LDP (Mugino in the Chuokoron, 
Aug 1956, p 83; The Bunge1shunju, Oct 1958 p 72). One of the examples 
is LDP Secretary-General Maeo’s denial of a two-China line m the 
UN, see Report of LDP Foreign A古田rsCommittee. op. cit p 130. 
76) Gaimusho Press Releases, 1961, p. 57 et seq. About government 
thought on the juridical aspect of this issue, see Hayashi, ex-Secret-
ary-General of the Legislative Bureau of the Ikeda Cabinet, in Today’S 
Tap1cs, Apr 1965, pp. 48-50. It田町田ificantthat he too tended to a 
two-Chma theory as a solution to the UN Chinese representation issue. 
The Okazaki speech, ind田d,was based on the Interim Report of the 
LDP Sub-Committee on China, s田 Reportof the LDP Foreign Affairs-
Committee, op. cit., p 117 and pp. 124-125. 
77) Waga Ga1ko no Kinkyo, vol. 6, Jun. 1962, covering the period from 
Jan 1961 to Mar. 1962, on p. 20. 
78〕品id, pp. 21-22. The Okazaki Sp田 ch(on the occasion of Japan’s 
becoming a co sponsoring state of the 'important question’proposal 
at the 16th Session of the UNGA〕assertedthat such solution would 
mean de facto expulsion of a member state, ibid. p. 19. This streng-
thened Japan’s argument for an‘equitable (Just)' solution, that is, a 
two Chma situation crystallised. See also Fukushima, chief delegate 
to UN at a later period, told US Press about Japan’s two-China line, 
in the UN. Cf. the Sekai, June 1961 issue, p 127 
79) Yada, oιcit , p.20, my translation. 
80) The Yomiuri Shimbun, Jan. 3, 1962. Note that in the Waga G出 ko・
no k叩 kyo,the two-China hne, though implied only, was considered 
“the policy that is the best for mamtaining our national interest” 
(No 9, 1965, p. 21, translation writer's〕．
81) Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo, No 1, oρ. cit, p. 15, No 8, p 14, and No. 
9, p. 21, etc. Ind1rectly, this can be出回 inthe clause勺heN ationahst 
Government and Japan) have once more entered into friendly relations. 
as a result of the end of the war'，。＇bid No 1, p. 45 parentheses. 
and translation the present author’s）目
82〕Records,Standmg Committee for Budget, House of Representatives, 
Feb 4, 1961, translation and brackets mine. In his Administrative・ 
Policy Speech to the Diet (39th Extraordmary Session, Sept 28, 1961), 
Ikeda again emphasised this point, by saying that Japan had concluded. 
a 'Peace Treaty’with廿1eRepublic of China’（Gaim附hoP何 SS Rel四ses,
1961, p. 37, note that Ikeda, on m田 yother occasions having n。
beanngs on the war-indemmty issue and/or of the state of war, 
nearly without exception dropped the word ‘peace’when he referred 
to this‘Peace Treaty' w1th ROC) At he end of 1963, in reply t。
questions by the Tokyo Shimbun, Foreign Mmister Ohira said the 
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same thmg‘see The Tokyo Shimbun, Dec 1, 1963 
83) Records, ibid, translation and brackets mine. See below for the 
formal view of the Foreign Ministry. 
84) See the Nation and Politics 〔J)Mar. 1964, p. 61 
85) s田 theTokyo Shimbun, Series ‘All about the Chma Problem，’ op・
cit. No. 1. This tells the true r田 sonwhy Japan has to support the 
ROG to the last moment, unless a two-China settlement 1s certain 
86) The Sekai, Jun.1959, p 306. Cf Kaya in Gendai no Me, Jun. 1964, p. 98. 
87〕 OnJan 27, ROG protested France’s action with a memorandum in 
which any form of two-China was rebuked ; on the same day, the 
Mainland Regime voiced the same thing (by New China News Agency, 
Jan 28) 
88) For analysis of this case, see the present writer’s article in the 
Journal of Social Science No. 5, ICU Pub!. I B, pp 251-292. 
89) The Nilwn li.eizai Shimb•凶， Jan. 18, 1964, translation and brackets mine. 
90) The Asahi Shimbun, Jan. 19, 1964, my translation. Behind this 
address there were m田yvital factors that forced the Japanese govenト
ment to use expressions full of implications. US opposition against 
France was considered by Japan in the first instance Other factors 
considered by Japanese Government included the fact that the Situa-
tion had yet been fluid, hence whether France would succeed in realis-
ing a two-China theory was stil dubious. Ag司n,withm the r叫mg
LDP the anti-communist group was taking the lead (in the Fo四ign
Affairs Committee especially), and majority in the Foreign Mmistry 
at the outset predicted that the Nationalist Government would strongly 
react against a two China settlement and would severe diplomatic 
relations with Fr印 Ce〔althoughmany m that凶 nist円Fdoubted the 
latter part of this prediction) These were two other vital factors in 
this Situation It must be pointed out that the Foreign Mmistry was 
proved to be correct in its prediction, and that it was mistak町iin 
predictmg impliedly that the Mamland Regime might tacitly com-
promise with France on a two China plan one way or the other. 
91) It was known later that such terms of emphasis like‘sterロ fact',
‘realistic policy’，etc., were mserted by Ikeda himself. See the Economist 
CJ) Special Issue, Apr. 10, 1964, p. 54 
92) Waga Gmko no Kinkyo. No. 8, Aug. 1954, Materials, p. 9. Tr阻 s-
lation and brackets mme. But, in his replies to mterpellations 
in the Diet after it had been clear that a two-China situation became 
impossible, Ikeda denied that he had “ever thought of a t、vo-China"
This was not his“formal view" we m田nin this Chapter, but if the 
delicate timing and the too emphatic wordings of the denial be taken 
into special account, such denial rather sounded as a trumpet com-
mand for em町gentretreat. On the content of this denial, see Records, 
Standmg Committ田 forBudget, House of Representatives (Ikeda’s 
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replies Jan. 31, 1964). Cf目 Ibid.Feb 11 (alsa Ikeda’s replies) 
93〕 Formstance, Ikeda’s Address in the former Session ( 45th Session) 
of the Diet, see Waga G酎kono Kmkyn, ibzd. p. 3 He might have 
kept szl凹 tif he had had no volition to act. Of course, his uneasy position 
must also be paid attention to, e g , hisfailure on the China policy 
would directly weaken his position in the election of the Party 
President (automatically election of the Pnme Mmist町） slated to be 
held in July, 1964, and would also push to the front, and deepen, the 
potential ideological struggles among the factions within the Party on 
the balance of which factions the Ikeda Cabinet had stood for years. 
94) Ibid. p. 9. My translation and brackets 
95〕 Thiswas hmted in Foreign Mmister Ohira’s Address in the same 
( 46th Ordmary〕Sessionof the Diet, in which it was concluded on 
the French Recogmtion Situation that へweare watching the develop-
ment of the situation and moves of mternational public opinion and 
will deal with it cautiously" (ibid. p. 12) 
95〕 TheTokyo Shimbun, Jan. 23, 1964 and the Mamichi Shimt、unof 
the same day. 
97〕 Thiswas so se口ouslybelieved, that the Foreign Ministry on Jan. 
23 1964 was obliged to take unusual measure m the form of special 
press confer田 ceby the Permanent Vice・ Minister (Mr. Shima) to 
deny any change of recognition policy on the China Problem. 
98〕 Seefor instance, the Yomiuri Sh1mbun, J四 18,1964 
99〕Ikeda’sreplies in the Diet, Records, Stand1昭 Committeefor Budget, 
House of Representatives, Jan 31 ; Ikeda’s replies in the Diet, ibid 
Feb. 11 
100) See, for example, Ikeda’s replies m the Diet, ibid. Jan 30. Underly-
ing this was Japan’s fear that should Japan push too farm the Situation 
the Nationalist Government might be thrusted into a suicidal 
determination of‘cooperation' or compromise with the Mainland Regime 
one way or the other. 
101〕 Repliesto Socialist Member Yokomichi’s question. Idem., brackets 
added. 
102〕 Repliesto Democratic-Soc凶istMember Imaizumi's question，品id.
Jan. 31, where Ikeda raised this as one of the‘positive reasons’for 
Japan’s non-recognition of the Mainland Regime, and when asked a 
litle further, the Pnme Mimster went to the bnnk, by answering 
that“if Japan has to be the last nation to recognise, so let it be” 
(idei匁）. Such is of course not a "view”made after deliberation. and 
cannot be fragmentarily taken up to be the spe曲目r's“realinten-
t10n" if there be no other proofs. e. g . repetitions. 
103〕 RecordsStanding Committee for Budget, House of Representatives, 
J阻 1.,Ikeda’s replies. This hne was emphatically endorsed in the 
Prime Minister’s Add同国 tothe Diet ( 46th ・Ordinary Session〕onJ田．
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21, 1964，目ferredto in the above, hence was part of the formal 
attitude of the government See also the “Talk”to the press after 
Ikeda’s reply, by the Chief of the Information and Cultural Bureau 
of the Mimstry of Foreign Affairs, which is the ordinary way of 
expressing government formal views 
104) The Foreign Minister’s replies in the Diet, Records, Standing Com苧
mittee for Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Feb 12. Italics 
and brackets mine 
105〕Records,Standing Committee for Foreign A百airs,House of Coun ・ 
c1llors, Feb 20, 1964, translation mine. 
106〕 Onthe meaning of the word 'blessed’，Ikeda commented in the Diet 
that this目ferredto the situation (1) where the Main］四dRegime be 
not warlike, (2〕whereit contributes in the cause of peace no less than 
other co田 triesdo, and 〔3)where Japan’s friendly countries a目 notop 
posed to it( Records, Prime Minist町、repliesin Standing Committee for 
Budget, House of Councillors, Mar. 4, 1964〕 Thiscomment m effect 
puts more conditions. In the same replies, actually, by implication 
Ikeda put forth other conditions for recognition, inter alia, that the 
Mainland Regime should recognise the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty 
and admit the fact that war rep町ationhad been given up by the ROC; 
and these were referred to as“precond1t1ons”to Japan’s recognition 
(Id帥＇＂ replies to LDP Member Kajima’s mterpellations Note here 
that Kajima was at that time Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee of LDP). Thus, the‘blessed situation' involved Japan’s national 
mterest directly. In a word, Japan would recognise the Mainland 
Regime any time ; but USA restraint on the niatter b田ngput aside, 
Japan would not do so田1conditionally,as France had done with町red
calculations on the probability for realization of a two China theory 
through fa1t accompli. It is furthermore highly signi自cant that in 
those replies Ikeda also made clear that UN admiss10n of the Main-
land Regime was a necessary condition, but not the su侃cientcondition, 
for Japan’s recognition of that regime "In logic", he explained, "admis-
s1on into the UN 1snot necessarily followed by recognition, but is the 
pre一conditionof the latter" (idem, in reply to Socialist Member Hanyu’S 
mterpellation〕Heendeavoured to make himself clearer. by saying that 
for Japan’s recognition of the Mainland Regime，“consents from friendly 
countries" would be required. This would me田 consentof USA and 
of other countries we児 cond1t1ons of his conditions. Despite 
his explanations the point was by no means understood better, and it 
was far from clear whether ROC was co山1tedone of such countries 
whose consent would be required as a condition to his conditions 
(that is, in the form of a two-China) But it must be warned that al 
these replies were made with suddenness, and under excited circums-
tances, hence they can not be treated as the formal view of the Prime 
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Minister or that of the Foreign Minister. To speak frankly, the real 
meaning of 'blessed’remains a puzzle even as of today. 
107) The Tokyo Sh1mbun, Jan. 23, 1964 and the Mainich Shimb皿 ofthe 
same day, translation and italics mine. 
108) Prime Minister's replies to LDP Member Aichi's interpellations, 
Records, Standing Committee for Budget, House of Representatives, 
Jan. 29 ; Prime Mmister’s replies to Socialist Member Yokom1chi’s in-
terpellations, Records, tbtd , Jan 30 Fo目 ignMinister Ohira did make 
known the same view, see Records, Committee for Foreign A古田rs,
House of Counc1llors, Feb 20, where it was stated that“in law the 
said (1952) Peace Treaty (between Japan and ROC) does not preclude 
Japan’s establishment of diplomatic relations with the Mainland 
Regime, but Japan must be faithful to treaty, and 1t 1s too early to 
discuss politically the destiny of this Peace Treatyぺparenthesesadded) 
Ohira here clearly adopted the view of an international lawyer, see 
Records, Statement by Ine K in a public heanng at the Standmg 
Committ田 forBudget, House of Representatives, Feb 13, 1964 
109) Loe cit. in note 108 ; tr田 slationmine 
110) The Pnme Minister’s replies to Democratic-Socialist Member Ima-
1zumi’s interpellat10n, Records, Stading Committee for Budget, House 
of Representatives, J田.31, translation and brackets mine. See also supra 
not田 82and 83 of this Part on Foreign Minister Kosaka’s replies, and 
additional( supplementary) explanat10ns thereto, of the Secretary-General 
of the Legislative Bureau of the Cabinet at the Diet on Feb 4, 1961. 
111〕“Asa問suitof the scheduled French recognition of Communist 
China with recognition of the Nationalist Government kept mtact, the 
‘undetermined’status of Taiwan will be recognised as under the legal 
control of the Nationalist Government.ぺseethe Tokyo Shimbun, 
Jan. 23, 1964 and the Maimchi Sh1mbun of the same day, translat10n 
the present writer’s, quotation marks added 
112) Records, Standing Committee for Budget, House of Representatives, 
Jan. 30, translation mme. 
113) Idem., translation, 1tahcs and brackets mine See this in detail, Kajima, 
Nihon G由kono Tenbo, 1964, Appendix No. 1 pp. 220-221. 
114) Records, Committee for Foreign Affairs, House of Councillors, Feb. 
1, translations mine, brackets added. 
115) Prime Minister’s replies to Socialist Member Okada’s interpellations, 
Records, Standing Committee for Budget, House of Representatives, 
Feb. 29 Translation and parentheses mme. It was perhaps based on 
such dubious attitude that Ikeda at the last moment made his decision 
on the Chou Hung-ching Asylum Case, s田“Statementon the Chou 
Hung-ching Question”，Public Information and Cultural A百airsBureau, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Gaim悶hoKohyoshu, J阻 1964(cov•町’
ing the latter part of 1963), pp 71-72 
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116〕 Translationmme. In terms of the Peace Treaty and the war-
reparation !Ssues, this is too hurtful to Japan’s interests But Foreign 
Minister Ohira was so curious when he said that“the Sino-Jap叩田e
Peace Treaty has nothing to do with the rights to恒町i加ry(Taiwan〕
on the part of Communist China," Records, Standing Committee for 
Foreign Affairs, Ho田eof Councillors, Jan. 12 (tr田 slat10nand brackets 
mme〕， andhe con自rmedthis on Feb 29, 1964 (id捌〉
117) ltahcs and brackets added For content, see Kajima, Nikon Gaiko no 
Tenbo, op cit., Appendix No. 1, pp 214 218. The Um自edView of LDP 
is nearly the same as this, cf Chapter 8 (Ill). 
118) See supra Chapter 8 (ll), and (!) of this Chapter respectively. 
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CONCLUSION 
Confronted with the Chma Problem, Japan’s position rs 
unique. Tbe uniqueness lies in differences of restrict10ns upon, 
hence of breadth of, States’freedom of act10n in general and 
Japan’s freedom m particular. 
These differences may be observed from political as well as 
iuridical point of view. The characteristics of Japan's position, 
m the last analysis, come from the existence of a peace treaty 
between Japan and the Republic of China. This peace treaty be-
comes the source of bounds of Japan's legal freedom in the Chma 
Problem. And, a peace treaty bemg jund1cal!y basic for post-
war relations between the states parties to it, legal restric-
tions upon Japan's freedom of action, as a matter of risks, come 
to the forefront and occupy a weight at least equal to the 
weight occupied by conceivable political restraints in the same 
Problem (Part II〕
The China Problem JS generally conceived and studied more 
.as a pohtical quest10n than as a juridical one. This is not 
without good reasons. The cardmal distmction of the 3undical 
.aspect of Japan's Chma Problem 1s very except10nal. Compared 
with general freedom of act10n of other states facing this 
Problem (Part I and Part II), Japan’s freedom, hence her posi -
t10n, differs from the positions of other states quahtatively, 
whereas among other states the differences m pos1t10ns, albeit 
mev1table, are only a matter of quantity (degree of freedom to 
.act or not to act m a situation or change thereof (therein), 
which may or may not mvolve change of form or content of the 
・China Problem itself) Japan’s position 1s therefore 'marginal’． 
But there is some danger in any over-emphasis of the juridical 
.aspect of the China Problem, just as there is some danger in 
any over-emphasis of the political aspect of the same Problem 
which has made a vacuum, or an unbalanced condition, in the 
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study of this Problem at the present stage 
If it 1s true that the juridical issues of the China Problem are 
for Japan factors vital to her policy-making, 1t certainly leaves 
little doubt that Japanese policy-makers will resort to do-
mestic (national) consensus (in a broad sense as to include all 
sorts of public opinion〕orits equivalence, 1£ any, as one of the 
determining factors, to Justify their negative policy (inaction〕
toward the Problem, or to make effective their affirmative deci-
sion (action〕necessitatedby change in a situation of the China 
Problem, in the form of active or passive supports of the people, 
at large. National consensus, etc., therefore, if it does not 
take precedence over juridical considerations (risks〕， atleast 
balances the latter. In other words, taking other external environ -
mental conditions as unaltered, and excluding for the time being 
political considerations of reactions from USA and/or-from the・ 
two Chinese policy-target entities vis-a-vis Japan against her 
action/inaction in the Problem, we may say that the Japanese 
Government, when it handles the Chma Situation or any change 
thereof 〔therein),and considers to act or not to act in such 
situation, calculates and Judges on the basis of a balance between 
iuridical risks as a price for Japan’s going beyond the bounds 
of her ‘marginal’position, on the one hand, and domestic 
consensus, on the other hand. From this follow the indivisible 
relations of the marginal position to consensus and/or to 
Japanese Government views/attitudes (Part IV and Part V). 
Thus the most significant feature of Japan’s China policy is 
the mutual check between consideration of juridical nsks, and 
that is the marginal position, and domestic consensus. In the 
context that the present China Problem has always been made 
used of by the Japanese political parties as from the early 1950’S, 
or by the factions within a single party later, both as a chief, 
and in fact an effective, means for domestic political struggle, 
to the State of Japan the nature of this Problem appears more 
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domestic than international. And, if, when dealing with this 
Problem the Japanese Government centers its attention on a 
balance between mternational juridical risks and public opinion 
inside Japan, of necessity it 1s politically compulsory that 1t 
should be very much careful in taking any novel action, that 
is, something which amounts to vital change in the fundamen-
tals of its China policy, lest Japan be endangered as a result 
・of a probable political turmoli; even if internationally the 
juridical risks might be worthy as cost for such novel action. 
This 1s what the Japanese policy-makers, mcluding the 
bureaucrats in the Gaimusho〔theForeign Mimstry〕， aremost 
・in fear. Here lies the very reason why Japan’s China policy 
has been so mact1ve and semi-static for so many years. In 
this sense, Japan’s Chma Problem is m fact Japan’s“Japan 
.Problem" 
This 1s the real question for the present study. This ques-
tion takes the following form: Japan’S position being objec-
・tively (legally〕 marginal,how does (did〕theJapanese people 
respond? how do (did〕theJapanese poilt1cal parties? and how 
does (did) the Japanese Government adjust the one to the 
・Other, and adapt itself to the立1?
The findings of Part IV show that there existed in the Ikeda 
Admmistration some relative national consensus on the China 
Problem. The greatest common measure was a two Chma line 
Tn concrete terms, toward this Problem the Japanese people, 
including the press and the bunkajin〔chishikijin〕， etc.,by and 
large responded in a discernibly similar direction, with a yet 
somewhat vague content agreed among the maiority to main-
tain the present non-recognitwn policy but with a two-China 
line in the perspective. In this regard, of course, there 1s no 
.denial that many are〔were)impatient as a result of the think-
mg, which 1s something in the policy-vacuum, that somehow 
Japan has to maintain relations with both Chmese entities merely 
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because they are“Chinese”. But this may not iustify the 
.opimon that there is no agreement among the Japanese people 
1n their basic attitude toward the China Problem （ιg, Matsu-
moto S., in the Jiyu (Freedom), Apr. 1964, p. 76〕．
One step further, in Part V it is clear that there existed in 
the Ikeda Administrat10n no discrepancies of substance as among 
the polit1cal parties (except JCP and some extreme-left JSP 
members). Such discrepancies, though not at all mythic, were 
too much exaggerated: thus an assertion for uncondit10nal 
recognition of the Mainland Regime of China by Japan, 
which is only the mmority opm10n, has been suggested as 
representmg “public opinion" and, in turn, made a measure 
for desirability of Japan’s China policy. Actually, although 
for the purpose of elections the attitudes assumed by the politi-
・cal parties appear as 1f they were different and uncompro-
mising, such attitudes, be they not always “shows”， must be 
understood from the peculiarity of Japanese politics in which 
・such“difference for differentiat10n's sake" is something m-
.dispensable for the pohtical parties to survive. Accordingly, 
it is an inexcusable mistake to believe the face values of the 
‘formal' attitudes of the Japanese pohtica! parties on the China 
.Probfom, on which to base one’s judgement about the trends. 
Without doubt, 1t would go too far to assume that there is 
(was) no disagreement at al in Japan as among the political 
parties on some points of the Chma Problem. The contrary 1s 
true. There is some sign that disagreement on this Problem 
may m the long run come to the front and may cause a re-
painting of the polit1cal map. The reason for this is that there 
.are too many“willful views which lack m certam common 
understanding and unified judgement" (Royama, International 
Politics and Japan’s Diplomacy CJ) 1959, p. 278). This is a 
serious question for future. What is, however, asserted here is 
rather the significance of informal attitudes/views of mdividual 
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members of these poht1cal part1e.s, especially when they are 
(were〕leadersof certain factions in their own parties From 
this there comes the phenomenon that side by side formal 
disagreements on the vertical “party-level”coexist with inform-
al agreements on the horizontal “individual/fact10nal level”． 
Here we have a scene wherein party-interest is in clash with 
national interest; and our findings in the present study 
convince us that as a general tendency the latter so far pre-
vailed during the Ikeda Administration〔Chapter9). This is 
so, if we take into consideration, besides national consensus, 
that a government responsible to a peopleロrnstconsider ra-
t10nahty, contmmty, and consistency of its foreign policy, 
reactions from the target-entities, and restraints from friendly 
states. National consensus is therefore not all and everything, 
nor is an agreement, express or tacit, among the political 
parties in Japan. Over-simplification of Japan’S posit10n in the 
China Situat10n and abuse in criticizing as a result of surplus 
of freedom, are the two main defects of many Japanese leaders 
of al circles . .This might lead to a situation highly detrimental 
to Japan, in the sense that a solution of the Chma Problem at 
the present stage may be no more than・ a deterioration of the 
Chma Problem. In one word, while a solut10n to a problem is only 
the means to an end, many a Japanese take a solution to the 
China Problem for an end m itself In this context, Japan’s 
China policy m the Ikeda period, though it was one of inaction 
-a policy not to do anything, was a good, if not the best, 
policy. It seems that Ikeda’s this ment has so far not been 
justly evaluated or properly appreciated by the critics. 
Lurking behmd this“maction”policy was a special technique 
used by the Japanese Government m the Ikeda period (and this 
is still so used by it m the present Sato Admmistrat10n). It 
was a technique of impudent attack and defence at the same 
time, but within bounds, to accumulate as much as possible 
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the gains and to await a timing for change. This fitted Ikeda’s 
taste, adapts to Japan’s marginal position and smts the present 
fluidity of the China Situation. Ikeda was therefore successful 
to an invis1hly great extent. Concretely, once more, his policy 
was a de facto two China line, translated in the fact of 
maintainmg formal diplomatic relat10ns with ROC under 
an implied coerc10n of getting closer to the Mainland Regime 
of China; and in the fact of usmg this formal diplomatic 
relation as a shield to bar any demand concerning the Second 
World War which the Mainland Regime would not give up, 
when Japan stretched toward the latter all relations except 
the formal ones. Although the accumulat10n process was grad-
ual, and from time to time was stopped due to US check, to 
ROC violent protest, and to unfavourable reactions from the 
Mainland Regime, the gain had nonetheless been very re-
markable. Avoidmg drastic act10n which would bring with risks, 
Japan was making a two-Chma s1tuat10n through fait accompli, 
with the hope that some state would turn this into a de jure 
situation at best timing, without Japan's taking the initiative. 
Internationally, this released Japan from risks, on the one 
hand, and made it possible for her to avoid getting into con-
flict with USA on the China Problem (the one like France 
did in early 1964), on the other hand. Domestically, this line 
was also useful for the Japanese Government as a sign that 
public opm10n had been respected, that Japan's national in-
terest had been protected, and that one of Japan’s serious 
problem-trade with Mainland一hadbeen promoted as much as 
possible Under the circumstances, the opposition parties and 
the press were deprived of convincing reasons for strong attacks 
agamst the government on its Chma policy as a whole. This 
is perhaps an explanation why Japan’s semi-static Chrna policy 
could be maintained for so many years with the opposition 
parties always remainmg passive. In this picture, the Japanese 
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Government in the Ikeda per・10dsucceeded m its trial to keep 
a balance between Japan’s margmal posit10n and national 
consensus; and the above technique used may be termed a 
”guerrilla-style two-Chma line" Although Japan demes this from 
time to time, the fact remams true that there is no other state 
on earth that has led so potentially influential in crystallising 
a two-China •lituation. 
To many this may souud unpleasant, at least strange. But it 
must be reminded that the fact that Japan has been pushing 
forward such an underground two-Chma policy towards the 
China Situation is no novelty at al. To state adversely, for Japan 
present a two-Chma line has rather been a general rule. At least 
as early as from the Tanaka Cabinet of the 1920治〔Tadamiya,
Showa no Seijika (The Statesmen of the Showa Period) 1963, 
p. 17〕， whenthe phenomenon of dual-or multi government in 
China had not been exceptional, there had been too many 
diplomatic precedents of this kmd, which indeed impress one 
deeply that Japan’s China policy has a tradition of making a 
split-China by whatever means available 
The categorical reason for this tradition has been the fear of 
a unified and strong China (Kmdai Nihon no Gaiko, op. cit , p. 
191). And, on this point, for better or worse historical repeti-
t10ns have made Japan an excellent expert by habit. This long 
tradit10n/habit could not be thrown away overnight by Ikeda, 
less can this be done by the bureaucrats in the Gaimusho which 
always respects its own policy continuity (cf Horita, m the 
Economist (J) New Year Special Issue for 1965, p. 34, North-
edge，“The Divided Mind of Japan" in the Yearbook of World 
Affairs, 1957, p. 170). In this sense, it is true that the Ikeda 
Admimstration was faithful to Japan’s diplomatic tradition on 
the China Problem, and that its lme is to Japan’s national 
interest (Foreign Mimster Kosaka’S Policy Speech before the 
40th Ordinary Session of the Diet, Jan. 19, 1962, see Gaimusho 
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Press Releases, 1962, p. 5) 
The characteristic of Japan’s two-Chma policy m the Ikeda 
period is that it was the result of Japan’s marginal position. 
This means that the two-China policy as conceived by the top 
policy-makers durmg the Ikeda Admmistrat10n had as its 
subiect matter the contmumg existence of the ROC on Taiwan 
and another China, and that 1s, the Mainland Regime at the 
other side of the Taiwan Straits, with ROC as the tradit10nal 
Chma, hence the latter a new entity. This is the rational con-
clusion of Japan's margmal pos1t10n. It 1s clearly not the same 
in content as the two Chma line conceived by policy-makers 
of USA which has no tradition of making a spl!t-Chma and 
which on the present Chma Situation might prefer a“one-
Taiwan, one-Chma”line because of different motive and aim. 
Such difference is understandable , it is the result of difference 
in positions of the two states in face of the Chma Situation. From 
this it follows that weights put on the issues of the China. 
Problem are also dissimilar to each other: while Japan gives 
primacy to the JSsue of UN Representation, USA gives primacy 
to the issue of Recognition. This in the two-China line would 
take the form of difference that, while Japan prefers to push 
this lme m the UN, USA prefers to realise it through recogni-
t10n. To some extent, these differences, reported as “delicated” 
and “potential”， were admitted by the authorities concerned of 
the two states after the Oh1ra-Rusk Talk in Tokyo (Jan. 27, 
1964) when they were confronted with the drastic change of 
situat10n-France’s recogmtion of the Mamland Regime of 
China. 
This seems to be adiustable. However, with change m 
international environment and in Japan's domestic political 
s1tuat10n this may well become matter of prmciple 
We do not predict here, because prediction about the China 
Problem at the present stage is highly dangerous. Nevertheless, 
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something is not indiscernible at al. 
If an exaggerat10n be allowed, the Chma Problem is for Japan 
the pronoun for her traditional diplomacy, both m importance 
and in frequency. From historical, geographical, economic, cul -
tural, and ethnic viewpoints, before the Chma Problem, by fate 
Japan belongs to the absolute 回 tegory. Leaving to Japan no 
choice in this regard is her marginal position as a result of the 
Second World War. But this is not al. Owmg to great changes 
of world situation after 1952 and to Japan’s success m economic 
field, Japan has become a leading power m the Far East. Thus 
she leads, or is on the way of makmg herself to lead, in this 
area in the matter of balancing, not to say striving agamst, 
the power of the Mainland Regime of China. This power-rela-
tion makes Japan to belong to the relative category in the 
Chma Problem. Thus Japan is at the same time a state of the 
absolute and the relative categories. This naturally makes 
Japan conscious of her own importance among, if not of a sense 
of saviour of, the Free World states in the Far East Such 
consciousness is of course no trifle, and when it adds to the 
cherished national volition of “independence m foreign affairs”， 
which has been the long-range aim since the Yoshida Admims-
tration of the early 1950’s, Japan’s China policy and that of USA 
would encounter in a new sense, for the reason that USA 
belongs to the relative category while Japan belongs to both 
categories, if for no better reasons. 
Inside Japan, changes on the political stage after 1964 have 
shown a strong pressure toward such new encounter. Such 
pressure may or may not push the pomt to a total departure on 
the part of Japan from US China policy, but for reasons already 
given it is qmte certain that Japan’s resistance will never be 
weakened. However, this does not mean that the men m the 
Foreign Ministry will try to engage Japan in some drastic change 
of policy lme even if the form and content of the present China 
705 
Problem remain unchanged. For, the Japanese top policy. 
makers, advised by the figures of the Gaimusho, know well 
Japan’s own position and are aware of the fact that the China 
Problem is not susceptible of being solved by any single state, 
pending vital change of world environment. Even Japan be left 
free on this Problem, she 、;vil not try to pick up the chestnuts 
out of the fire 
Thus, about future tendencies possibilities may be suggested. 
(1) If the Ch1rta Situat10n remains fluid and if world envir-
onment (the determmate factor being the war m Vietnam) 
remams unchanged－一
Considering Japan's own safety and her friendship with the 
Free World countries, in the foreseeable future there seems no 
good reason for her to commit herself in a change of some 
essentials of her China policy. There are good reasons for us to 
say that, from now on Japan will substantiate her two Chma lme 
as her decis10n-makers conceive it; This means that the Ikeda-line 
(more properly, the lme laid down by Kishi and concretized by 
Ikeda) would remain the guide, although there might be gradual 
change of quantity (accumulation of gains m getting close to the 
Mainland Regime through trade, etc ) in the same lme ; and the 
Yoshida Letter of 19臼 onthe quest10n of〔restrictionson) trade 
with the Mainland would doubtlessly become the hot issue This 
is .perhaps what the then Japanese ambassador to USA Takeuchi 
meant, when he said, m connection with French recognition of 
the Mainland Regime of China, that “Such question (solution of 
the China Problem〕isnot one that should be determined today 
-Or tomorrow”（Address before the San Francisco Commonwealth 
Club, Feb. 25, 1964; The Asahi Shimbun, Feb. 26, 1964〕
(2〕Ifsome vital changes m the mternational environment 
appear (mcludmg vital changes inside the Mamland）ーーー
Japan’s domestic pressure would not remain only potential, 
but would come up to the surface and make itself a much 
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more vital factor for the Japanese Government to seriously 
reconsider its China policy. But, other things being equal, Japan’s 
domestic s1tuat10n in future would stil be subiect to inter-
national environment; therefore, so long as there will be some 
factors yet undetermmed the Japanese Government would stop 
at the stage of “serious re-considerat10n”． 
In this regard, the question as to what degree of change in 
the internat10nal environment might push the Japanese Govern-
ment to step over the !me of“serious re・consideration”， is
one for the moment nobody can answer What may safely be 
said 1s perhaps this, that, if there be another recognition-
typhoon of 1964 there would highly probably be an answer to 
this question In this case, again, other thmgs bemg equal, 
there would be a direct clash between Japan and USA. But this 
does not exclude a poss1b11ity that USA would, strangely but 
not unnaturally m the world of reason(s) of State, turn to 
follow Japan’s line. For, after al, on the Chma Problem it 
seems truer that it is Japan, and no more USA, that now holds 
the casting vote. 
